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The Madras Soldier
1746—1946

THE MADRAS SOLDIER OF 1946—JEMADAR PAKIANATHAN, M.M.

4th Battn., The Madras Regt. (W.L.I.)

The Madras Soldier

1746—1946

By

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Late Madras Regiment and Civil Liaison Officer
Madras Presidency and South Indian States
1940—45

With a Foreword by

Sir CLAUDE AUCHINLECK

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Commander-in-Chief in India

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DEDICATED

TO

THE PEOPLES OF SOUTH INDIA

IN

GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE

OF

FORTY-THREE YEARS

HAPPY ASSOCIATION

FOREWORD

I am very glad that Colonel Phythian-Adams, himself an old soldier of the Madras Army, has written this book about the Madras Soldier. When I myself first joined the Indian Army in 1904, the battalion to which I was posted, the 62nd Punjabis, had very recently been raised as a brand new Punjabi unit on the ashes of the old 2nd Madras Infantry which had an unbroken record of service in many wars from 1759.

Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief at that time, repeated this process with many battalions of the old Madras Line, as he thought they were no longer worth a place in the modern Army of India. There is no doubt that he had some justification for this opinion. But the fault was not that of the Madras soldier. The inevitable and continuous movement of India's frontier further and further to the West, and the increasing enrolment in the Army of the men of the Punjab and of the North-West Frontier, had made service in the old Madras Army, dull and unfashionable. The natural result was that the quality of its British officers tended to deteriorate. The best material in the World will not make good soldiers unless it has good officers.

So for a period, with the outstanding and resounding exception of the Madras Sappers and Miners, famed on many a battle field, the old Madras units eventually disappeared completely as such, though their badges and battle honours continued to be borne by their successor units manned by soldiers from the North.

The wheel has now turned full circle and during the last World War, I am glad to say, Madras contributed half a million soldiers to the Army of India, especially in the greatly

expanded Indian Artillery. The Madras Regiment of Infantry was raised and proved itself in battle. A large number of men from the South served with fortitude and great distinction in the Signal Corps, in Motor Transport units, the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and other Corps including the Pioneer Corps, from Italy to Sumatra. The Madras Sappers emerged from this last colossal struggle with an even higher reputation than before.

It is not easy to foretell the future of the Armies of India, but if present plans mature, the Madras soldier including those from Cochin and Travancore, will have a full share in the defence of his country.

The 16th Light Cavalry raised about 1780 as the 3rd Regiment of Madras Cavalry is once again composed of soldiers from Madras who drive and fight the tanks which have replaced the horses and sabres of the days of Wellesley—the "Sepoy-General." There are several regiments of Artillery of all calibres manned by men from Madras. The Madras Sappers go from strength to strength, and the Madras Regiment carries on the name and fame of the old Madras Infantry, while the Signal Corps and other corps of the Army all hold their quota of Southern Indians, who total to-day about one-fifth of the whole strength of the Army of India. May they always live up to their great traditions of the past—Loyalty, Steadfastness, Courage and Endurance in adversity.

C. J. AUCHINLECK,
Field Marshal.

1947.

FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION

It gives me the greatest pleasure to write a foreword to Lieutenant-Colonel Phythian-Adams' excellent history of the Madras Infantry,—a history which rescues these regiments from the undeserved neglect which they have suffered at the hands of historians.

The exploits of the Madras Sappers and Miners are known to military historians the world over, but it is not always realized that the corps was developed from the ordinary Madras Infantry regiments whose story is so ably told in this book.

It is a story which goes back nearly 200 years. Starting from a nucleus of local levies, such as those led by Clive, fifty-two Infantry regiments and one Rifle Regiment of Madras Infantry were raised between 1758 and 1826. They served in the wars against the French in the Carnatic, and in all the four Mysore Wars which marked successive stages in the long forty years struggle against Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan of Mysore. In the second of these wars they were commanded by Sir Eyre Coote; in the fourth, in which Colonel Wellesley (afterwards Duke of Wellington) was one of the subordinate commanders, they took part in the storming of Seringapatam in 1799. General Wellesley (as he had then become) chose them for service in the First Mahratta War in which they played a great part at the Battle of Assaye in 1803. They saw jungle fighting, now of such topical interest, in the First and Second Burmese Wars, stood firm and did much to turn the tide in the dark days of the Bengal Mutiny of 1857, and went to Burma again for the Third Burmese War. In the Great War their now depleted ranks

were reinforced by eight temporary battalions, and they saw service in Mesopotamia and East Africa and on the frontier. In the present war large forces of Madras Infantry have been raised. Indeed at the present time the Madras Presidency holds the proud distinction of contributing more recruits to the armed forces than any other Province or State in India.

During this long period various regiments of the Madras Infantry have earned the appreciation of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, received the thanks of Parliament, and been commended by the Secretary of State, the Viceroy, and the Commander-in-Chief, besides being mentioned on many occasions by the Madras Government. By 1919 they had been awarded no fewer than twenty-eight battle honours.

Such in brief outline is the inspiring story which Lieutenant-Colonel Phythian-Adams has told with such skill. Its inspiration derives from the innumerable instances of fidelity and courage which occur in it. The Madras infrantryman could be relied upon to hold out to the last against desperate odds, as in Baillie's defeat at Perambakkam in 1780, to fight with dash and daring at the Battle of Assaye in 1803, and to cope undismayed with all the strangeness of jungle warfare in Burma. These splendid services were rendered under hard conditions, with pay several years in arrears, and supply frequently wanting and generally precarious.

Thus the newly raised Madras Infantry regiments have great traditions behind them. I have no doubt that, given proper leadership, they will once again demonstrate the great qualities of their forebears, and prove themselves the equals of any fighting men anywhere.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
GUINDY,
13*th October* 1943.

ARTHUR HOPE,
Governor of Madras.

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CORRIGENDA.

Page ii, line 5.—*For* " 1947 " *read* " 1948

Page viii, line 17.—*For* " infrantry man " *read* " infantry man

Page xi, line 22.—*For* " magnificient " *read* " magnificent

Page 28, *line* 12 *from bottom.*—*For* " Cuddallore " *read* " Cuddalore ".

Page 34, *line* 8 *from bottom.*—*For* " Corwallis " *read* " Cornwallis ".

Page 48, *line* 4.—*For* " morally " *read* " mortally ", and *for* " himsellf " *read* " himself ".

Page 49, *line* 3.—*For* " no " *read* " not ".

Page 53, *line* 8 *from bottom.*—*For* " destrying " *read* " destroying ".

Page 54, *line* 15 *from bottom.*—*For* " Carnotic " *read* " Carnatic ".

Page 56, *line* 9.—*For* " Maharatta " *read* " Mahratta ".

Page 60, *line* 15 *from bottom.*—*For* " Europens " *read* " Europeans ".

Page 117, *line* 11 *from bottom.*—*For* " Indian " *read* " Indians ".

Page 120, *line* 16.—*For* " visulised " *read* " visualised ".

Page 120, *line* 22.—*For* " belong " *read* " beyond ".

Page 121, *line* 9 *from bottom.*—*For* " intolarably " *read* " intolerably ".

Page 124, *line* 5 *from bottom.*—*For* " sucecssors " *read* " successors ".

Page 126, *line* 13.—*For* " casualities " *read* " casualties ".

Page 130, *line* 15.—*For* " year " *read* " years ".

Page 156, *line* 8.—*For* " Infantary " *read* " Infantry ".

Page 156, *line* 24.—*For* " 65 " *read* " 65th ".

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Page 172, *line* 9 *from bottom.*—After "34th " *insert* " Madras ".

Page 179, *line* 2.—*For* " Battallion " *read* " Battalion ".

Page 180.—*Delete* brackets against " Afghanistan 1878–80 " and " Burma 1885–87 ".

Page 203, *line* 7 *from bottom.*—*For* " Receipient " *read* " Recipient ".

Page 206, *line* 1.—*For* " Receipient " *read* " Recipient ".

INTRODUCTION

My most grateful thanks are due to Sir Claude Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief in India, for so kindly writing a foreword to this book. His unrivalled knowledge of all classes enlisted into the Indian Army renders all the more valuable the tribute which he pays to the Madras Soldier.

In its original form this work dealt only with Madras Infantry, but in response to many requests, and in order to have a permanent record of Madras' magnificent war effort, the present edition has been revised and greatly expanded so as to cover not only the Infantry, but also the Cavalry, Artillery, and Sappers and Miners, while the story is carried down to 1946. A special chapter has been added on Seringapatam 1799, the importance of which seems largely to have escaped notice. It is true that the Duke of Wellington never referred to it in after-years, but his unfortunate experience at Sultanpet possibly was not without influence in this connection.

In this epic of two centuries I have attempted to show how the Madras Army from small beginnings gradually grew into a great fighting force with magnificient traditions, its decline almost to extinction, and then the amazing come-back staged by the Madras Soldier in the 2nd World War. Attention has throughout been focussed on the Madrassi and little has in consequence been said of his British officers, but through the story runs the thread of trust and devotion on one side, and of sympathy and leadership on the other. The time is now fast approaching when this wonderful *camaraderie* of 200 years will come to an end, but experience in the last war shows that Madras can produce an excellent type of officer, though at present limited in numbers, and there is no reason whatever why the Madrassi under the leadership of men of his own race should prove himself any less efficient as a fighting man, than he has done under British officers.

The story I have told is one of fact and not fancy, and every endeavour has been made to ensure historical accuracy. It has been compiled from that standard work Colonel Wilson's *History of the Madras Army*, from regimental histories and digests of services, from official records, and from contemporary accounts of the various campaigns; a bibliography of books consulted is included to encourage further study by those interested in the subject. To facilitate reference to the precis of units, the Infantry battalions have generally been referred to as *M.I.*, even before they were officially thus designated, while places and surnames, as in the first edition, have in most cases been spelt in accordance with the practice in vogue in earlier times.

The Appendix giving lists of decorations awarded for gallantry has been compiled from Madras Government Orders and from information supplied by Regimental Centres; awards to the Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force have also been included. As one who served for so many years with the Madras Soldier in peace and war, and who has the highest admiration and affection for him, I have done my best to make these lists complete, but if any names have inadvertently been omitted I tender to the recipients my regrets.

My best thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Murland for kind permission to make full use of his *Baillie-ki-paltan*, to Rao Bahadur Dr. B. S. Baliga, PH.D. (Lond.), Curator, Madras Record Office, for most useful information on obscure points, to Professor E. E. Speight for literary advice, to the Reverend Edmund Bull for assistance in historical details, and to many of my Indian friends for their help and encouragement.

KALHATTI, NILGIRIS, 15*th June* 1947.

E. G. PHYTHIAN-ADAMS, *Lieut.-Colonel.*

THE MADRAS SOLDIER, 1746—1946

CHAPTER I

Origin and Progress

The entrances of the elder world were
Wide and sure and brought immortal fruit.
II Esdras 7-13.

The town of Madras was founded in 1639 and the first Fort St. George in 1644, but the Military History of the Presidency does not commence till more than a century later. During the first hundred years of its existence the Company, recognizing that war was bad for trade, endeavoured to avoid fighting whenever possible, and maintained the minimum of armed force necessary for local protection. Thus it happened that when war broke out between England and France in 1744 the Company found themselves unsupplied with adequate means of defence, and the town of Madras fell an easy prey to the French Forces in 1746, in the absence of any help from the Nawab of Arcot. The Government of the Coromandel Coast thus devolved on the Governor and Council of Fort St. David at Cuddalore, who immediately began to raise troops, and the movement then commenced has continued with varying fluctuations to the present time.

The first sepoy levies had no discipline and were armed with matchlocks, bows and arrows, spears, swords or any other weapons they could get. They consisted of bodies of various strength, each under the command of its own chief, who received from Government the pay of the whole body and distributed it to the men. As time went on some improvement took place in discipline, while the best Indian officers were appointed as Commandants. Muskets were issued in place of matchlocks and the men acquired some idea of drill. As the result of careful selection of the officers under whom they were placed and constant service in the field in association with European troops, they rapidly improved and soon showed their worth in action under Major Stringer Lawrence, who has recorded his high opinion of their services. Incidentally it may

be noted that the French Government at Pondicherry had raised some 5,000 sepoy troops as far back as 1739 to meet a threatened attack by the Mahrattas, and many of these were at a later date incorporated in the Madras Army.

In 1756 the Nawab of Bengal took Calcutta, and the Madras Government sent every man they could spare under Clive to re-establish the Company's affairs in Bengal, in spite of the fact that the renewal of war between England and France was imminent and a large French force was daily expected on the coast of Coromandel. The expected event materialized in 1758 and the Madras Government found themselves in a position of extreme danger. They could not meet the enemy in the field, Fort St. David was captured, and the French advanced to besiege Madras. This seems to have opened the eyes of the Madras Government to the need for increasing their sepoy forces and to the advantage of giving them better discipline. In August 1758 they were formed into regular companies of 100 men each with a due proportion of Indian Officers, Havildars, Naiks, etc., and in January of the following year it was decided to form these companies into five battalions with a European Subaltern to each and a Captain to command the whole.* Other battalions were raised during the next six years, till in 1765 the establishment was fixed at ten, and by 1767 increased to sixteen battalions. By 1826 its strength had grown to eight regiments of Light Cavalry, a corps of Artillery, two European regiments, fifty-two regiments of Infantry and two battalions of Pioneers, while the constant warfare of the previous half century had brought it to the top of its form; it would in fact have been difficult to find anywhere a finer fighting force of all arms.

Though it had no share in the campaigns in Northern India between 1839 and 1848 its efficiency remained unimpaired, and the Madras units employed in the 2nd Burma War of 1852–54, the Bengal Mutiny, and the 2nd China War of 1857–60 gave an excellent account of themselves. When the East India Company's rule came to an end and its armed forces were transferred to the

* These were mostly seconded from the King's service with a step in rank. They were of a better class, better educated and above all had far more military experience than the Company's officers.

Crown, it would not have been unreasonable to expect that the services of the Madras army would be recognised by an increase of establishment, but the opposite proved to be the case, and between 1860 and 1864, no less than four regiments of cavalry and twelve of infantry were disbanded. Behind all this lies a story. From the earliest days the authorities in Northern India had been hostile to and jealous of the minor Presidencies. When on field service the Bengal sepoys received double batta, while those of Madras and Bombay were given only half or at most the single allowance. Bengal sepoys were awarded medals for the campaigns in the Carnatic, Mysore, Ceylon, etc., while Madras and Bombay troops serving alongside them were excluded. The fact that the Madras Cavalry and Infantry regiments were senior to those of Bengal had always been a sore point, and the despatch of Madras officers to quell the mutiny of the Bengal officers in 1766 further embittered relations, while the loyalty of the Madras Soldier in 1857 was also, illogically enough, an added cause of offence. Bengal in fact suffered from what we should now call a most unpleasant superiority complex, which in due course was passed on to the Punjab. The policy of the Supreme Government after 1860 was therefore to relegate the Madras army to internal security duties in the south of the Peninsula, and to deny it practically all chances of active service. A period of decline naturally set in, so far as the Infantry was concerned, though the Sappers and Miners under excellent officers continued to maintain their high reputation. Promotion was blocked by transfers of men from disbanded regiments, and recruiting suffered, since men of suitable physique and soldierly instincts will not enlist in an army which is seldom if ever sent on active service, and which whenever it is so employed is relegated to police work and guard duties on the lines of communication. Unfortunately at the same time preference was given in some units to the tall weedy type of recruit, who might indeed compare more favourably in appearance on parade with the sepoys of Northern India, but who most certainly lacked the essential guts of a soldier, and could not stand extremes of climate. It was this type of man which gave Lord Roberts when Commander-in-Chief of Madras, such a poor opinion of the Madras Soldier, though it must be

remembered that he was a Bengali born and bred, and so not likely to be favourably impressed in any case. But above all the quality of the British officers deteriorated, since the more ambitious naturally gravitated to the Punjab, which seemed to offer the only chances of advancement.

When the 3rd Burma War broke out in 1885 and Madras regiments were at last, after an interval of nearly 30 years, again given an opportunity of active service, the men were totally inexperienced in war, and their British officers much the same, while they had to start straight away with jungle warfare, trying even to soldiers trained to it. Some regiments did well from first to last, and as has been said elsewhere it does not appear that more regrettable incidents occurred to Madras troops than to those of other Presidencies. But such as did occur were seized on with avidity by those in Northern India, who still suffered from the old Bengal complex, with the result that in addition to eight regiments mustered out in 1852, a further seven were converted into Burma battalions between 1890 and 1892 and reconstituted with Gurkhas and Punjabis. With the notable exception of the Sappers and Miners and Pioneers, the remaining battalions were now relegated to garrison duties, and for the reasons already given it became more and more difficult to attract recruits, while the quality of their British officers still further deteriorated, since it became the practice to send to a Madras regiment British officers who had been tried out on the frontier and for one reason or another, been found wanting.

When the Indian army was reorganized and renumbered in 1903, Lord Kitchener ordered further reductions in the infantry, while the Madrassi element was almost entirely eliminated from the cavalry. The three Pioneer regiments were maintained at full strength as units of the field army, but the 8 Carnatic battalions were placed on a reduced establishment of 600, and though they were not informed of the fact, relegated to garrison duty, even in time of war.

Between 1914 and 1918 war requirements necessitated the despatch of Madras regiments overseas, and those that managed to work their way up to the Field army, showed that under good

officers, the Madrassi was as fine as ever. Recruits of a type which had not been seen in any number for a generation poured forth in an unending stream, and eight new Pioneer and Infantry battalions were raised. By 1920 it was generally recognized that the Madrassi had made good, and in the post-war army it was at first proposed to retain ten Infantry battalions in addition to the Sappers and Miners and the Pioneer Group. But the old complex, inherited by the Punjab from the days of the Bengal army still persisted, and finally the share of Madras in the infantry was whittled down by half and the remaining battalions mustered out. The 3rd Madras Regiment thus formed was however destined to survive only for a few years, the axe being again applied on the grounds of economy, and in 1928 the sole remaining battalion, which had just been tried out on the North-West Frontier with marked success, lacking an advocate at Army Headquarters, disappeared from the Army List. In 1933 Pioneers were abolished throughout the Indian army and in consequence the Madras Pioneer Group was mustered out. A small remnant of two Indian officers and 100 I.O.Rs. was however retained as " A Company Madras Pioneers " and attached to the 14th Field Regiment R.A. After training it became the first (Madras) Battery Indian Artillery, and thus formed an unbroken link between the Royal Indian Artillery of to-day and the old Coast Army. On the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the only Madrassi units in the Indian Army thus were one battery of Indian Artillery, the Corps of Madras Sappers and Miners, two signal companies, and four Territorial battalions which had been formed in 1921–22. But the urgent need for fresh troops and the never-failing readiness of the Madrassi to enlist in time of war, added to the threat of invasion of their homeland, soon caused a reversal of the current. In 1941 the four Territorial battalions were converted into regulars and many new Madras units in almost every branch of the service were raised, the comparatively higher education and intelligence of the Madrassi making him specially suitable for the artillery, signals, and mechanized transport, so that by the beginning of 1945 the number of Madrassis serving with the Armed Forces in and out of India exceeded manyfold the establishment of the old

Coast Army even at its zenith. Being given a fair chance under officers who were prepared to take the men as they found them, the Madrassi once again proved that as a fighting man he was the equal of any in India. Before the War ended the Madras Presidency and the South Indian States had provided more than 500,000 men which made up nearly a quarter of the Indian Army and more than half the Royal Indian Navy, as well as a large proportion of the Royal Indian Air Force, in addition to over 100,000 recruited for Civil Pioneer Corps and Labour Units. A list of all Madras units of Company strength or over raised during the War will be found in Appendix A, and the recruitment figures for the Madras Presidency and South Indian States in Appendix C. Madras may well be proud not only of its magnificent war effort, but also that the bitter memory of past injustices was not allowed to prejudice the issue in India's hour of need.

CHAPTER II

War Services

Troops who never turned in battle, fierce as fire and strong and brave,
Guarded well his lofty ramparts as the lion guards the cave.

RAMAYANA, BOOK I, CHAPTER 1.

French War—1746—48

When the French attacked Fort St. George in 1746, the garrison consisted of only 150 Europeans and some peons, and the defences were extremely weak. The French, on the other hand, were in overwhelming strength, and their morale was high, in consequence of reports received a short time before from France to the effect that the greater part of Britain had been over-run, and that the Young Pretender would shortly be seated on the throne of England—the news of Culloden was not received until long after. The French had acquired in Europe a high reputation as soldiers, and the Nawab of Arcot, in consequence, was not inclined to aid the English. The inevitable result was that after three days bombardment Fort St. George surrendered, and only Fort St. David at Cuddalore remained to represent the possessions of the East India Company in the Carnatic.

The garrison of that place consisted of about 200 Europeans, some of whom had escaped from Madras, and 100 Topasses.* To augment it, an irregular force of about 2,000 sepoys was raised and armed with all the weapons available; and thus commenced the history of the Madras Army.

In December 1746 the French forces appeared before Cuddalore and were about to attack it, when the advance of the Nawab's army to intervene compelled them to retire. The attempt was renewed in the following year, but again failed due to the arrival of the English fleet with reinforcements. Three months later the French attempted to carry the town of Cuddalore by escalade, but their design having become known, preparations were made for their reception, and they were repulsed with loss.

* Half-caste Portugese, not to be confused with the R.I.N. Topass of to-day, whose duties though no less meritorious, are of a fundamentally different nature.

In the meantime Major Stringer Lawrence arrived from England as Commander-in-Chief, and strong reinforcements having been brought out by the English fleet, the tide turned and it was decided to attack Pondicherry. But the siege was mismanaged and Admiral Boscawen who was in command was compelled to raise it after suffering heavy casualties. Major Lawrence unfortunately had been taken prisoner early in the operations, and no other experienced military officer was available, otherwise the result might have been more favourable. It was during this siege that Clive first served in a military capacity.

1749—54

In 1749 in accordance with the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Madras was restored to the English, but hostilities were soon renewed for control of the Carnatic. Dupleix, Governor of Pondicherry, elated by his easy victory over the Nawab's forces at the battle of Adyar, dreamed of setting up a French empire in India, and in furtherance of his views gave armed support to Chanda Sahib, who claimed the Nawabship of the Carnatic. The English Company, from motives of self-preservation, were compelled to support the rival claimant Mahomed Ali, and the French and English forces acting as mercenaries on either side were constantly engaged during the four years following, though their respective countries were at peace in Europe.

This unofficial war lasted from 1750 to 1754, with the Mysore and Mahratta forces engaged sometimes on the one side and some times on the other; it witnessed many gallant feats of arms and some reverses, but is chiefly notable for bringing into prominence Major Stringer Lawrence, who has well been termed the "Father of the Indian Army" and his able subordinate Captain Clive. The leadership which had been lacking in the past now came to the front, and under it the Madras soldier was to prove what he became and is to-day—a fighting man of the highest quality.

The first action of the campaign was an attempt to recover Madura which had been seized by a partisan of Chanda Sahib, thus depriving the Nawab of half of his revenues. Captain Cope was accordingly sent from Trichinopoly in February 1751 with

150 Europeans and 400 sepoys to recover the place. He had with him only one 12 pr. and a few field pieces, but with these he managed to breach to some extent the inner wall through an opening in the ruinous outer rampart. All the shot for the breaching gun having been expended, an attempt was made to storm, though the breach was only partially practicable, with the help of scaling ladders. The first wall was passed without resistance, but at the foot of the breach were three men in complete armour, who inflicted considerable casualties before they were disposed of. The breach was then mounted in face of very heavy fire, but it had been cut off by the defenders by a wall behind, and on either side by palisades of horizontal palm trees, through the interstices of which the defenders thrust their long spears in complete immunity. After a hand to hand struggle for half an hour the attempt was abandoned, the sepoys having lost two-thirds of their number, and many Europeans having been killed and wounded. Captain Cope having burst his battering gun retreated to Trichinopoly which he reached unmolested on the 10th April. His failure was attributed to his notorious bad luck, while the real reason, the strength of the place and the courage of its defenders, was not realized till further repulses had occurred in 1757 and 1763.

This set-back to the English arms was followed by another near Volcondah where Captain Gingens had been sent to bar the French advance on Trichinopoly. The troops, both European and Indian, were unaccustomed to operations in the field, and their officers lacked both experience and spirit. After an initial success Captain Gingens was forced to withdraw to Trichinopoly with the loss of much of his baggage.

Trichinopoly was now closely besieged by Chanda Sahib and the French, and to create a diversion Captain Clive was sent to seize Arcot. The plan succeeded and the siege of Trichinopoly was raised, but Clive who had expected at most a blockade, was himself besieged from the 25th September to the 14th November, and the gallant defence of Arcot will always be associated with his name.

At the commencement of the siege, the troops fit for duty consisted of 120 Europeans and 200 sepoys, with two 18 prs. and

three field pieces, while the enemy force amounted to 150 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, 3,000 horse and 5,000 armed peons with numerous guns. Two practicable breaches had been made in the crumbling walls, and the enemy, learning of the approach of a relieving force, made a most determined effort to storm the place on the morning of the 13th November. Simultaneously with the attacks on the breaches, parties advanced against the gates accompanied by elephants whose foreheads were protected by plates of iron, while others applied scaling ladders to different accessible parts of the ruinous walls. But every effort of the assailants was met by a withering fire of musketry and from two field pieces, while the crowds beneath the ramparts were dispersed by shells with short fuzes being thrown among them. In front of the south-west breach the ditch was not fordable and seventy men attempted to cross it by a raft, but a few rounds from the field pieces upset the raft and caused such casualties that the attempt was abandoned. At last after these attacks had continued for more than an hour, the enemy drew off, having lost not less than 400 killed and wounded. The effective strength of the garrison at this time was only 80 Europeans and 120 sepoys, and these besides serving the field pieces, fired no less than 12,000 rounds of ball cartridge. It was during this siege that the sepoys proved their devotion by giving up their rice to the Europeans, and subsisting themselves on the water in which it had been boiled.

After the raising of the siege, Clive defeated the French at Arni and then withdrew to Fort St. David, but was in the field again early in 1752 when he came up with the French at Cauveripauk at sunset, the first intimation of their presence being a heavy fire from nine guns directed on his advance guard. Ordering his baggage to the rear and the infantry to take cover, Clive detached some guns to hold the enemy cavalry in check, while his three remaining field pieces maintained an unequal contest with the French battery. The action continued for two hours by moonlight and the Madras gunners had suffered such heavy casualties that a retreat seemed inevitable unless the French guns could be carried. Fortunately it was ascertained from a Sergeant who had been sent with two sepoys to reconnoitre, that the enemy's rear

was unguarded, and Clive detached 200 Europeans and 400 sepoys, who succeeded in gaining their objective undetected, and poured in a heavy volley at close range on the unsuspecting French. This decided the action and the French force fled in panic, abandoning everything. Meanwhile at Trichinopoly the Nawab had been joined by the Mahrattas under Morari Rao, and by forces from Mysore and Tanjore, but neither side had shown any initiative and Major Lawrence was sent with a strong detachment to overwhelm the French before they could receive reinforcements from Europe. The capture of the outlying posts of Lalgudi, Coilady and Pitchanda shut the French force completely in the island of Srirangam, and an attempt at relief having failed, they were compelled to surrender. Chanda Sahib was among the prisoners and was shortly after put to death. It was during these operations that Clive so narrowly escaped death in the night attack on Samiaveram, when the Sergeants on either side of him were killed. This victory left Pondicherry practically undefended, but the English were unable to take advantage of the fact on account of the peace in Europe.

The Regent of Mysore now demanded that Trichinopoly should be handed over to him in accordance with the agreement which Mahomed Ali had made to secure his services. But under various pretexts the Nawab refused to fulfil his promise, and the English therefore had, as his agents, to continue to garrison the place on his behalf. In consequence the Regent some time later joined the French who were now able to put a fresh force in the field.

An attempt to capture Gingée, which had been taken by the French two years before failed, but this was to some extent compensated for by Major Lawrence's victory over the French at Bahur on the 26th August 1752. The action was well contested and was decided by the bayonet. The French Commander with 13 officers and 100 Europeans were made prisoners, while all their artillery and stores were taken. In this battle the sepoys formed the first line and the Europeans with the guns, the second.

Meanwhile the Mysore Army and the Mahrattas were blockading Trichinopoly and Captain Dalton was ordered to attack them, but the sortie, after an initial success, was compelled to

withdraw with such heavy casualties that the garrison was rendered incapable of any further active operations.

In January 1753, Trichinopoly began to run short of supplies, and Major Lawrence marched at once to cover the movement of convoys from the Pudukkottai country. In the following months he fought three successful actions in the neighbourhood of the Golden and Sugar Loaf Rocks, in all of which the sepoys took their full share, while on one occasion Lawrence's eight field guns, by their rapid fire, defeated an unexpected onslaught of the enemy's cavalry, inflicting a loss of 600 killed and wounded, in the space of a few minutes.

In the meantime the defence of Trichinopoly continued, the French guns supplying the defenders with round shot, which Admiral Boscawen had thrown away with as little effect against Pondicherry in 1748. Dissatisfied with their slow progress the French made a determined effort to storm the place on the night of the 27th November 1753. The point selected for attack was the work known as Dalton's battery which covered the gateway, and 600 Europeans with a further 200 and the sepoys in support, were detailed for the purpose. They escaladed the selected outwork in the hours of darkness and bayonetted the defenders. most of whom were asleep, and if they had followed their instructions to refrain from firing, there was nothing to prevent them blowing in the gate and capturing the place. But instead, they fired off two of the 12 prs. which they had captured and found loaded, against the walls of the town. They accompanied this fire by a volley of small arms and by shouts of *Vive le Roi*, which effectively roused the garrison who hurried to their alarm posts and opened fire. The night was dark and they could take no aim; but the first discharge killed the English deserter who was guiding the French, and the two men carrying the petards, while most of the scaling ladders were rendered unserviceable. With the few remaining, an attempt was made to escalade the wall but this was frustrated without difficulty, and the French, penned in without means of escape were forced to surrender. Of the entire body of 600 men, eight officers and 364 men were taken prisoners, many being wounded, while one officer and 40 men were killed;

the remainder jumped down into the ditch 28 feet below, where some were killed and none escaped fractures or serious injuries; these were carried off by the supporting party. This French reverse was however to some extent offset a few months later by the loss of a valuable English convoy and the destruction of its escort. The latter was composed of 100 Grenadiers, 80 Europeans belonging to battalion companies, 800 sepoys and 4 guns. Unfortunately this detachment had been placed under the command of an officer " of little experience, and less ability." Instead of keeping his men in formed bodies, he spread them out in small parties along the whole line of the convoy, with the inevitable result that no effective resistance could be offered when 12,000 Mahratta and Mysore Horse suddenly galloped down on them. The Mysore Horse were under the command of Haidar Ali, who there made his first appearance against the English.

This was the most serious reverse yet sustained; it swept away one-third of the European battalion, including the gallant grenadier company, which had rendered such good service since its first formation. But this set back had little lasting effect. The French continued to blockade Trichinopoly, but the Mysore Regent was growing discontented, while Morari Rao with his Mahrattas had been bought off. At this juncture, orders arrived from Europe recalling Dupleix, whose policy was not approved by his Directors, and in October 1754 his successor M. Godeheu concluded a treaty of peace with the English Company which secured Nawab Mahomed Ali in the possession of the Carnatic.

During these four years the sepoys had been constantly engaged and had shown that when properly led they were an excellent fighting force. Captain Dalton in his report on the second action near Volcondah on 29th May 1752 says: " Soon after, the sepoys who formed the van of the English column appeared, out-marching the Europeans at a great rate. Eight hundred of them had in the enemy's service made a resolute attempt to storm the breaches at the assault on Arcot, and having since that time been employed in the English service in several actions under the command of Captain Clive, entertained no small opinion of their own prowess. These men no sooner came within cannon shot of the enemy than

they ran precipitately to attack them without regarding any order. They received the fire of the enemy's cannon and musketry which killed many of them, but that did not check the rest from rushing on to the push of the bayonet."

The same officer after defeating the French at Utatur on the 3rd May 1752, wrote the next day to Clive: "Your Nellore Sepoys are glorious fellows and their Subadar as good a man as ever breathed. He is my sole dependance."

The Indian officer mentioned was the famous Mahomed Yusuf Khan, usually known as the "Nellore Subadar".

Another instance occurred on the 26th June 1753, when the French attacked a small post of 200 sepoys on the Golden Rock, but were unable to dislodge them until the whole of their forces had moved up to support the attacking party. Again at the action of the 21st September, the left wing of the English sepoys carried the Sugar Loaf Rock in most gallant style, although exposed to the fire of nine guns, while the capture of Waycondah shortly afterwards was due to the fact that a party of sepoys led by a sergeant of Artillery (who was later promoted for his gallantry) escaladed the walls by climbing on one another's shoulders and opened the gate to admit their comrades.

But the sepoys of this period lacked discipline, and at times when badly led or surprised, were liable to be thrown into confusion and even panic, from which the Europeans too were by no means immune. Some years yet were to elapse before they could show themselves reliable under all circumstances.

For his services in this campaign Major Lawrence received a Royal Commission as Lieutenant Colonel, and was presented by the Court of Directors with a sword richly set with diamonds and valued at £750. Captain Clive also received a sword of lesser value, while the Nellore Subadar, Mahomed Yusuf Khan, was given a Commission as Commandant of all the Company's sepoys' and at the same time presented with a gold medal, for gallantry and outstanding leadership.

1755—57

Between 1755 and 1757 the Company's troops were engaged, in support of the Nawab, in the Madura and Tinnevelly districts. In February 1755, a considerable force under Colonel Heron, advanced from Trichinopoly, and both Madura and Tinnevelly were occupied without opposition. But on his return march, Colonel Heron was heavily attacked by the Kallans in the densely wooded pass of Nuthum; he lost all his baggage and most of his stores owing to carelessness, and the detachment would probably have been cut off but for the skill and energy of Captain Joseph Smith commanding the rear-guard; in his account of the action he specially mentioned the good work of the sepoys and gun lascars. Madura was again attacked by a force under Captain Caillaud in April 1757, when two attempts to carry the place by storm failed, but the garrison, despairing of assistance from either Mysore or the French surrendered shortly afterwards.

Meanwhile the Bengal Government applied for assistance early in June 1756, in consequence of the loss of the Cossim Bazaar settlement and the advance of the Nawab against Calcutta. A detachment of 250 Europeans with four small iron field pieces was immediately despatched, but shortly afterwards news of the fall of Calcutta was received, and it was decided to send every available man to restore the situation. Colonel Clive sailed on the 13th October with the following detachment:—

Adlercron's Regiment (H.M's 39th)	250
Madras European Infantry	528
Madras Artillery	109
Madras Lascars	160
Madras Sepoys	940

Twelve field pieces and one howitzer,

while a further reinforcement of sepoys followed a fortnight later. Fort William was recaptured on the 2nd January 1757, and on the 14th March, the French settlement at Chandernagore surrendered after a very resolute defence.

On the 23rd June 1757 was fought the famous battle of Plassey, which however remarkable for the moral courage shown by Clive

in fighting, and the great results which followed, cannot be considered an important battle is a military sense, since there was no manœuvring and very little actual fighting. But the word "Plassey" is so well known, that a brief account of the action is necessary. Clive's force, at the close of a toilsome day's march, camped for the night in a grove of mango trees near Plassey, within a mile of the enemy. At sunrise on the 23rd June, the Nawab's huge force of some 50,000 horse and foot with 40 guns and a small body of French auxiliaries poured from their camp, and began to move towards the grove where the English lay. To meet them Clive drew up his small force of about 900 Europeans and 2,100 sepoys, with eight 6 pounders and one howitzer, in front of the grove, and in that position awaited the onset of the enemy. But finding the situation exposed to the heavy though not very accurate bombardment of the Nawab's artillery, he withdrew his infantry behind the bank which enclosed the grove. His guns remained outside, and so effective was their fire, that after several hours cannonading, the Nawab's army, which had suffered considerable loss, including his most trusted subordinates, withdrew to its entrenched camp. Clive seized the opportunity to advance, and the entrances to the camp now came under so heavy and accurate a fire from the English guns that when the enemy again attempted to deploy, they were unable to do so, and their heavy losses soon threw them into hopeless confusion. Clive again advanced and completed the victory by the capture of the camp and the pursuit of the Nawab's demoralized forces, taking all their 40 pieces of artillery. The casualties in the English force amounted only to 23 Europeans and 43 Indians killed and wounded, while the Nawab lost some 500 men. In the return of Subadars commanding companies of sepoys in Clive's force it is of interest to note the well-known Madras names of Vurdarauze, Comrapah, Raganaigue, Survian, Tim Naik and Vengana, as spelt in those days. Of the troops which took part, by far the greater proportion was furnished by the Madras detachment, those of the Bengal and Bombay establishments, both European and Indian, being comparatively few in number. The Madras troops, with the exception of certain officers, did not return to their

Presidency, but were incorporated into the Bengal establishment, and formed the nucleus of the Bengal army.

About the same time a detachment of 100 Europeans, 300 sepoys, one company of Coffrees *, with some artillery, was sent to coerce the Governor of Nellore, in the interests of the Nawab. The detachment came before the fort on the 27th April 1757, and a breach, supposed to be practicable, was effected by the 3rd May. On the following day efforts were made to induce the Governor to surrender, but these having failed, an assault was delivered which was repulsed; no further attempt could be made as Colonel Forde was recalled to Madras in consequence of the commencement of hostilities by the French. The dispositions made for the assault were unusual, as it was led by the Sepoys who were followed by the Coffrees, the Europeans being in the rear. The sepoys who first mounted the breach were either killed or wounded by pikemen in the trenches which had been constructed behind the rampart and the rest, losing heart, dispersed; the Coffrees behaved well and maintained their place on the breach for some time, but were unable to force their way against the pikes. A final attempt by the Europeans met with equal lack of success.

1757—62

War again having broken out in Europe, the French, who had received large reinforcements, took the field, and in a short space of time had captured almost every place of importance in the Carnatic except Fort St. George, Vellore and Trichinopoly. At the same time Brig.-General Bussy took all the English settlements in the Circars, and so obtained entire possession of the coast from Ganjam to Masulipatam. The English were unable to offer any serious resistance owing to the absence of the greater part of their forces in Bengal, and it was to Bengal that they applied in this hour of distress. The call was answered, and Clive despatched a force under Colonel Forde who, by a brilliant feat of arms, captured Masulipatam from a superior French force in April 1759.

* Natives of Madagascar and of West Africa were known by the general designation of "Coffrees." A company of these men served with credit during the war in the Carnatic from 1751 to 1754.

In the meantime General Lally had captured Fort St. David with little difficulty, and appeared before Fort St. George on the 17th December 1758. But the fortifications had been greatly improved since its surrender in 1746 and the morale of the garrison was high. The French on the other hand, having left Chingleput fort in their rear, suffered from lack of supplies due to the operations of small bodies of troops (among whom the Nellore Subadar was conspicuous) against their lines of communication. The French batteries opened on the 2nd January 1759, and the siege continued till the 16th February, when the arrival of the English fleet forced the enemy to withdraw. They left behind all their sick and wounded, also 32 heavy guns most of which were disabled.

It was during this siege that the Sepoy companies were first formed into battalions, the 1st and 2nd, numbering 2,213 men. They did good service both as pioneers and as infantry, and suffered a fair proportion of casualties—105 killed and 217 wounded. Of the services of the artillery, the Chief Engineer recorded as follows :—

"To the credit of our Artillery, let it be remarked that two 12 pounders from the north ravelin dismounted four 24 pounders opposed to them; and that of 32 pieces of cannon found in the enemy's batteries, 31 were disabled by our shot, which are many more than we had hurt by the enemy, notwithstanding our works were enfiladed, plunged into, and taken in reverse."

The casualties in the Royal Artillery were 8 killed and 27 wounded, while the Company's Artillery lost 24 killed and 30 wounded during the siege.

It is interesting to note that in 1946 a Tattoo was held outside Fort St. George to re-enact the siege, including Draper's sortie, and that French sepoys were sent from Pondicherry to take part.

After the siege of Madras had been raised, Major Brereton attempted to take Wandiwash, but was repulsed with a loss of 200 killed and wounded; the French however from lack of funds remained inactive. In October 1759 Colonel Eyre Coote arrived to command the troops in the Carnatic and his energy and skill soon restored the situation. After capturing the forts of Wandiwash and Carangooly, on the 22nd January 1760 he inflicted a crushing

defeat on the French outside Wandiwash, an action which has justly been described as one of the decisive battles of India. The French lost 400 killed and wounded, several hundred prisoners including Brigadier General Bussy, who for many years had been in the service of the Nizam at Hyderabad with a strong French force, and 23 guns; while the English lost under 300 including about 70 sepoys. Almost all the fighting was done by the European troops on both the sides, and Orme records that after the action the Commandants of sepoys, complimenting Colonel Coote on his victory, thanked him for the sight of such a battle as they had never seen.

Coote then proceeded to capture Chetput, Arcot, Permacoil and various other forts in possession of the French, and finally Pondicherry itself surrendered on the 15th January 1761.

But though the sepoys took little part in the battle of Wandiwash, they distinguished themselves on a number of occasions, as at the defence of Conjeeveram in June 1757, when two companies under Sergt. Lambertson beat off a French detachment composed of 200 Europeans, 500 sepoys and 2 field guns; in the action near Devicottah in February 1760, when two companies under Sergt. Somers defeated two companies of French Sepoys, taking four officers and the colours; at the assault of Permacoil when Coote reported that "The good behaviour of the sepoys was more remarkable than anything I could conceive. I have ordered a gold medal to be made for Bulwant Singh, a Commandant of Sepoys, who led the attack the night we took possession of the hill"; at Villanoor near Pondicherry, when a sudden attack by two companies led to the surrender of the fort; and in September 1760 at the redoubt in the bound hedge of Pondicherry, which was held by three companies against a French counter-attack of 400 Europeans with two field guns.

War with Spain having been declared in 1762, an expedition under Colonel Draper left Madras on the 1st August for the Philippines, and the town of Manila was stormed on the 6th October with little loss. The force included 30 Madras Artillerymen and 650 sepoys, drawn presumably as volunteers from different battalions. Peace having been declared between England, France

and Spain, the Philippine Islands were restored in 1764 and the French Settlements in India in 1765.

In 1763 the Nellore Subadar Mahomed Yusuf Khan, whose previous distinguished services have been recorded and who had been appointed as renter of the Nawab for Madura and Tinnevelly districts, hoisted the French Colours, being driven into rebellion by intrigue. A considerable force was despatched to deal with the rebellion, but two attempts to storm Madura failed, and only after a blockade and as the result of treason among the Subadar's French troops was the place surrendered and Yusuf Khan hanged, by order of the Nawab.

His death not only deprived the Company of the services of one of the finest soldiers Madras has produced, but also had the unfortunate result of relegating Indian officers in future to subordinate positions, on the abolition of the rank of Indian Commandant.

From the end of 1764 up to June 1767 detachments were employed against the Poligar Chiefs of the Central and Southern Carnatic, and a good deal of desultory fighting ensued, in which the sepoys took their full share. Col. Campbell reporting to Government on the 19th January 1765, says :—"The sepoys behaved gallantly indeed and pushed through the thick woods, which at other times they would have found almost impossible." In July of the same year Lieut.-Col. Wood also brought to the notice of Government the spirited behaviour of the 5th M.I. at the capture of certain stockades near Trichinopoly, and he mentions the Sepoy Commandant, Moideen Sahib, as having distinguished himself greatly.

1st Mysore War—1767—69

On the 25th August 1767, Haidar Ali invaded the Carnatic in alliance with the Nizam and thus commenced the first of the four Mysore Wars which were to strain the English Company's resources to the limit and to see them suffer some severe reverses before the storming of Seringapatam on the 4th May 1799, removed the menace which had confronted them for 32 years. The allied force was a strong one and totalled 42,000 cavalry, 28,000

infantry and 109 guns, to match which Col. Smith had 30 European cavalry, 800 European infantry, 5,000 sepoys and 16 guns. He was subsequently reinforced by Col. Wood's detachment of 500 European infantry, three incomplete sepoy battalions and eight guns. Col. Smith endeavoured to strengthen the frontier by taking possession of certain places in the Baramahal, but an attempt on the virgin fortress of Krishnagiri was repulsed, nearly the whole of the European Grenadiers being killed by rocks hurled down by the defenders. In his report to Government Col. Smith stated that the Sepoy Grenadiers of the 2nd Battalion behaved with remarkable spirit and firmness. On the 30th August, Col. Smith marched for Tiruvannamalai to meet Col. Wood's detachment and to secure provisions, but the enemy followed immediately, hoping to bring Smith to action before the junction could be effected, and came up with him near Chengam (North Arcot district) on the 2nd September. A battle ensued in which the allies were defeated with considerable loss, but Col. Smith being without provisions was obliged to resume his march. Col. Wood joined him and on the 26th September a second action was fought near Tiruvannamalai, which resulted in the complete defeat of the enemy with the loss of 64 guns. As these battles were the first general actions in which Madras sepoys took part after having been trained to manœuvre in battalions, they are worthy of special notice, and a full account of both actions will be found in Chapter III.

Col. Smith was then compelled to disperse his army for subsistence, and Haidar seized the opportunity to attack Ambur Fort which was gallantly defended by the 10th M.I. under Capt. Calvert, till relieved by Col. Smith's renewed advance.

In his report to Government Captain Calvert thus describes a sortie made by the garrison when three breaches had been made and a storm was imminent :—

"I pushed down the hill a company of Grenadiers (10th M.I.) with a very brave Sergeant at their head, with orders not to fire a shot, but rush upon them with their bayonets; this was executed beyond my expectations, for those of the enemy next the hill gave way as soon as my sepoys came near them, and they followed so close that they drove them one upon another against the gateway which was set on fire in order to cover themselves with smoke. At

this place by their own accounts they had seventy killed, and a hundred of them ran through the fire to escape the fury of the sepoys who were pushing at them as fast as they could draw their arms backwards and forwards." This and other sorties so discouraged the enemy that they never attempted to storm, but converted the siege into a blockade. For this defence the 10th M.I. received the first honorary distinction granted to the Madras Army —a Rock Fort with the word *Ambur*.

A rising in Malabar and operations of the Bengal Army towards Hyderabad now caused the allied armies to separate, their withdrawal being covered by active operations on Col. Smith's convoys. One of these was attacked by Haidar in person at Singarapet on the 29th December 1767, but he was repulsed with loss by the escort, the 5th Battalion of Sepoys (4th M.I.) being specially noticed for repelling the Mysore cavalry.

In 1768 the British army advanced and captured Krishnagiri, Hosur and Kolar, and Col. Smith proposed to move on Bangalore and Seringapatam, but the presence in his camp of two members of the Madras Council impeded his operations and Haidar was given time to save Bangalore. He made overtures for peace, but they were rejected by the Madras Government and the war was resumed. Col. Wood's detachment narrowly escaped disaster at Mulbagal where the 1st and 12th M.I. received special mention, and at Bagalur due to the misbehaviour of the Nawab's sepoys and his own faulty tactics, and Haidar then countermarched and entered Coimbatore, overwhelming Capt. Nixon's detachment and capturing Erode. A considerable amount of manœuvring ensued and Haidar, who was hard pressed and feared that he might be forced to fight a general action with disastrous consequences, resolved on a bold stroke. On the 29th March 1769, he suddenly appeared before the gates of Madras with 6,000 horse, having marched 130 miles in three-and-a-half days, and dictated peace practically on his own terms, one of these being of mutual assistance in case of attack. The agreement signed was by no means disadvantageous to the British, since it included mutual restoration of prisoners and places. Haidar had shown remarkable military skill on many occasions in this campaign, but Col. Smith also deserves the fullest

praise, handicapped as he was by greatly inferior forces, but above all by a total lack of cavalry against an enemy force largely composed of that arm, and by the repeated interference of the Madras Council with his military operations. In this war for the first time two short brass three pr. guns were attached to each sepoy battalion.

1771--77

In 1771 a force was assembled to impose certain terms on the Rajah of Tanjore, who had contributed nothing to the expenses of the recent war with Haidar. The fort of Vallam was captured and on the 22nd September the army came before Tanjore. On the 1st October the enemy made a very determined sortie, which was eventually repulsed with loss. By the 27th a practicable breach was effected and preparations were made for an assault, when the Rajah agreed to surrender. Tanjore was again captured, this time with little loss, on the 17th September 1773, the assault having been made unexpectedly about noon.

Fighting also took place against the Marawars of Ramnad and the Poligars of Madura and Tinnevelly in 1772, and in the Northern Circars at Kimedy in 1773-4, and again in Jeypore in 1775.

Early in 1775 two companies of European infantry and the 9th M.I. were ordered on service to Bombay, and this detachment saw considerable service in Guzarat, and was later complimented by the Bombay Government. In recognition of their readiness to proceed on foreign service the 9th Battalion was permitted to bear on its Colours and appointments the motto *Khooskee Wa Turree* (by land and sea), which is still borne by its lineal descendant the 2/2nd Punjab Regiment.

In August 1777 a field force of two Sepoy battalions with a detachment of artillery assembled at Sholinghur (North Arcot district) for service against the refractory Poligars in the hills near Chittoor. The natural difficulties of the country being great, the service was harassing, but was successfully accomplished in a few months.

1778—80

During June 1778 Government, in anticipation of the declaration in Europe of war with France, made preparations to attack Pondicherry and the other French Settlements, and a strong force including Artillery from the Mount, a Battering Train from Trichinopoly and the 2nd, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th and 20th M.I. was assembled for the purpose. Yanam (East Godavari district) was taken on the 31st July and Karikal (Tanjore district) surrendered on the 11th August. Batteries were opened against Pondicherry on the 18th September and the place capitulated on the 17th October after an obstinate defence, during which the British lost 49 Europeans killed and 122 wounded, while 153 sepoys were killed and 496 wounded. The French losses amounted to considerably less, viz., 136 killed and 332 wounded.

Early in 1779 a force including 3 companies of artillery and the 3rd, 4th and 19th M.I. was sent against Mahè (Malabar) a few miles south of the English fort at Tellicherry, and the place surrendered in March. The Sepoy battalions received the thanks of Government for their zeal and good conduct on this occasion.

In February 1780 a detachment of artillery, one battalion of European infantry and the 8th M.I. embarked for Surat and joined General Goddard's force for operations against the Mahrattas.

On the 5th May of the same year a body of Nairs estimated at 1,000 made a surprise dawn attack on the detachment at Tellicherry. Some of them effected an entrance into the fort but after a sharp struggle they were repulsed with the loss of 217 men killed and wounded. For over a year the Madras troops were detained at Tellicherry (which was then within the Presidency of Bombay) and throughout that time there was continuous fighting not only against the Nairs but also against a force which Haidar Ali, annoyed at the loss of Mahè, through which port he received his supplies of arms and munitions, had sent against the English settlement. Finally the 19th M.I. which formed the garrison was relieved by Bombay troops and returned by sea to Cuddalore. Their services received special mention on two separate occasions.

2nd Mysore War—1780—84

When in 1779 the English began to operate against the French Settlements, they were warned by Haidar Ali that if they attacked Mahe he would retaliate on the Carnatic, and accordingly, he assisted the French, though without effect, in the defence of Mahé. In the eleven years which had elapsed since the close of the 1st Mysore War, Haidar had greatly extended his domains, which now stretched from Dharwar in the north to Dindigul in the south, while the sea coast from Honawar to Cochin formed his boundary on the west and Cuddapah, Chittoor and the Baramahal his limits on the east. From the immense treasure, estimated at 12 millions sterling, which he had captured at Bednore in 1763, he had raised and equipped a large force, part of which had been trained in the European manner and was commanded by French officers; he also had the assistance of 600 French troops under Col. Lally, who had joined him in 1778. Annoyed at the loss of Mahé, and in pursuance of his threat, Haidar Ali decided to ally himself with the Mahrattas and the Nizam and to drive the British out of India.

Early in 1780 he assembled his army, amounting to 28,000 cavalry, 62,000 infantry and 100 guns, at Chengam (North Arcot district) and on the 20th July he invaded the Carnatic, devastating it far and wide to the confines of Madras itself. To meet this grave emergency the Madras Government, at last awake to their danger, could dispose of only a pitifully small force already weakened by the detachment to Surat and the garrisons of various forts. Col. Braithwaite was recalled from Pondicherry to Madras, while Col. Baillie was instructed to march south from Ellore with a detachment of Artillery and European infantry, the 1st, 7th and 11th M.I., and one unrepresented Circar battalion; his force numbered in all about 200 Europeans and 2,600 sepoys.

On the 24th August Col. Baillie reached a place within 28 miles of Munro's camp at St. Thomas Mount, and the junction of the two forces could easily have been effected on the 25th. The Commander-in-Chief, however, ordered Baillie to march on Conjeevaram, where the army from Madras, only some 5,000 strong, arrived on the 29th. The route so unfortunately laid down for Baillie brought him into dangerous proximity with the enemy,

and the opportunity was too good to be missed by a skilful general like Haidar, who detached a strong force under Tipu to cut off Baillie, while he himself with the main portion of his army contained Munro. Baillie was delayed by a flooded river till the 4th September, and when Tipu appeared on the morning of the 6th he took up a position near Perambakkam, 14 miles from Munro's camp, losing on that day 100 killed and wounded. On the same evening he wrote to Munro for assistance, while Tipu, who also had lost heavily, sent to ask for reinforcements from Haidar. The latter had on the 6th interposed his army between Munro and Baillie's expected route, but Munro made no move to frustrate his intention, and did nothing on the 6th, 7th or 8th, in spite of the fact that the sound of firing, which showed that Baillie was engaged, was distinctly audible. On the 8th Baillie's letter was received, and the flank companies of the army, only 1,000 men, under Col. Fletcher, were sent to Baillie's assistance. Fletcher by a night march succeeded in eluding Haidar, and joined Baillie on the 9th, thus bringing the latter's force up to 3,700. On the same night they started to march for Conjeevaram, while Haidar, perceiving that Munro intended to remain where he was, quietly moved off in the darkness towards Perambakkam. Baillie had scarcely quitted that place when he encountered the enemy, and after some desultory fighting came to the unaccountable resolution of halting where he was for the night, in spite of Col. Fletcher's protests. He was at this time within nine miles of Munro, and had he only continued to advance must have effected a junction with the main force without much difficulty. At daybreak on the 10th September, the march was recommenced, but Haidar's army had now come up and the fate of the detachment was sealed. The unfortunate troops, in the open and exposed to a cross fire of 50 guns, made a brave resistance until their ammunition was exhausted, an event which was hastened by the explosion of two tumbrils, and then formed into a square by their now severely wounded commander. received and repulsed no fewer than 13 different attacks of the enemy horse, but a final desperate effort by the Mysore cavalry broke the square and the little force was practically annihilated. Meanwhile Munro, discovering in the

morning that Haidar had disappeared, marched towards Perambakkam, but after advancing a few miles halted, being uncertain of Baillie's situation. On hearing of the disaster he hastened back to Conjeevaram, and abandoning his heavy guns and stores commenced his retreat next morning to Chingleput, while Haidar, finding that his troops, who had suffered heavy losses, were by no means anxious to attack Munro's army, contented himself with detaching a force to annoy it on the march. Munro reached Chingleput on the 12th losing in the retreat upwards of 500 killed and wounded, mostly sepoys of whom the rearguard was composed. Speaking of these men Innes Munro says:—"Many of Col. Baillie's sepoys fought hard in Gen. Munro's army the next day, which was no small mark of their loyalty and courage."

Baillie's defeat has been treated at some length not only on account of the magnitude of the disaster, but because it was the first of numerous attempts by both Haidar and Tipu to overwhelm detached forces, which became in fact a regular feature of their strategy, though the results were not always attended by the same success.

Thus closed one of the most brief and discreditable campaigns in Madras military history. Had Munro acted with more decision, his plan, faulty as it was, might still perhaps have been carried through with success. Possibly he feared to risk the only field force remaining in the Presidency, whose defeat would have involved the fall of Madras. Haidar too missed a golden opportunity in not following up his victory and destroying Munro's force —such an opportunity was never to occur again. It is out of place here to follow the fortunes of the unfortunate prisoners to their dungeons in Seringapatam, where Baillie was soon to be joined by two other British Generals, but the visitors to that historic fortress should not omit to view the graphic wall painting of Baillie's defeat in the Darya Dowlat Bagh palace.

In November 1780, the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Eyre Coote, arrived in Madras with reinforcements and took over sole direction of the war. The situation which confronted him on arrival might well have appalled a less resolute man. The small Madras army had not only suffered in morale as the result of

Baillie's defeat, but had lost there the picked companies of their battalions. Transport was almost entirely lacking, while all supplies had to be brought by sea, since Haidar had applied the scorched earth policy to a belt of country 30 to 50 miles wide, running from the Pulicat Lake in the north to Pondicherry in the south. Nor was the sea route certain, as a French fleet might at any time appear in superior force and drive off the British squadron. But Coote rose superior to all difficulties and in a few months was prepared to meet Haidar in the field.

At the commencement of 1781, Haidar, who had already captured Arcot, was engaged in the siege of Ambur, Vellore, Wandiwash, Perumukkal and Chingleput, of which Ambur previously so successfully defended by Captain Calvert in 1767, capitulated on January 13th.

Meanwhile, Sir E. Coote, who had assembled his army, consisting of 1,600 Europeans, 10 Sepoy battalions and 62 guns, marched south and relieved Chingleput and Wandiwash, storming on the way the fort of Karunguli. Wandiwash was relieved on the 24th January just in time, as only one day's ammunition remained to the garrison which, though consisting of only two British officers and two and a half companies, had, owing to the heroic efforts of Lieut. Flint, maintained a stout defence against Haidar's principal officer Mir Sahib, with a powerful train of artillery, 11,000 foot and 22,000 horse, since the 12th August 1780.

On arrival at Cuddallore on the 8th February, Coote found himself in a desperate position, being unable to bring Haidar (who had followed him south) to action, while the enemy's cavalry laid waste all the surrounding country. Had the French fleet properly performed its duty of intercepting supplies by sea, on which the British army entirely depended, the latter must either have capitulated or been dispersed. Fortunately the fleet moved off and Coote was rapidly reprovisioned from Madras. On the 16th June he moved southwards to capture the fortified Pagoda at Chidambaram, which Haidar had strengthened as a depot for provisions; but having been greatly misinformed as to the strength and composition of the garrison, the small force which he sent

to make the attempt proved unequal to the task. Coote at first decided to renew the attack with a larger force but learning the true situation withdrew without making a further attempt. This repulse decided Haidar to move at once and complete the defeat of the British, whose losses at Chidambaram had been exaggerated. Making a forced march of 100 miles he interposed his army between Coote and Cuddalore, and commenced to fortify a position within three miles of the British camp, while his cavalry covered the whole country round and prevented Coote from obtaining any information as to the enemy's strength and disposition. At last the opportunity for which the British Commander had waited so patiently had arrived, and requesting Sir E. Hughes to cover Cuddalore with the fleet, he moved forward to try his fortune in battle, the result of which was to mean triumph or annihilation. On the 1st July, 1781, was fought the battle of Porto Novo, which is described in detail in Chapter III. Suffice it here to say that Haidar was defeated with heavy loss and ordered a general retreat, though unfortunately the victory could not be exploited owing to the want of cavalry and the exhaustion of the army.

After the battle Coote moved towards Madras to cover the arrival of the Bengal detachment, which in the course of its long march had lost from sickness or desertion more than half its original strength of 5,000. What remained however was good material and proved a welcome addition to the field army.

On the 27th August Haidar offered battle at Pollilore, close to the scene of Baillie's disaster in the previous year. The result was indecisive, and Haidar withdrew to again offer battle at Sholinghur (North Arcot district) on the 27th September. The end of a hard day's fighting saw the British victorious and encamped on the field of battle, the high light of the action being the repulse of Haidar's Household Cavalry by the 21st Carnatic Battalion (20th M.I.). A full account of this action is given in Chapter III.

Coote's army as usual was greatly distressed for want of supplies, and he had to send out various detachments to forage. One of these, consisting of a few Europeans and 5 Sepoy battalions, was surprised by Haidar's main army near Virakanellur on the

23rd October. Although hotly pressed by the enemy on both flanks and rear, the troops fought with undaunted courage, the 20th M.I. again being conspicuous in recovering a gun which had been temporarily abandoned. Finally Haidar gave up the pursuit, greatly mortified at his failure to destroy such a small force, which he had made certain of being able to annihilate before Coote could come to its rescue.

A lucky discovery of hidden grain now enabled Coote to relieve Vellore, whose garrison had been holding out with the greatest heroism for 16 months, by supplying it with 6 weeks rice, after which, as the north-east monsoon was approaching, he withdrew to Tripasur. Meanwhile Sir Hector Munro with a force of 4,000 men had captured Negapatam and forced Haidar's troops to evacuate that area. Coote had consequently a larger area from which to draw supplies.

On the 2nd January 1782, Coote again relieved Vellore, whose retention was of the utmost importance as a base for future operations. Haidar endeavoured to prevent the operation, but without success, thanks to Coote's skilful manœuvring.

Meanwhile in the South the detachment under Colonel Braithwaite had captured a number of places, but on the 18th February 1782 it was surprised by Tipu at Annagudi (Tanjore district) and forced to surrender after 26 hours desperate fighting. Braithwaite's force consisted of 100 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys, while Tipu had Lally's French Corps 400 strong, 10,000 picked horse and 10,000 infantry. Not long after Haidar received a further reinforcement of French troops.

The position now was that Haidar controlled practically the whole of Carnatic, with the exception of a few forts, and it was obvious that the only remedy for this desperate state of affairs was to bring him to action. Coote therefore marched in May, but was unable to come up with Haidar till the 2nd June at Arni, where as usual Haidar evaded a general action. Finally Coote returned to the Mount on the 20th June and shortly afterwards, his health having broken down, handed over command to Major-Gen. James Stuart and proceeded to Bengal. At the end of the year Haidar died at Narasingarayanpet near Chittoor, and Tipu,

who was engaged on the West Coast opposing the Bombay force, hurriedly returned and assumed command of the army.

The passing of this remarkable man deserves notice however brief. Of lowly origin and quite illiterate, Haidar, by sheer force of character, had made himself ruler of Mysore, and by his ability finally dominated almost the whole of South India. A brave soldier and a most skilful general, he was entirely without conscience, but not cruel for the sake of cruelty. "Everything was weighed in the balance of utility, and no grain of human feeling, no breath of virtue or vice, was permitted to incline the beam. If he had affection for anyone it was for his unworthy son, whom he had nominated as his successor, while predicting that he would lose the empire which he himself had gained." (Wilks.) Haidar Ali was indeed the finest soldier whom South India has produced.

Only a few months later Sir Eyre Coote also died shortly after his return to Madras, much to the grief of the sepoys, by whom he was regarded with a devotion never manifested before or since to any other European leader.

Early in 1783 Gen. Stuart reprovisioned Vellore, without interruption by Tipu, who was hastily returning to the West Coast on account of the capture of Bednore by General Mathews with the Bombay Army. Stuart then moved to recover Cuddalore from the French, with the co-operation of the fleet, and arrived before that place on the 7th June. On the 13th an attack was made on the outer lines of defence, and after very heavy fighting the British succeeded in retaining one redoubt only, but the French withdrew within the walls the same night. The casualties on this day amounted to over 1,000, the good name of the Coast Army being upheld by the 19th M.I. which divided the honours of the day with H.M.'s 101st Foot.

On the 17th June the English fleet was driven off by the French squadron under Admiral Suffrein, who landed 3,600 men to assist Bussy, and on the 25th the latter made a vigorous sortie, which was however repulsed with loss. The position of the British now became critical, their numbers having been diminished by casualties and disease. Fortunately at this juncture intelligence was received of the conclusion of peace in Europe, in consequence of which hostilities ceased on the 2nd July 1783.

The war with Tipu however continued and Col. Fullarton, who had carried out some successful operations in the south, now took over command. From Madura and Dindigul he moved on Palghat with a force of 2,000 Europeans, 14 Sepoy battalions and 56 guns, and captured that place by storm during a heavy fall of rain. Shortly afterwards Coimbatore surrendered, and Fullarton made preparations to advance via Satyamangalam on Seringapatam, hoping either to attack the capital at a disadvantage during the absence of Tipu before Mangalore, or to force him to raise the siege of that place.

But Tipu, realizing that in the absence of French support he would be unable to contend alone against the British, since Warren Hastings had skilfully detached his other two allies the Nizam and the Mahrattas, decided to make peace, and hostilities thus came to a close.

Throughout these campaigns Sir Eyre Coote's correspondence with Government is full of complaints regarding the scarcity of provisions and the difficulty experienced in obtaining the smallest assistance from the Nawab's officers throughout the country. The sepoys in addition were kept constantly in arrears of pay for several consecutive years, "notwithstanding which and the extreme severity of the service, they steadfastly resisted, with few exceptions, the numerous offers conveyed by the emissaries of Haidar and Tipu." Such fidelity under similar circumstances is without parallel in the military history of any nation, as Col. Wilson justly remarks.

Innes Munro, who served alongside the Carnatic troops throughout these campaigns, writing in 1789 says about the prisoners in Mysore :—

"Enough cannot be said of the fidelity and generous conduct of the Company's Indian officers and sepoys during the whole series of these unparalleled sufferings. Every cruel mode that could be suggested was adopted by the enemy to force them into their service, but the brave sepoys were satisfied to suffer every hardship and indignity rather than forfeit their allegiance to the Company."

In connection with the shortage of transport Col. Fullarton from his camp at Dindigul reported on the 6th February 1784 :—

"The Indian troops have carried their provisions on their backs from Palghat to this place, and have enough remaining to subsist them as far as Madura, being nearly 200 miles. I mentioned this circumstance as proof of the willing spirit of your sepoys in this quarter, who have borne all their hardships with alacrity seldom equalled and never surpassed."

Madras troops engaged in the campaigns of 1780–84, were the Artillery, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 19th and 20th Madras Infantry, and the Pioneers. They were later awarded the battle honour *Carnatic*, but only the Bengal detachment received the medal.

3rd Mysore War—1790—92

The 3rd Mysore War was occasioned by Tipu's attack on our ally the Rajah of Travancore in December 1789.

Major-General Medows arrived in Madras as Governor and Commander-in-Chief on the 19th February 1790, and in May proceeded to Trichinopoly to take command of the army which had been assembled there, amounting to some 15,000 men. His intention was to invade Mysore by the pass from Coimbatore, while the force under Col. Maxwell was to advance direct on the Baramahal. There was some delay due to commissariat troubles, but by August the frontier forts had been captured, as well as Dindigul, Coimbatore and Palghat, while a strong detachment under Col. Floyd took Satyamangalam by surprise. The British forces were now dangerously dispersed and on the 11th September Tipu suddenly descended into Coimbatore by the Gazalhatty Pass with about 40,000 men and a large train of artillery, and endeavoured to cut off Floyd. After heavy fighting Floyd succeeded in extricating himself, but with considerable loss, the Sepoy battalions (1st, 5th and 25th M.I.) losing 98 killed and 86 wounded while H.M.'s 36th Foot had over 100 casualities, and 6 guns were lost. Medows, having reassembled his army, marched on Satyamangalam, but Tipu evaded him and after capturing Erode and Dharapuram withdrew to the Baramahal on learning of Col. Maxwell's advance in that direction. General Medows joined Col. Maxwell on the 17th November and immediately after endeavoured

to bring the enemy to action, but Tipu eluded the attempt and descending into the Carnatic made for Trichinopoly. After plundering Srirangam he endeavoured to take Thiagur, but was repulsed by Captain Flint, the former defender of Wandiwash against Haidar; he then captured Tiruvannamalai, where the town and temples were sacked, and finally encamped at the Red Hills near Pondicherry, where he remained several weeks negotiating with the French.

In the meantime Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General, arrived in Madras on the 12th December to assume control of operations and in accordance with his orders Gen. Medows moved to Madras via Arni. Cornwallis realizing that the only way to bring Tipu to terms was to strike at Seringapatam, concentrated his army at Vellore on the 11th February 1791, and by a rapid march entered Mysore by the Mugali Pass before Tipu, who had hastily returned, had time to oppose him. Kolar was taken on the 28th February, Hoskote on the 2nd March and on the 5th the British Army arrived before Bangalore. On the afternoon of the 6th, Col. Floyd was sent with the Cavalry brigade and 5 Sepoy battalions to carry out a reconnaissance. He was lured into an ambush and the cavalry suffered severely till their withdrawal was covered by Major Gowdie's brigade: the loss in horses was particularly serious owing to the difficulty in replacing them. Early on the morning of the 7th the petta was stormed after severe fighting and a practicable breach having been made by the 20th, the fort of Bangalore was assaulted and carried on the night of the 21st.

Meanwhile Tipu had remained in the vicinity with his main Army, but beyond sending in reinforcements made no attempt to interfere with Corwallis' operations. Probably he was of opinion that the fort, which was a strong one and adequately garrisoned, could hold out indefinitely.

After effecting a junction with the Nizam's cavalry some 10,000 strong, Cornwallis then advanced on Seringapatam by the Kakanhalli road, thus eluding Tipu, who had taken up a strong position on the more direct road near Closepet. An action was fought at Arikere on the 14th May and Tipu who had lost heavily

withdrew to Seringapatam, but the British army was now suffering great distress from want of supplies, while the transport cattle were dying in hundreds daily from lack of forage and the gun bullocks were so emaciated that they could no longer drag the guns. A reconnaissance of the fortress showed that nothing could be effected by a coup-de-main and Cornwallis after halting a few days at Kanambadi to cover the withdrawal of the Bombay division to the West Coast, burst his siege guns and started his withdrawal to Bangalore. A few days later junction was effected with our allies the Mahrattas, whose well-stocked bazaars relieved all anxiety as regards supplies. Tipu's numerous cavalry had till then prevented all means of communication between the allied forces, so that Cornwallis had no idea of their proximity, but the siege train having been destroyed nothing further could be attempted against Seringapatam till it was replaced, and the withdrawal to Bangalore was therefore resumed.

During the remainder of 1791 the army was employed in reducing numerous hill forts, the most notable of which were Nandydrug and Savandrug. The first of these was carried by storm before daybreak on the 18th October and in his General Orders Lord Cornwallis commended the good services of the 3rd, 4th, 10th, 13th and 27th M.I. in these operations. A story is told that just before the assault a whisper went round that the breach was mined. General Medows' quick retort that any mine there must be a mine of gold raised a laugh and dispelled any hesitation which the first ill-timed remark might have occasioned. Savandrug was stormed on the 21st December with the loss of only one soldier wounded, the garrison having been seized by sudden panic. The capture of these reputedly impregnable forts had a considerable effect on the morale of Tipu's troops, while at the same time it ensured the safe passage of the British convoys.

In the meantime the Nizam's army, attached to which was the subsidiary force of a company of Madras artillery and the 21st and 22nd M.I. under the command of Captain Read, after spending nearly six months in capturing the strong hill fort of Cupool, came against Gurramkonda on the 15th September 1791. This place is remarkably strong, the hill fort being protected on

three sides by an almost perpendicular precipice some 500 feet high, while the lower fort which guarded the line of ascent was of considerable strength. Against the massive walls of the latter the Nizam's artillery had little effect and finally Lord Cornwallis sent some heavy guns which had been employed at Nandydrug. These soon made a practicable breach and on the 7th November the lower fort was stormed by the flank companies of the Madras battalions, headed by a forlorn hope of 8 artillery men. The upper fort being too strong to be carried by a coup-de-main, a detachment of the Nizam's troops was left to blockade it and the rest of the army moved off towards Kolar. As soon as Tipu heard of the fall of Gurramkonda he despatched a force of 1,200 men, who by a surprise attack recaptured the place. But the Mysorean occupation did not last long. Such was the importance of the place, that on learning the news, the whole of the Nizam's army retraced its steps. The lower fort was for a second time stormed by the Madras detachment, and leaving a stronger force to maintain the blockade of the upper fort, the Nizam's army moved to join Lord Cornwallis, which they did at Magadi in January 1792. The upper fort held out successfully until the treaty of that year, by the terms of which Tipu retained Gurramkonda though he surrendered most of the Cuddapah district to the Nizam, and it was not till 1800 that the fortress came into possession of the British.

While these operations were taking place Tipu made an attempt at a diversion by attacking Coimbatore, which was forced to surrender after a gallant defence of twenty-eight days against overwhelming odds, but Cornwallis was not to be diverted from his objective and on the 25th January 1792, he again resumed his advance on Seringapatam, and encamped at French Rocks about six miles north of the fortress.

The fondness of Lord Cornwallis for night operations is notable —Bangalore and Nandydrug were both stormed at night, and the advance from Arikere was also carried out before dawn. So here too the British Commander decided to use the cover of darkness for his assault on Tipu's huge entrenched camp. This was on the north side of the Cauvery river, immediately in front of the

island on which the fortress stands, and covered about three miles in length, diminishing from 3,000 yards in breadth at the western extremity to about one mile in the centre, and running nearly to a point at the eastern end where it was flanked by the defences on the Karighat hill. It was enclosed by a wide hedge of prickly-pear and strengthened by a number of redoubts, all armed with heavy cannon. Tipu's infantry, computed at 40,000 with 100 field guns was drawn up behind the line of redoubts with about 5,000 cavalry in the rear. The guns in the fort and other parts of the island which could be brought to bear on the north side were estimated at 300.

The attack was made in three divisions, and as was to be expected resulted in some confusion and much hand-to-hand fighting. One column lost its way in the dark and Lord Cornwallis himself was temporarily isolated with his escort.

The latter incident is thus related in Mackenzie's History of the War:—

"The force which His Lordship had collected bore no proportion to the number by which he was attacked. It consisted of seven companies of the 74th regiment under Captain Dugald Cameron, with the 2nd and 21st Coast battalions (2nd and 20th M.I.) under Captains Vigors and Montgomery. This handful of men withstood the furious and desperate onset of many thousands for sometime. Three companies of Madras sepoys that had been detached to within fifty yards of the enemy, fired by platoons with a regularity and steadiness that would stamp credit on the best troops in Europe; and on being seasonably reinforced, the whole body came to the bayonet, and after repeated charges proved successful. The Mysoreans, however, on this occasion discovered no want either of discipline or valour. The reinforcement which fell suddenly on their right flank instantly received a heavy and well-directed fire from a corps that changed front for that purpose, nor did this body give way until they felt the points of the bayonets from different directions."

In many parts of the field the enemy made repeated counter-attacks but all were repulsed, and dawn found the British not only in command of the greater part of the fortified camp but also

well established across the river on the island itself and facing the petta of Ganjam. During the next day the enemy continued his counter-attacks in that part of the camp which was still in his possession, covered by the fire of the guns from the fort, but by 4 p.m. his forces gave up the attempt and retreated to the island. By evening the petta had been cleared and the British troops on the island had consolidated their position.

Tipu now made overtures for peace, but as nothing definite was proposed, preparations for the siege were commenced. Gen. Abercromby with the Bombay division arrived on the 16th February and on the 19th crossed the river and took up a position south-west of the fort. The plans which the Bombay Engineers then prepared proved of the greatest value at the final siege in 1799. On the 22nd Tipu made an attempt to dislodge Abercromby but failed, and seeing that further resistance was useless accepted the terms offered. By the treaty thus concluded Tipu agreed to cede half his dominions to the Allies and to pay an indemnity of three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees; pending settlement he surrendered two of his sons as hostages.

Thus concluded the 3rd Mysore War which, though it started badly for the British, ended most favourably for them and their allies. Cornwallis, like Smith in 1767 and Fullarton in 1783, realized that Seringapatam was the key to success, and once he had decided on his objective he refused to be diverted from it. Tipu on the other hand missed a great opportunity of overwhelming either the Bombay division or Lord Cornwallis' army itself when want of supplies compelled the latter to withdraw from Seringapatam in 1791.

Madras troops which took part in this war were the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Light Cavalry, Artillery, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd Madras Infantry, and Pioneers, all receiving later the battle honour *Mysore*. Prize money amounted to over £93,000 and since both Lord Cornwallis and General Medows gave up their shares, the amount distributed to the troops was proportionately increased, ranging from £27.12 to a Subadar to £5.18 to Indian other ranks. The medal for the campaign was awarded to the Bengal detachment only.

1793—96

War having been declared by the National Convention of France against England and Holland on the 1st February 1793, a well-equipped force including twelve sepoy battalions with artillery and pioneers was assembled in July for the capture of Pondicherry. No opposition was expected, as the garrison was known to number only 500 Europeans and 900 sepoys, but as the French refused to surrender siege operations were commenced on the 10th August; fire opened on the 20th and the place capitulated on the 22nd. Our loss was small, amounting only to 248. The Colours of the 12th M.I., which had been taken at the surrender of Cuddalore in 1782, were recovered on this occasion.

About the end of April 1794 preparations were commenced for an expedition against the French island of Mauritius and volunteers were called for to make up three sepoy battalions. Great alacrity was shown in responding to the call, the 19th M.I. and some other battalions coming forward in a body. Eventually the expedition was abandoned in consequence of intelligence from England.

Minor operations took place in 1794–95 against the southern Poligars and in the Northern Circars, but the next major operation was the expedition to Ceylon in 1795, consequent on war having broken out with Holland. The force employed included the 1st, 7th, 9th and 25th M.I. with detachments of Madras artillery and pioneers. Operations commenced with the siege of Trincomalee, which surrendered after little resistance on the 26th August. Other places were captured in rapid succession and by early 1796 the whole island had been occupied.

Another expedition sailed against the Dutch Indies at the same time, and Malacca surrendered on the 18th August. It had been intended that a force to attack Amboyna should be supplied from Bengal, but as the Bengal sepoys refused to embark and Government did not consider it expedient to resort to force, the expedition was composed exclusively of Madras troops and proved equally successful. Col. Braithwaite when reporting the embarkation at Madras in October 1795 remarked :—

" No troops could possibly show more spirit than has been shown by the 17th Battalion on this occasion. A similar spirit has

been shown by the 16th and 32nd Battalions, which were called upon to supp'y the few men wanted to complete the 17th. The numbers required were immediately supplied and numbers of others pressed down to the waterside in readiness should they be wanted."

The 17th M.I. remained on foreign service for five years and did not return to Madras until 1801. It was then thanked in General Orders for its exemplary zeal and spirit; and honorary badges were given to all ranks.

Early in 1795 the Nizam, being about to go to war with the Mahrattas, desired that he might be accompanied by the British contingent; but this having been objected to by the Governor-General the Nizam took offence and dispensed with the two Madras battalions (21st and 22nd M.I.) and the detachment of Artillery which formed the subsidiary force, and in consequence they were ordered into the Northern Circars.

But about the end of June, following the rebellion of his eldest son, the Nizam applied for the return of these troops and his request was complied with. This force in 1796 stormed the very strong fort of Raichur with comparatively little loss and received for its services the thanks of Government and the Court of Directors.

During August of the same year a force was assembled at Madras for an expedition against Manila, the sepoy portion of which, comprising the 3rd, 16th, 23rd and 24th M.I., was entirely composed of volunteers. Most of the troops had embarked, and part of the fleet had sailed when the project was suddenly abandoned in consequence of intelligence from Europe. The alacrity which the sepoys displayed in volunteering for this overseas service was subsequently recognized by the issue of brass badges which were ordered to be worn on the left arm.

4th Mysore War 1798—99

The refusal of Sir John Shore to assist the Nizam against the Mahrattas in 1795 had caused the latter to employ over 100 French officers to organize and discipline his troops, which were formed under Monsieur Raymond into regular battalions totalling 14,000 men, with a due proportion of artillery. Shortly after the arrival of Lord Mornington at Calcutta in May 1798, it was ascertained

that Tipu had entered into an alliance with the French, and that a small party of French officers and men from Mauritius had landed at Mangalore and joined him at Seringapatam. In consequence of this discovery the Madras Government were directed to equip the army for the field, but before declaring war, the Governor-General considered it necessary to take steps to prevent the formidable French contingent at Hyderabad from going over to Tipu, with whom the officers were known to be then in correspondence. With the agreement of the Nizam the British subsidiary force was augmented to 6,000 sepoys with a due proportion of European Artillery, and the French contingent was disarmed and disbanded without much difficulty.

Intelligence of the invasion of Egypt by the French having reached the Governor-General on the 18th October 1798, he ordered the Madras Government to advance the army to some convenient place near the Mysore frontier, but not to engage in hostilities unless the negotiations which he commenced with Tipu to sever him from his French interests should fail. At the same time the English Fleet was directed to the Malabar Coast to intercept any further French reinforcements. The Governor-General then sailed for Madras, where he landed on the 31st December and assumed charge of the Political and Military Departments. On his arrival an evasive and unsatisfactory reply was received from Tipu, and a renewal of the correspondence being attended by a like result, orders were issued for the advance of the Madras Army on Seringapatam, to anticipate the invasion which Tipu was almost certain to launch as soon as he received sufficient French reinforcements.

General Harris the Commander-in-Chief at Madras had experienced great difficulty in organising a field army for the purpose. Not only was the Presidency practically bankrupt, but in spite of the difficulties experienced by Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Cornwallis in previous campaigns, the Madras Army was still unprovided with any sort of transport corps for carrying supplies or even moving the guns. A large number of bullocks had therefore to be obtained and given some sort of training before any advance could be made. In addition, many Madras units were absent in Ceylon, or required for garrison and convoy duties, and it was calculated that not more

than 3,600 Europeans and 10,400 Indian troops could be provided by the Presidency as compared with the 5,500 Europeans and 18,400 Indian troops with which General Medows had commenced the 3rd Mysore War in 1790.

The deficiency of personnel was made good by a detachment of five Sepoy battalions from Bengal and by the Nizam's contingent, while the lack of funds to finance the campaign was met by a public loan, the Governor-General heading the list with a subscription of £12,000, an example which was attended by most satisfactory results.

It was of the utmost importance that the Army should reach Seringapatam well in advance of the monsoon, whose early rains might be expected to render the Cauvery impassable some time during May, and General Harris had therefore decided that once the advance started nothing should deter him from his objective, and that he would give battle only if Tipu opposed his progress.

On the 14th February the army, which had been concentrated at Vellore, began its advance. It consisted of 21,649 men, and included 4 regiments of Madras cavalry, 2 battalions of Madras Artillery (with 1,483 gun lascars), eight battalions of Madras Infantry and 1,000 Pioneers. The train consisted of 60 field pieces including 12 of the Horse Artillery, and 40 heavy guns viz. two 24 prs., thirty 18 prs. and eight 12 prs. each with 1,200 shot. When near Ambur the army was joined by the troops from Hyderabad including four more Madras battalions under Colonel Roberts, who was later superseded by Colonel Wellesley.

The combined force, marching via Rayacotta and Kankanhalli, met with practically no opposition till it arrived at Mallavelly on the 27th March, when Tipu attacked in force but was driven off without much difficulty. The British Commander, adhering to the maintenance of his objective, Seringapatam, refused to pursue, nor in any case were his gun bullocks capable of doing so, as they were in extremely poor condition due to disease and lack of fodder.

General Harris had been Military Secretary to General Medows during the 3rd Mysore War, and was present when Lord Cornwallis attacked Tipu's entrenched camp outside Seringapatam on the 6th February 1792. He had therefore a personal knowledge of local

conditions and of the difficulties which the army had encountered in the previous campaign. Accordingly he decided to cross the Cauvery at the Sosile ford and to advance on the fortress by the south bank of the river, where Tipu had made no attempt to lay waste the countryside and drive off the cattle as he had done on the north side, and where a junction with the Bombay Army could more easily be effected.

Moving in a huge hollow square with a frontage of three miles and a depth of seven, and enclosing in its midst a moving city of a hundred and fifty thousand non-combatants, the army slowly advanced, being so impeded by the emaciated condition of the gun and commissariat bullocks that the average march fell to 5 miles a day. But by the 5th April it encamped before Seringapatam, and General Harris had thus reached his objective with his siege train intact, and with a full month available before any serious rise of the Cauvery need be expected. His forces however would not be complete till joined by the Bombay division of 6,400 men under Lieut.-General Stuart, which had marched from Cannanore on the 21st February and had troubles of its own. The ascent of the Virarajendrapet ghat had cost the force 4,000 bullocks and as it approached the Mysore frontier the densely wooded country so restricted camping space that the brigades were widely separated. On the 2nd March the leading brigade under Lieut.-Colonel Montresor was encamped at Seedasir on the frontier some six miles from Periapatnam, while the two remaining brigades were located eight and twelve miles respectively further back towards Siddapur. The force was therefore dangerously dispersed, and Tipu, fully aware of the situation, determined to exploit it by cutting off the advanced brigade. To conceal his purpose the Sultan gave out that he intended to march against General Harris at Maddur, while he concentrated 12,000 of his best troops at Periapatnam, where he joined them on the 5th March. On the following morning Col. Montresor's brigade consisting solely of sepoys with a few guns was beset on all sides, but with the utmost gallantry held off their assailants, though the latter were repeatedly re-inforced by fresh troops, for six hours, till they were almost exhausted and their ammunition expended. In this critical situation, Lieut.-General

Stuart arrived with reinforcements, and after a short but severe struggle drove the enemy from the field. His opportune arrival was due to a fortunate chance. A party of officers had ascended the Seedasir hill to prospect the Mysore camp some miles away near Periapatnam, and while they were watching a large green marquee was pitched. The Raja of Coorg who accompained the party was so positive that this indicated the presence of the Sultan in person, that information was at once sent to General Stuart, who realising the danger of his advanced brigade, immediately ordered reinforcements to the front. Had the leading brigade been overwhelmed, the set-back would have most seriously affected the general operations of the main army, and possibly delayed the siege of Seringapatam till the monsoon had broken. After his repulse Tipu remained in the neighbourhood for several days in hopes of another opportunity but was frustrated by General Stuart withdrawing his troops to more open ground near Siddapur, pending the arrival of General Floyd with the cavalry. As narrated later, the Bombay division finally reached Seringapatam on the 14th April.

In view of the importance of the time factor General Harris decided not to wait for them, but to commence operations at once against the enemy's outposts. A full account of the siege which culminated in the storming of the fortress on the 4th May, and the death of Tipu Sultan, is given in a subsequent chapter.

1799—1802

During the confusion attending the storm of Seringapatam Dhoondiah Wagh, a notorious freebooter who had been imprisoned by Tipu, managed to effect his escape and having collected a body of horse took possession of Shimoga and neighbouring forts. Having thus provided himself with artillery, ammunition and money, he increased his forces and asserted his right to the sovereignty of the province. Two detachments consisting of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Light Cavalry and the 1st, 8th, 19th and 22nd M.I. were immediately sent against him, and on the 8th August, the Shimoga and Honelly forts were attacked and taken by storm, General Harris reporting to Government that " the gallant behaviour of the sepoys who alone were employed was highly honourable to them." But

Dhoondiah escaped and though defeated several times was not finally disposed of till the following year, by which time he had been joined by nearly the whole of Tipu's late cavalry, and had greatly augmented his forces. In May 1800, Col. Wellesley marched with a field force against this elusive foe, and after the capture of a number of forts and operations involving much strenuous marching, finally succeeded in bringing him to bay at Conagul on the 10th September. In the action which followed Dhoondiah was killed and his force dispersed for good. It is recorded that information as to his exact position was given the previous night by a sepoy of the 20th M.I., whom Col. Wellesley rewarded with 200 pagodas and promotion.

The territory on the south of the Tungabhadra and Kistna rivers, now known as the Ceded Districts, which the Nizam had acquired under the treaties of 1792 and 1799, was made over by him to the East India Company in October 1800, in return for an augmentation of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force. These districts were principally held by Poligar chiefs, generally in a state of rebellion, and both Haidar and Tipu had met with great opposition from them.

Early in November steps were taken under the direction of Col. Wellesley, for the occupation of the ceded territory, which at first proceeded smoothly. But the settlement introduced by Major Munro was resisted by many of the Jagirdars and Poligar chiefs, and serious disturbances ensued, the troops being actively engaged until October of the following year, when operations came to a close with the capture of Ternakal, about 17 miles east of Adoni. Two attacks on that place were repulsed with loss, and it was not till breaching guns had been brought up that the fort surrendered. The troops engaged were H.M.'s 25th Light dragoons, 4th and 6th Light Cavalry, Artillery, H.M's 73rd regiment, the 23rd W.L.I. and the 15th and 30th M.I.

Our attention must now be directed to the extreme South where the brave Marawars of Ramnad and Tinnevelly, whose ancestors had conquered and held for several centuries the greater part of Ceylon, were to inflict on British troops more than one serious reverse.

Since 1749 the Nawab of the Carnatic had experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining his authority over the Poligars or petty Rajahs in Tinnevelly and Madura, and from 1753 to 1763 they were kept in subjection only by the energy and ability of Mahomed Yusuf. In 1783, encouraged by the Dutch, they again broke into rebellion but were quickly subdued by an expedition under Col. Fullarton, and Tinnevelly remained comparatively peaceful until 1798, when a fresh outbreak occurred. All available troops at the time were required for the 4th Mysore War, and it was not till after the fall of Seringapatam that an expedition could be despatched. This force, consisting of some Bengal Artillery, 400 Europeans and 2 battalions of sepoys under Major Bannerman, attempted without artillery preparation to storm the fort of Panjalamkurchi, about 26 miles north-east of Palamcottah, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Reinforcements then arrived and the defenders evacuated the fort on the following night, Katabomia Naik, the principal rebel, being captured shortly after and executed.

On the 2nd February 1801 a number of Poligars who had been imprisoned in the fort at Palamcottah succeeded in escaping and fled to Panjalamkurchi, where they were quickly joined by 4,000 men. Major Macaulay at once marched with all available troops, totalling some 900, but on arrival at Panjalamkurchi found that the fort, the walls of which, but not the bastions, had been completely destroyed in 1799, had been rebuilt and was as strong as ever. The garrison was about 1,500 strong but the people of the surrounding country rapidly assembled until there was a force of some 5,000, and Major Macaulay was forced to retreat to Palamcottah, repulsing on the way a night attack made by the enemy. Application was at once made for reinforcements, but instead of waiting for these Major Macaulay made several attempts on the enemy, all of which were unsuccessful, while in the meantime the Poligars took several small forts including Tuticorin. On the 27th March British reinforcements arrived and the force, now amounting to 2,800 men, reached Panjalamkurchi on the morning of the 31st. The fort was an irregular oblong about 500 feet in length and 300 feet broad and had been considerably strengthened in the interval; the whole was surrounded by a thick thorny hedge. By about

3 p.m. the guns had made what appeared to be a practicab'e breach in the north-west bastion and the storming party advanced to the assault covered by the fire of the remainder of the force. Under a heavy fire they succeeded in crossing the hedge and reached the top of the breach, but were unable to make any further progress, every man who showed himself being instantly killed or disabled. Finally the attempt had to be abandoned with the loss of 4 officers and 49 men killed and 13 officers and 254 men wounded. Col. Welsh says that only 46 out of 120 Europeans in the storming party were unhurt.

The cause of the failure was ascertained on the capture of the place in May to be due to the fact that the bastions were hollow and that there was no footing on the top for the assailants. The defenders, closely packed inside the bastions and armed with their 18 foot pikes, the Marawars' favourite weapon, were enabled to repulse the assault without exposing themselves.

After this set back Major Macaulay took up a position 1,500 yards from the fort and awaited further reinforcements, which arrived on the 21st May, when Lt.-Col. Agnew assumed command. A practicable breach having been made, the troops moved forward to the assault at 1 p.m. on the 24th. Their advance was impeded for some time by the hedge, and when they reached the summit of the breach they met with such an obstinate resistance that an entrance could not be effected until after a contest of over twenty minutes, when nearly all the defenders of the bastion had been killed by hand-grenades. Immediately after the capture of the bastion the Poligars, numbering about 3,000, rushed rapidly but in close order out of the fort, when they were charged by the cavalry, which inflicted considerable losses on them; the British loss amounted to 47 killed and 177 wounded. The fort no longer exists, having been razed to the ground, and the site is now a cultivated field.

After this the rebels withdrew to dense jungle, and severe fighting was necessary before the insurrection was finally quelled in October and the ringleaders executed. Altogether these operations cost the army between 800 and 900 killed and wounded, including 40 officers. The dogged bravery which the enemy then

evinced is still a characteristic of the Marawar, many of whom are now serving with Madras formations.

Col. Welsh describes how one of the Poligars fighting on the side of the British, when morally wounded, had himsellf carried into the presence of the British Commander. The old man who was placed upright in a chair then said in a firm voice : "I have come to show the English how a Poligar can die." He twisted his whiskers with both hands as he spoke and in that attitude expired.

About the end of March 1800 a small detachment with 2 guns and 50 Pioneers was sent against the Rajah of Bullum, who had taken possession of a ghat leading from Mysore into Canara, and so interrupted communications with Mangalore. The Rajah had occupied a strongly stockaded position in dense forest near Arrakaira, about 3 miles south-east of Munjerabad and this was attacked on the 2nd April, but the detachment was repulsed with the loss of 47 men killed and wounded. Reinforcements having arrived, the place was carried at a cost of 81 further casualties, while Mysore troops taking part also lost 19 killed and 41 wounded. The grenadiers of the 23rd W.L.I. who, with 3 companies of the 13th M.I. and the flank companies of H.M. 73rd and 77th regiments, formed the column of assault on the stockade, were specially mentioned for gallantry on this occasion.

But the Rajah re-occupied his position shortly afterwards and owing to other pre-occupations, it was not till 1802 that Colonel Wellesley could march against him from Seringapatam. Arrakaira was on this occasion captured with little loss, and the Rajah and his principal adherents were shortly after captured and executed. Madras troops employed on this operation were the 5th Light Cavalry, Artillery, 1st, 2nd, 5th and 18th M.I., and Pioneers.

Two overseas expeditions complete this section.

Early in 1801, at the instance of the Resident at Amboyna, a small mixed detachment including some Madras Artillery and Pioneers was sent to capture Ternate, one of the Spice Islands belonging to the Dutch. Owing to lack of co-operation by the naval commander the expedition failed, but the attempt was renewed two months later and proved completely successful. On the second

occasion the force included 150 Madras sepoys who had volunteered in a body, but whether they belonged to the 17th M.I. or to the Madras Volunteer battalion is no recorded.

A detachment of the 2nd battalion Madras Artillery, and one of Pioneers, accompanied the expedition to Egypt under Major General Baird in 1801. The force arrived in time to witness the surrender of Alexandria on the 2nd September, but too late for the battle which dispelled once and for all the myth of French invincibility on land. The privilege of bearing the *Sphinx*, with the word *Egypt*, on their Colours and appointments was subsequently granted to the corps concerned.

2nd Mahratta War—1803—06

The curtain was now about to rise on the drama of the 2nd Mahratta War in which the Madras soldier was to win fresh laurels under his "Sepoy General."

The Mahrattas had first become an organized nation in the 17th century under Shivaji. On the latter's death the Government passed from the feeble hands of his successors, the Rajahs of Satara, into those of the astute Brahman Minister, the Peshwa at Poona. The Mahratta confederacy was then formed, consisting of the Peshwa (Baji Rao) at Poona; Holkar at Indore; the Gaekwar of Baroda; Daulat Rao Sindhia of Gwalior; and the Rajah of Berar, who was Chief of Nagpore and also bore the title of Bhonsla.

Sindhia, who was ambitious of becoming the head of the Mahratta Empire, succeeded in winning over the Peshwa and inflicted a severe defeat on Holkar, his principal rival, in 1801; but having failed to follow up his victory was himself defeated with the Peshwa at Poona a year later. The Peshwa fled to Bassein and made a treaty with the British for the establishment of a permanent subsidiary force at Poona.

The convulsed state of the Mahratta Empire and the necessity to protect the Nizam under the terms of the agreement reached in 1800, caused the Marquis Wellesley, the Governor-General, to take steps to cover the frontiers from possible invasion and to implement the treaty of Bassein. All available troops were therefore assembled to act in three columns—one under Lord Lake from

Oudh; one towards Cuttack; and one from Mysore. The last-mentioned force consisted of 20,000 men under Lt.-General Stuart and the subsidiary force from Hyderabad, about 9,000 strong under Col. Stevenson. But in conformity with orders received from the Governor-General the troops destined to advance into the Mahratta country were limited to 10,600 men under the command of Major-General Wellesley; supported by Col. Stevenson's division. Two sepoy battalions in Wellesley's force are noticeable; the 8th M.I. whom he had specially selected "because I know it is a good corps which has seen much service" in spite of its having suffered severely from malaria in the Wynaad during recent operations; and the 3rd F.L.I. which had marched from Madura to the Taptee, a distance of about 1,000 miles, without a single desertion.

Wellesley crossed the frontier at Harihar on the 9th March 1803, and by the 19th April was within one march of the Bhor Ghat. Here he heard that Holkar intended to burn Poona before evacuating it, so with the cavalry and the 24th M.I. he made a forced march of 60 miles in 32 hours and arrived in time to save the city, which the Peshwa entered in state on the 7th May. On the 4th June, Wellesley marched towards the Godavari in order to watch the armies of Sindhia and Berar, who apparently intended to invade the territory of the Nizam, and when the Mahrattas commenced to advance on the 14th July he called upon them to retire. This they declined to do, and having in the meantime been invested with plenary powers by the Governor-General, Wellesley determined to commence operations by attacking Ahmednagar. He arrived before the place on the 8th August and found the petta occupied by a strong force of Arabs and one of Sindhia's battalions.

The Killadar having refused to surrender, the petta was immediately attacked by escalade in three columns. The curtains were about eighteen feet in height, connected at every hundred yards by towers or bastions held by Arabs. The first column composed of the picquets * and the flank companies of H.M.'s 78th regiment, planted their ladders on one of the curtains, but as these had no

* The advanced-guard was composed of one half company from each infantry regiment, forming the picquets coming on duty under the Field officer of the day. In the same way the rear-guard was formed of the picquets coming off duty.

ramparts, the men on getting to the top found nothing to stand on, and were consequently obliged to desist after suffering considerable loss. The right column, composed of the flank companies of H.M.'s 74th and the 3rd P.L.I., was more fortunate as it escaladed at a re-entering angle touching one of the bastions. The Arabs made an obstinate defence, but after a sharp struggle the men made good their footing, and getting down into the petta, they opened the gate to the third party, which was composed of the battalion companies of the 74th and the 8th M.I. The two columns uniting, the place was speedily cleared of its defenders. Our total loss during the storm amounted to 27 killed and 92 wounded.

On the following morning, a position within 400 yards of the fort was seized and a battery for four guns constructed, which opened at day-break on the 10th with such effect that the Killadar surrendered. The fort was found to contain a large quantity of military stores, and the gunpowder was of such good quality that the General made use of it to replace that which had been expended during the siege. The speedy capture of this immensely strong fortress had a great moral effect, one of the Mahratta chiefs in the British camp writing to friends in Poona :—

"These English are a strange people and their General is a wonderful man; they came here in the morning, looked at the petta wall, walked over it, killed all the garrison, and returned to breakfast! What can withstand them?"

Wellesley then moved to Aurangabad, where he met Col. Collins, who till recently had been Resident at Sindhia's court, and who warned him as to the opposition he was likely to meet. "I tell you, General, as to their cavalry you may ride over them wherever you meet them; but their infantry and guns will astonish you."

Meanwhile, Col. Stevenson's division, which had been covering the Nizam's dominions, moved forward to attack the confederates, but was eluded by them, and on the 21st September, in accordance with orders, joined General Wellesley, who had determined to concert a combined attack on the enemy. The two divisions separated on the 22nd and moved towards Bokerdum where the enemy was reported to be, Stevenson marching due north to block an alternative route by which the enemy might retire, while Wellesley took

a more easterly route. The latter arrived at his ground near the village of Naulniah about 11 a.m. on the 23rd, and hearing that the enemy were within six miles of him and preparing to move off, he determined to attack at once without waiting for Stevenson. A detailed description of the battle of Assaye which followed will be found in Chapter III. It will suffice here to say that the victory was decisive, though the British loss in a force totalling only 6,000 was extremely heavy, amounting to 1,584 of whom 428 were killed.

General Wellesley remained at Assaye for a few days to make arrangements for the comfort of his wounded and the security of the captured guns and stores, while Col. Stevenson's division pursued the retreating enemy. During the two succeeding months various minor actions took place. A force of 1,500 Arabs attacked a small sepoy detachment (one coy. 23rd L.I. and details) on the march near Korjet Corygaum, but was repulsed, losing in killed alone a number exceeding that of the detachment. An unsuccessful attempt was made by the enemy's cavalry to cut off a convoy at Umber which the escort of five coys. of sepoys (13th and 18th M.I.) beat off with considerable loss. About the same time the enemy tried to take possession of the bridge of boats over the Godaveri, but were foiled by Jemadar Shaikh Mohiuddin 6th M.I., who commanded the detachment left in charge. This officer not only repulsed the enemy but followed them up and captured part of their equipment, the affair being mentioned in General Orders and the Jemadar promoted.

Meanwhile Col. Stevenson had captured Burhampur, and the fortress of Asirgarh, and on the 29th November rejoined General Wellesley, who intended with their combined forces to undertake the siege of Gawilgarh. On learning however that the enemy in an endeavour to prevent the siege was drawn up in force only six miles distant, Wellesley decided to attack at once in spite of the lateness of the hour. He formed up his army in two lines, the infantry in the first and the cavalry in the second supporting the right, while the Hyderabad and Mysore horse supported the left. Some little time elapsed before the lines could be formed, owing to the picquets and the sepoy battalion which led the column

having been thrown into some confusion by a heavy cannonade of the enemy's guns as they emerged from a village; this was however quickly rectified by the General, who was close by and so able to rally them and bring them back on to their correct line of deployment. In fairness to the battalion concerned it must be noted that it had lost six out of eight British officers and no less than 228 rank and file out of 782 not long before at Assaye, where it had distinguished itself, and that it behaved admirably in the battle which followed and subsequent operations. The incident shows how even the best troops may be seized with a sudden panic.

As soon as the whole line was formed it advanced at 4-30 p.m. The 74th and 78th Foot were fiercely attacked by a large body of Arabs who were destroyed to a man, and Sindhia's cavalry charged the 6th M.I., which was on the left of the line, but were repulsed with a loss of 600. It was during this phase of the action that Col. Welsh, records an amusing incident: "An Arab threw a spear at an officer which passed through his leg and stuck in the ground behind. The officer seized it and hurled it back transfixing his opponent who was rushing at him sword in hand. All eyes were for an instant turned on these two combatants when a sepoy Grenadier rushed out of the ranks and patting the officer on the back exclaimed: 'Accha Sahib! Bahut accha kiya.' Such a ludicrous circumstance even in the heat of action could not pass unnoticed, and all enjoyed a hearty laugh before concluding the work of death on the remaining Arabs."

Elsewhere the enemy retired in the utmost disorder before the steady advance of the British line, leaving behind them 38 guns and all their ammunition; over 20 standards were also captured. The British cavalry then took up the pursuit and followed the disorganized enemy for several miles, destrying great numbers of them and capturing transport and baggage; it is stated that had there been one hour more of daylight scarcely a man would have escaped. Our loss in this important victory was inconsiderable, amounting only to 46 killed and 308 wounded. Madras units engaged were the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Light Cavalry, Artillery, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd and 24th M.I. and 1st Battalion Pioneers.

After the battle the General lost no time in commencing the siege of Gawilgarh, a fortress of great strength crowning one of the highest peaks of the Satpura Hills. Batteries were opened on the 12th December and by the night of the 14th the breaches were found to be practicable. The assault which was timed for 10 a.m. the following morning was carried out successfully by Col. Stevenson's division, while the enemy's attention was diverted by feints made by two detachments from the General's camp. The garrison, composed of regular infantry which had escaped from Argaum, and of Rajputs, was numerous and well armed with English muskets. Great numbers of them were killed, particularly at the breaches and in the gateways; our own loss was trifling, amounting in all to 126 killed, wounded and missing. The capture of this fortress having opened the way to Nagpore, the capital of Berar, the Raja of that place immediately sued for peace, while Sindiah finding himself deprived of his ally, took similar steps. This brought the war to an end.

The extraordinary mobility achieved by General Wellesley in this campaign, which contributed so much to its success, was due to the provision of pontoons for the rapid passage of rivers, and to improved methods of supply, but above all to the employment of the famous Mysore draught cattle, which were so superior to those of the Carnatic or the Deccan. As regards armament, it may be noted that the musket then in use was decisive at 80 and effective up to 160 yards; well trained troops could fire two to three rounds a minute. Artillery fire was decisive at 400 yards and effective at double that range, and when well served the English short field guns could fire up to 10 or even 12 shots a minute.

Of the troops of the Mahratta confederates the following account is taken from a report made by Lieutenant-General Stuart:—

"Scindiah's army consisted of a large amount of infantry regularly constituted, composed of natives from the north of Hindustan, conducted by European officers, and possessing all the advantages of discipline, of long experience in war, and of the confidence inspired by numerous successes.

"His artillery had attained a degree of proficiency which was scarcely to be surpassed by the skill of European troops, and the

foundries, which were established in his dominions under the direction of European officers, had supplied an extensive train of ordnance of excellent manufacture.

"His cavalry, although numerous, was inferior in quality to his infantry, and inferior indeed in activity, boldness and skill, to the former cavalry of the Mahrattas.

"In all the actions which have been fought his troops performed evolutions with a facility and order which denoted a considerable progress in European tactics.

"The troops of the Raja of Berar were constituted upon the same principles with those of Scindiah, but they possessed less experience, and were less respectable than the latter."

For the operations just concluded the troops received the Army of India Medal with bars for *Assaye*, *Argaum*, *Gawilghar* and *Asserghur*; and, as elsewhere mentioned, special distinctions for Assaye. The prize money, amounting to eleven lakhs, was distributed to the troops in the usual proportions.

Shortly after the conclusion of peace, General Wellesley, leaving Col. Stevenson's division in Berar, moved south to deal with the numerous banditti infesting the Nizam's dominions. He succeeded in coming up with their principal force at Munkaisir on the 6th February 1804, and decisively defeated them with great loss. This operation involved the infantry (8th M.I. and details of other battalions) marching 60 miles in 20 hours in order to keep up with the cavalry—a feat to which the General often referred in years to come. About the same time, another body of freebooters in the Doab, consisting of about 10,000 Mahratta horse and a number of irregular infantry, was destroyed by a field force (included in which were the 1st and 2nd Light Cavalry and the 23rd L.I. and 33rd M.I.) formed from the army of reserve. The Madras subsidiary force at Poona was also engaged in 1804–05 in Khandesh against Holkar's forts, a number of which were captured without much loss to our side. Madras Battalions engaged in these operations were the 3rd and 6th Light Cavalry, Artillery, 3rd P.L.I. and the 8th 19th, 20th and 21st M.I.

During these years the Madras Presidency had enjoyed peace, except for minor disturbances at Dindigul and Chittoor, which were

quickly suppressed, but the situation in the Wynaad and Malabar continued to be far from satisfactory. Here the Pychy Raja, as he was called, had been in more or less open rebellion since the district was ceded to the Company after the fall of Seringapatam in 1799. The area was at first garrisoned by Bombay troops, but Madras sepoys were sent by Wellesley to reinforce them after a detachment of the 1/4th Bombay Regiment had been cut up near Manantoddy in 1802. Matters were settled for the time, but after the withdrawal of the Madras troops for the Maharatta War the insurrection broke out again. Finally in 1804 the Bombay troops, numbering some 6,000, were entirely replaced by Madras troops, and the rebellion, which had increased to such an extent as to threaten the British settlements on the coast, was brought to an end by the death in action of the Pychy Raja on the 30th November 1805. Thus terminated the career of a man who had been able to persevere in hostilities against the Company for nearly nine years, during which time many thousands of lives were sacrificed and immense sums of money expended. Although more than a century has passed the memory of Kerala Varma Raja (to give his full name) is still cherished by the people of the Wynaad.

Only one item remains to be chronicled in this section, which was the serious outbreak of mutiny by the 2/23rd and part of the 1st M.N.I. at Vellore, where the family of Tipu Sultan had been interned. The outbreak was caused by the very injudicious introduction of a new pattern of turban and by certain regulations which the sepoys considered an infringement on their caste. To what extent the rising was instigated by the Mysore Princes will perhaps never be known, but they were certainly privy to it and determined to profit by any success which it might achieve. Warnings that all was not well were unheeded, and at 2-30 a.m. on the morning of the 10th July 1806 the sepoys made an almost simultaneous attack on the British guards, on the British barracks and on the officers' quarters in the fort. Most of the officers and British soldiers were killed before they could recover from the surprise but a small party managed to fight their way on to the ramparts and hauled down the Mysore Flag which had been hoisted by the mutineers; they then established themselves above the main gateway.

Meanwhile Col. Gillespie, who was stationed at Arcot some 18 miles away, learning of the outbreak set out immediately with a squadron of the 19th Dragoons and the 7th Madras Cavalry. On his arrival Col. Gillespie was drawn up by a rope on to the rampart, where his presence encouraged the brave men above the gateway, who being without ammunition had to trust to their bayonets alone. Not long after the galloper guns arrived, and the gate was blown open, when the Dragoons, handsomely supported by the Madras Cavalry, charged into the fort and inflicted dire retribution on the mutineers, of whom upwards of 350 were killed on the spot, while a number were taken in different parts of the country within the next few days. Five of the Mysore Princes' retainers were sentenced to either death or long terms of imprisonment, while the Princes themselves were sent to Calcutta, their complicity not having been established to such a degree as to warrant more extreme measures. The obnoxious orders regarding dress were rescinded and both the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief with his Adjutant-General were removed from their respective offices by orders of the Court of Directors. The 1st and 23rd Regiments were struck off the strength of the army and their place was supplied by two new regiments numbered the 24th and 25th. The 1/24th, it may be added, displayed great gallantry at Seetabuldee in 1817, and in recognition of this the 24th and 25th Regiments were both eventually restored to their original position in the Army list.

So ended the Vellore Mutiny—the only stain which sullies the loyalty of the Madras Soldier during 200 years' service. Minor outbreaks taking the form of refusal to parade had indeed occurred before and were to occur again, due to grave shortage of supplies or to pay being many months in arrears, but these never resulted in loss of life and were easily suppressed. The loyalty of the Madras Soldier to his officers and to his service is a matter of constant comment by all historians, and it should be remembered that when the Bengal Army mutinied in 1857 there was no breath of suspicion that any Madras Regiment was affected. How great then must have been the provocation which produced the Vellore rising.

Travancore—1808—9

The scene now shifts southwards to the State of Travancore. Towards the end of 1808 the subsidy payable by the Rajah having fallen considerably into arrears, the Resident urged upon him as a measure of economy the expediency of dismissing a body of regular infantry known as the Carnatic Brigade, but this proposal was not accepted. The Resident, believing that the Diwan was the principal cause of opposition, insisted on his removal from office, which was agreed to, but during the interval required for the selection of a successor, the Minister employed himself in organizing an insurrection with a view to murdering the Resident, and induced the Diwan of Cochin to join in the plot. The Residency at Cochin was attacked at midnight on the 28th December 1808 by about 1,000 Nairs, but the Resident managed to escape. At the same time a ship with 31 Privates and a surgeon of H.M.'s 12th Regiment put into Alleppey, where they were all massacred.

At this time Lieut.-Col. Chalmers was at Quilon commanding the subsidiary force which consisted of the 2nd, 4th and 26th M.I. On the 29th December he learnt that numbers of armed men had assembled round the Diwan's house and that a large body of Nairs was marching on Quilon from the south. These were dispersed, but soon after it was reported that Travancore troops were crossing the bar at Ivicka, some five miles to the north, and a stronger detachment was sent to deal with them. On arrival at the bar it was found that a considerable number of men had already crossed and were drawn up to cover the landing of the remainder. Major Hamilton, who was in command, at once attacked, killed about 400, and drove the rest into the river, but finding that the enemy were getting round his flanks in boats he withdrew to Quilon. Col. Chalmers had now been reinforced by H.M.'s 12th Foot and 36th M.I. with a detachment of artillery while the number of the enemy had risen to about 30,000 with 18 guns. On the 15th January 1809, information was received that the latter were advancing in force from several directions, and two columns were sent to attack them. The engagement lasted five hours, and resulted in the total defeat of the enemy with heavy loss and the capture of 14 guns ; our casualties amounted to 141. On the 31st

January the Cantonments were again attacked by the Nairs with a similar result, the enemy suffering severe losses.

Meanwhile on the 19th January an attack was made by several strong bodies of the enemy on the town of Cochin, which was defended by six coys. 33rd M.I. and 50 men of H.M.'s 12th Foot under the command of Major Hewitt. The defence was made with much skill and gallantry, and the assailants after several determined attempts were repulsed at every point and compelled to retreat with the loss of about 300 men, the casualties on our side amounting to 71. For this gallant defence the 33rd M.I. was afterwards awarded the battle honour *Cochin,* the sole distinction given for this campaign.

During January 1809 about 3,000 troops were assembled in the south to relieve the pressure on Col. Chalmers at Quilon. This force, which included the 6th Light Cavalry, one company of Artillery, the 3rd P.L.I., 13th and 25th M.I. and was under the command of Lieut.-Col. Sentleger, came before the Aramboly lines on the 6th February. This line of fortification guarded the break in the ghats about three miles in width through which the road to Palamcottah runs. It was defended by walls of masonry with bastions at intervals armed with cannon and its flanks rested on impenetrable jungle. The Colonel being without a battering train determined to attempt a *coup de main.* Major Welsh, 3rd P.L.I., with two companies, 69th Foot and his own battalion, after a six hours' climb during the hours of darkness succeeded in escalading the strong point known as the southern redoubt, which enfiladed the whole line, and by 8 a.m. on the 10th this formidable position was entirely in our possession. Col. Sentleger then marched on Nagercoil, where the enemy had assembled in some strength, and compelled them to retreat with the loss of nine guns, after which he moved north and reached Trivandrum on the 28th where he took up a position on the south of the city.

Meanwhile Col. Chalmers at Quilon had been reinforced by H.M.'s 19th Foot and now felt himself sufficiently strong to attack the enemy's position at Killianoor, which was protected by batteries having a deep nullah full of water in their front and defended by about 5,000 men. One brigade was ordered to turn the flank while

the other made a frontal attack. Both attacks were successful and the enemy took to flight, leaving their guns behind; our losses were small. After this successful action Col. Chalmers marched to Trivandrum and encamped a few miles north of the city, shortly after Col. Sentleger had occupied a similar position on the south. An agreement with the Rajah was then concluded and operations in Travancore came to an end. In the meantime a strong detachment (including the 11th, 24th and 28th M.I.) under Lieut.-Col. Cuppage entered Cochin from the north, and remained encamped about twelve miles north of the town until affairs were finally settled in that State also.

1810—12

The Madras Army was now to take part in further overseas operations. Between 1792 and 1809 the trade of the East India Company suffered severely from the attacks of French ships of war and privateers based on Mauritius and Bourbon. These losses at length became so serious that in 1809 a small detachment was sent from Bombay to occupy the island of Rodrigues, which it was intended to use as a naval base. The operation was effected without difficulty, and Government now resolved to attempt a complete reduction of the French islands. Accordingly a force of 1,650 Europens and 1,900 sepoys including Madras Artillery, the 6th, and 24th M.I. and Pioneers embarked at Madras on the 8th May 1810 and arrived off St. Denis, the capital of Bourbon, on the 6th July. The troops landed after experiencing some difficulty from the surf and captured the whole island after slight resistance, but disasters to the fleet resulted in Bourbon being blockaded for a time.

Meanwhile a second and larger expedition was being fitted out for the capture of Mauritius; the Madras portion of the force numbered 3,600 men and included the Madras Volunteer battalion and 200 Pioneers. The expedition reached Mauritius on the 29th September and the troops were landed without resistance. An advance on Port Louis was made the following day, which met with only slight opposition, and the island capitulated a few days later. No less than five frigates, three corvettes and twenty-four merchant

men were captured in the harbour, while 209 pieces of heavy ordnance were found upon the works, and about 2,000 English seamen and soldiers who had been taken prisoner were released from confinement. The Madras troops returned early in 1812, when they were complimented in a Government Order " for the alacrity with which they embarked, the gallantry which they displayed when opposed to the enemy, and for their uniform good conduct on all occasions during the period of their absence from the Coast." Medals were given shortly afterwards to the Bengal troops but it was not till 1838 that the 6th and 24th M.I. and the Sappers and Miners were permitted to carry the word *Bourbon* on their Colours and appointments.

The practicability of the conquest of Java had been under consideration for some time, but the undertaking was postponed till 1811. Two divisions sailed from Madras in April of that year, including Madras Horse Artillery and two battalions of Madras Pioneers; the remainder of the force consisted of European troops. After joining a detachment from Bengal, the expedition landed in the Bay of Batavia on the 4th August, and on the 27th the formidable entrenched position at Fort Cornelis was stormed. The enemy suffered severe casualties, including 6,000 taken prisoner; our loss amounted to 643 killed, wounded and missing. General Jansens, who commanded the enemy, fled, but finding further resistance hopeless, surrendered the island on the 17th September. The battle honour *Java* was later sanctioned to the Madras Horse Artillery and the second battalion Pioneers.

1812—17

From 1812 to 1814 a Field Force of Madras troops was actively employed in the Southern Mahratta country in support of the Peshwa's authority; they acquitted themselves well and received the thanks of Government. During the same years minor operations also took place in the Wynaad, Northern Circars and Kurnool.

In 1816 and 1817 the northern districts of the Madras Presidency suffered much from the intrusions of Mahratta freebooters termed Pindaries, who being invariably mounted and accustomed to march immense distances (sometimes upwards of 60 miles) by roads almost

impracticable to regular troops, proved a very elusive foe to the detachments detailed for the protection of British territory. On rare occasions they were surprised and dispersed but rapidly re-assembled, and their depredations had become so serious and the atrocities perpetrated by them so grave that Government decided to root out the trouble at the source. It was realized that as the Pindaries resided in the territories of Sindhia and Holkar, this would probably involve a Mahratta War, but Government were prepared to take that risk in view of the seriousness of the situation, and orders were therefore issued to assemble the necessary troops. A Grand Army, as it was called, consisting of troops from Bengal and numbering over 43,000 was formed in the north, while Madras supplied the greater portion of the Army of the Deccan, totalling over 70,000 men and including 21 Madras Battalions.

3rd Mahratta War—1817—19

Space does not permit a detailed account of the relations existing at the time between the various Mahratta rulers and the British Government or of the military operations which ensued over so vast an area. It will suffice to extract those worthy of remark which concern the Madras soldier.

At the commencement of the war two actions took place which were very creditable to our troops. Major H. F. Smith, 27th M.I., then serving with the Poona Subsidiary Force, was sent from Sirur with six companies of his battalion to cut off a body of about 3,500 Mahratta horse retreating northwards. He came upon their track near the river Beema, and following by forced marches overtook them at Patree above the ghats of Khandesh at daybreak on the 17th April 1817, just as they were moving from their encamping ground. Seventy of the insurgents were killed and the rest fled leaving a quantity of arms and a number of horses. The detachment on this occasion marched 150 miles in five days.

An even more spirited action was the capture of Dossanah not long after by Col. Scott with the 43rd M.I., some cavalry and four guns. On arrival at the place Col. Scott came to the conclusion that the means at his disposal did not warrant an open attack on the fort, and decided in the first instance to assault the petta in the

hope of being able to enter the fort along with the fugitives. Ladders were hastily made with tent poles, small branches of trees and cavalry heel ropes, and the storming party, covered by the fire of the guns, quickly carried the petta with trifling loss. On getting possession of the petta it was found to be completely cut off from the fort by a high wall with a gate in the centre. This gate was forced and the guns brought to bear upon the fort whereupon the garrison, consisting principally of Arabs and Sikhs surrendered. The loss of this stronghold contributed more than anything else to the expulsion of Trimbuckjee's forces from Khandesh.

The scene now shifts to Nagpore where the Rajah's forces attacked the small subsidiary force of the Madras Bodyguard, three troops of Bengal cavalry, a detachment of Madras Artillery and two Madras battalions at Seetabuldee on the 26th November 1817. The desperate action which ensued is described in detail in Chapter III. Reinforcements having arrived, the Rajah's forces were attacked on the 16th December, outside Nagpore, and dispersed with the loss of 70 guns; our casualties amounted only to 144 killed and wounded, but as nearly all the wounded had been hit by cannon shot many of them died.

The enemy having withdrawn into the city of Nagpore further operations became necessary, and by the 23rd December, a breach having been made which was considered practicable, an assault was launched, but this failed owing to unforeseen obstacles, our loss amounting to 307 killed and wounded. The Arab garrison however, having done enough to save their honour and being unwilling to abide the result of a regular siege, surrendered on terms. The Madras troops engaged in the Nagpore actions were the 6th Light Cavalry, Artillery, 2nd, 21st and 26th M.I., 23rd W.L.I., and Pioneers, and at Seetabuldee the Madras Bodyguard, Artillery, 1st and 39th M.I. and Pioneers.

Meanwhile the 1st, 3rd and 5th Divisions had encamped on the southern bank of the Nerbudda and from there carried out a combined movement against the Pindaries in Malwa, which, however, though inflicting severe losses on the enemy, failed to effect their final destruction, owing to the connivance of Sindhia and the intervention of Holkar's army. The latter was brought to action at

Maheidpoor on the 21st December 1817, and decisively defeated. A full account of this last great battle of the Madras Army as such is given in Chapter III.

Further operations against the Pindaries in January and February 1818 resulted in the death or surrender of their leaders and the final dispersal of their forces, but this was not effected without considerable fighting, the storming of numerous forts and long marches, in all of which the Madras soldier fully proved his worth.

The war finally concluded with the capture of the strong hill fort of Asseerghur where the Raja of Nagpore was believed to have taken refuge. The petta was stormed with little loss on the 17th March 1819, and regular siege operations were commenced, resulting in the capture of the lower fort on the 30th March. The upper fort was immensely strong, and the only access to it except by a sally port was by steep steps leading through five successive gateways, the whole hill having been scarped all round the foot to a height of 100 feet. On the summit there were several large cavaliers mounting unusually heavy guns. Active operations involving much labour and fatigue were carried on against the upper fort from the 1st to 7th April, up to which time the fortress commander appears to have entertained no apprehensions. But when on the 8th April, the batteries began to play with vigour and effect his courage gave way and he surrendered unconditionally. Our loss during the siege amounted to 313, that of the enemy being considerably less. Madras troops engaged in this operation were the 2nd, 3rd and 7th Light Cavalry, Madras Artillery, the 23rd and 34th L.I., the 7th, 14th, 27th and 28th M.I., and Pioneers.

Units which took part in the 3rd Mahratta War were awarded the battle honours *Seetabuldee*, *Nagpore* and *Maheidpur*, while all ranks received the *Army of India* medal with similar bars.

During these years the Presidency remained tranquil, except for minor disturbances in the Northern Circars caused by feuds in the hill zamindaris. The service was extremely harassing on account of the impenetrable and unhealthy nature of the country, and our troops suffered more from malaria than at the hands of the insurgents. Such fighting as there was devolved on small

detachments and a typical one deserves mention. A Naik and five sepoys of the 20th M.I. had been sent to guard a village near the cantonment of Berhampore. On the night of the 16th July 1817, they were attacked by a large body of men armed with match-locks, swords and spears, but they stood firm, repulsed three attacks and finally beat off their assailants with considerable loss. The Naik was promoted Havildar for his gallantry by order of the Commander-in-Chief.

In 1818 a rebellion broke out in Ceylon, and at the request of the Governor a detachment of Madras troops was sent to suppress it, which was done without difficulty. The battalions engaged were the 29th and 36th M.I., and five companies of the 19th M.I.

1st Burma War—1824—26

From 1821 onwards the Burmese had committed numerous acts of aggression against British territory, and since remonstrances proved unavailing the Governor-General prepared for war. The difficulty in inducing the Bengal sepoys to embark on foreign service prevented their being employed except to a very limited extent, and consequently it was determined to send the principal part of the expedition from Madras. The force, which included five Madras battalions, reached Rangoon on the 11th May 1824, and captured the town without difficulty. Before the expedition sailed Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, had urged upon the Governor-General the necessity for sending with it sufficient transport for use on arrival in Burma and had offered to provide all the bullocks required, but his suggestions were ignored. Lord Amherst anticipated that bullock transport and boats would be available in Rangoon for a further advance by land and water on Ava, the capital, but these expectations were not realized and the force found itself dependent on India for both food and transport. Consequently no advance could be attempted before the end of the rainy season, except to a strictly limited extent.

At the commencement of operations the Burmese restricted themselves to the defence of stockades—these were constructed of teak beams or young trees planted side by side in the ground and bound together at the top by transverse beams, leaving embrasures

or loopholes through which the defenders might fire without being exposed. Their height varied from 10 to 20 feet and platforms were fixed in the interior on an earth ramp from which the garrison might overtop the paling. Sometimes an outer and an inner ditch were added, while numerous bamboo spikes enhanced the difficulty of access. The nature of the materials used offered little resistance to cannon shot, which generally passed through the stockade without effecting a breach. Unless provided with adequate scaling ladders the troops found great difficulty in storming these stockades and a repulse occurred at Kemmendine on the 3rd June, though the place was carried on the following day. After the loss of this post the Burmese withdrew to Donabyu, but towards the end of the month advanced in force on Rangoon. They first contacted the 7th and 43rd M.I. who repulsed them with loss and then drove them with the bayonet from the hill which they had occupied. An attack next day on the 12th M.I. at Dallah was also repelled.

These checks deterred the Burmese from making a general attack on our lines, but they still remained in force and continued to harass our pickets. It was therefore decided to dislodge them from their positions, which was done on the 8th July, the enemy suffering heavy loss. During the remainder of the month and August our troops were employed on various minor amphibious operations with success, but on the 5th October the Light Brigade sustained a severe repulse at the Kyaikalo Pagoda, some 14 miles from Rangoon, due to lack of scaling ladders and the enemy withholding their fire till the assailants had almost reached the foot of the stockade. Our loss, which amounted to 7 officers and 91 men killed and wounded, fell principally on the 34th L.I.; the enemy was found to have abandoned the position on the day following. In the meantime the Government of Ava had collected their whole disposable force, estimated at about 60,000 men, under Bandoola, their best general. This army advanced on Rangoon and arrived in its immediate vicinity on the 30th November, purposely unopposed in order that the opportunity of striking a decisive blow might thus be ensured. About 4 a.m. on the 1st December the post of Kemmendine was attacked by the enemy in force but they were repulsed with great gallantry by the garrison, consisting of 58

N.C.Os. and men, Madras European Regiment, and the 26th M.I. The enemy however continued his efforts, making repeated attacks by day and night, assisted by a large number of war boats, up to the 9th December, when he finally gave up the attempt. Full details of this gallant defence will be found in Chapter III.

Meanwhile the main Burmese army had closed in on the British position round the Shwe Dagon Pagoda and commenced to entrench themselves. Their advanced posts having been driven in, and several local attacks repulsed, the British assumed the offensive and a general attack made on the 7th December resulted in the complete defeat of the Burmese "Grand Army." Notwithstanding their losses the Burmese made a further stand at Kokine where they were again defeated with heavy loss on the 15th December, after which Bandoola retired to Donabyu to reorganize. Here he was attacked and killed and with his death vanished the last hope of success for the Burmese, though a full year was to elapse, including some heavy fighting, notably at Prome and Pegu, before the main British army reached Yandaboo, only 60 miles short of the capital, and the terms offered were accepted by the Burmese Court.

The last action of the war was at Sittang, and since it was a typical one it is given in rather fuller detail to show exactly what our troops had to contend with. A detachment had been sent to capture the place, but had failed to do so, and after several gallant but fruitless attempts to escalade, had been forced to withdraw with considerable loss. On hearing of this repulse Col. Pepper set out from Shwegyin with a detachment of 70 Madras Europeans and 450 sepoys of the 3rd P.L.I., 12th and 34th M.I.,, and landed at Sittang about 8 a.m. on the 11th January 1826, when the first objects which met the eyes of the troops were the naked and mangled bodies of their comrades suspended by the heels from gibbets on the bank. The force was formed into three columns, each with two scaling ladders to attack different parts of the stockade, the left column being composed of 42 European Grenadiers and 160 3rd L.I. Fortunately we have an eyewitness account from an officer who accompanied this column.

A previous reconnaisance had shown the stockade to be of great extent, built on a hill with an abrupt ascent and commanding

every approach. It was from 12 to 14 feet high, constructed entirely of teak and full of loopholes. All along the northern face there lay a creek quite unfordable except at low water, in consequence of which the assault did not begin till 2 p.m. when the troops moved to their several destinations. The left column had to cross the creek, which was between forty and fifty yards broad, in doing which the shorter men were up to their necks in water, and all were obliged to carry their pouches on their bayonets. Not a shot was fired from the stockade during the crossing, but when passing through the jungle to the left to gain its allotted position the column was exposed to fire from the enemy's skirmishers, by which a few men were wounded. On reaching the edge of the jungle the stockade was seen about seventy yards away, and the troops advanced at the double, but before they had got half-way a heavy fire was opened on them, by which many were killed or wounded, and the ladders were dropped. These were raised again, carried up the steep ascent and planted against the stockade in spite of the enemy's vigorous attempts to throw them off by spear thrusts through the loopholes. One of the ladders broke owing to the number of men who crowded on to it, but escalade was effected by means of the other, and the men of the centre and right attacks got in about the same time. No quarter was given and about 500 of the enemy were killed out of a computed total of 1,500. Our loss amounted to 86 including 7 officers.

The action at Sittang brought hostilities to a close, and a treaty was signed at Yandaboo, on the 24th February 1826. The troops then began to fall back on Rangoon by the line of the Irrawaddy, with the exception of the 18th M.I. under Captain David Ross, which was detached to explore the route across the mountains into Arrakan. This regiment, with fifty Pioneers and the elephants of the army, left Yandaboo on the 6th March, and arrived at Aeng twenty days later. Thence it proceeded by water to Amherst, where it embarked in transports for Madras. This march forms an interesting link with operations in Burma and Arrakan in the recent war.

This campaign was essentially one of jungle warfare in which our troops had no previous experience, and it was greatly to their credit that they did so well. The Burman proved a stout opponent

and while his superior physique gave him an advantage in hand-to-hand fighting, the nature of the country afforded him every opportunity for infiltration tactics and for the rapid construction of formidable stockades.

Madras troops taking part in this 1st Burma war were the 1st Light Cavalry, Artillery, 3rd and 34th L.I., the 1st, 7th, 9th, 12th, 18th, 22nd, 26th, 28th, 30th, 32nd, 36th, 38th and 43rd M.I. and Pioneers; while two other regiments, the 10th and 16th M.I., formed part of the large expedition sent from Bengal to subdue Arrakan, which was finally effected after some initial reverses had been suffered by the Bengal troops. On their return to the Presidency in 1826 all ranks received a donation of extra batta and the thanks of the Governor-General and both the Houses of Parliament, while the Governor of Madras remarked: "In many former instances Native troops of this Presidency have cheerfully gone upon foreign service; but in none has the spirit of enterprise been so high and the devotion to the service so universal as in the late war. The orders for foreign service were received by all of them with enthusiasm; whole regiments embarked without the deficiency of a man; and repeated instances occurred of extraordinary forced marches of parties absent from the headquarters of a regiment about to embark, in order that they might not be left behind." The troops which took part in this first Burma war were given the battle honour *Ava or Arracan*, while the Indian ranks received a special medal. British ranks received the *Army of India* medal with the bar *Ava*, as a later date.

During these years Madras troops in India were engaged in one instance only. A serious disturbance broke out at the fort of Kittoor about 20 miles from Dharwar in October 1824, when the Collector with the greater part of his small escort was suddenly set upon and massacred. A force was collected at Belgaum during November, including the 4th and 8th Light Cavalry, Artillery, the 6th and 14th M.I., the 23rd W.L.I. and Pioneers—the 23rd W.L.I. having carried out a forced march of 192 miles in eight days, during which several rivers in flood were crossed. Kittoor was invested on the 1st December and on the 3rd, after a fortified outwork had been carried, the guns opened on the fort. Shortly

after the place surrendered, its submission being hastened by the fact that the 23rd W.L.I. had in the meantime entered the upper fort by escalade. Our loss was trifling, viz., three killed and 25 wounded.

1831—39

Minor operations took place in Malacca in 1831–32 against local Malays, which though of small importance are of interest since only Madras troops were employed. In August 1831 a small column of 150 men of the 29th M.I. and 24 golandauze * with two guns, was despatched to reduce a refractory chief to obedience, but the numbers and determination of the enemy had been greatly underestimated and after four days' fighting against greatly superior numbers in dense forest, our troops ran short of supplies and were forced to withdraw. The enemy now attacked the stockaded post at Soongya Pattye in great strength and by the 28th August the situation had become critical, the garrison being reduced to one barrel of powder, while casualties were so numerous that every wounded man who could pull a trigger had to assist in the defence. Fortunately the Light company 29th M.I. managed to fight its way through in time and the post was evacuated pending the despatch of reinforcements from Madras. These arrived early in 1832 and consisted of the 5th M.I., a detachment of Madras Artillery and two companies of Pioneers, when the offensive was resumed and operations were brought to a successful conclusion after heavy fighting in which a number of stockades had to be stormed.

A revolt broke out in the northern parts of Mysore during 1832, and the State troops having met with a reverse at Bednore, famous both for the treasure it yielded to Haidar Ali, and at a later date for the surrender of General Mathews and his Bombay force to Tipu Sultan, regular troops were called in to suppress the insurrection. The Bednore Field Force, as it was termed, consisted of the 7th Madras Light Cavalry, a detachment of Madras Artillery with six guns, the flank companies of H.M.'s 62nd Regiment, and the 9th, 15th, 24th and 36th Madras Infantry. Operations in the dense jungle were impeded more by the monsoon than by any

* Indian Artillery.

active opposition of the insurgents, and Bednore having been captured with little resistance, the revolt came to an end. The fort was found to mount a dozen guns of large calibre trained to cover the Futehpet gate, which was the strongest part of the defences, and it was here that by some unaccountable mistake the original attack was made and the State troops repulsed.

In January 1833 the Government of Madras found it necessary to remonstrate against the tyrannical rule of the Rajah of Coorg who had been in power since 1820, but the Rajah, who was undoubtedly subject to violent fits of insanity, having highly inflated ideas of his own power and importance, resolved on war. A force some 6,000 strong was therefore organized in 1834 to depose him and this, owing to the bad roads and difficulties of supply, was divided into four columns, which were to converge on Mercara, the capital. Two of these columns were so roughly handled by the Coorgs that they were forced to withdraw, but the others were successful in reaching their objective and the Rajah surrendered, finally dying in England in 1862. Casualties in this short campaign amounted to 6 officers and 87 men killed and about 200 wounded. Madras troops engaged in these operations were the Artillery, Sappers and Miners, the 31st L.I. and the 4th, 9th, 20th, 32nd, 36th, 38th and 40th M.I. The steadiness of the Golandauze under heavy fire was specially mentioned, and Havildar Chokkalingam of the Sappers and Miners was awarded a special medal for gallantry.

At the close of the Coorg war certain taluks which had been ceded to Coorg in 1799 were retransferred to South Kanara, and in 1837 discontent arose owing to the Collector of Mangalore demanding cash payments in place of previous assessments in kind.

At this time Mangalore was garrisoned by the 2nd M.I. and on the 30th March 1837, a detachment of 180 men under Major Dawkes was sent to accompany the Collector to Puttur about 25 miles distant. But owing to lack of firmness in handling the situation, the whole countryside was now in a state of revolt and the detachment, cut off from all supplies, had to retreat to Mangalore, losing 28 killed and 19 wounded. A few days later reinforcements arrived from Cannanore under Col. Green. 4th M.I. and the rebels

were soon dispersed. A rising in Coorg had been planned to take place simultaneously, but this also was speedily suppressed, thanks to the loyalty of the Coorg leaders, and the general body of the Coorgs.

In September 1839 a small detachment was sent against the Nawab of Kurnool, and after a short but sharp fight the Rohillas and Arabs who composed his force were defeated and the Nawab captured. Casualties amounted to only 4 killed and 26 wounded. Madras troops engaged were a squadron of the 7th L. Cavalry, Artillery, Sappers and Miners and the 34th C.L.I.

Only one item remains to be recorded in this section. On the 23rd March 1839, a Havildar's guard of the 18th M.I. while on duty at the treasury of Malwan near Belgaum was attacked by a large party of armed men, who were repulsed with the loss of 16 killed, 20 wounded and 107 prisoners. The gallantry of the guard was acknowledged in a General Order and the Havildar was promoted to Jemadar.

1839—45

The tide of war was now flowing northwards, and the only representative unit of the Madras Army in the 1st Afghan War of 1839–42, and the Scinde War of 1843, was " C " Company of the Madras Sappers and Miners, which fully maintained the high reputation of the Corps. Sir Charles Napier, who commanded in Scinde, specially remarked on the gallantry of Subadar Tandavarayan at the battle of Meanee, and added that " whenever their services are called for, the Madras sepoys will never fail to merit fresh distinction as brave and faithful soldiers."

But the Madras Army had a further opportunity for service in the 1st China War 1840–42, in which the Madras Artillery, Sappers and Miners, and the 2nd, 6th, 14th, 36th, 37th and 41st M.I. and the Madras Rifles took part. Their conduct in these operations evoked the following tribute from the Commander-in-Chief:—

" Devotedness to the service and attachment to their officers have always marked the character of the Madras sepoys. Their perseverance and gallantry before the enemy have secured for them the confidence of the British soldiers who fight side by

side with them in assaulting a breach or who support them under fire when exposed to the attacks of the enemy. It is the mutual confidence that exists between the British soldier and the Madras sepoy that makes them so formidable in the field."

The 37th M.I. particularly distinguished itself at Canton on the 30th May 1841. Cut off from the rest of the force during a heavy thunderstorm, which rendered their muskets useless, and surrounded by several thousands of Chinese troops, they repulsed every attack until relieved. Special mention of this action was made by the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords, and the Regiment was renamed the 37th Madras Grenadiers for its services on this occasion.

The 2nd and 6th M.I. took a notable part in the capture of Chin-Kiang Foo on the 20th July 1842. In company with the 55th Foot they escaladed the walls under a heavy fire of round and grape shot, cleared the ramparts at the point of the bayonet in the face of stubborn resistance and under an intense fire from the houses below, and then threw open the gates to admit the remainder of the force, when enemy resistance soon ceased.

The 2nd M.I. remained as part of the Chusan Field Force after peace had been signed on the 29th August 1842, and did not return to Madras till June 1845.

All troops taking part in this war received the battle honour *China* and the crest of the Imperial dragon.

During this period, operations took place in the Southern Mahratta country, when a small force including the flank companies of the 18th and 26th M.I. with 3 guns and 2 mortars captured the fort of Nepaunee, which early in 1841 had been occupied by a body of insurgent Arabs, the whole garrison being captured after a short resistance. Later in the same year, another body of Arabs occupied the fort of Badami, from which they were evicted after a sharp action, to the success of which the fire of the mortars largely contributed; on this occasion the 7th and 47th M.I. were engaged.

Further operations took place in 1844–45 when a number of forts were captured, the most important of these being Punalla, which had previously been considered impregnable. The greater part of the considerable force engaged consisted of Bombay troops,

but a Madras contingent also took part, including the 7th Light Cavalry, 3rd P.L.I., 8th, 16th and 20th M.I. and 23rd W.L.I., with Artillery and Sappers. Few details of these operations are available except that the 20th M.I. were specially mentioned at an action involving the "descent of the Elephant Rock", and that Private Kolappa 16th M.I., was presented with a gold medal by the Lord Provost of Perth, at the desire of the citizens of that town, to mark their sense of his gallantry in protecting and carrying back the body of their fellow-townsman, Lieutenant P. Campbell, 2nd Bombay N.I., who was killed in action in December 1844.

2nd Burma War—1852—54

The Treaty of Yandaboo in 1826 had seemed to hold out a promise of lasting friendship between British and Burmese, but the latter soon forgot their losses and so quickly did their former arrogance return that in a few years it became evident that the Government of India would sooner or later be compelled to assert its rights by force of arms. So insulting did the behaviour of the Court of Ava become that the representative of the Governor-General had to be withdrawn in 1840, but Government was at the time fully occupied with the 1st Afghan War and later with the two Sikh wars, and it was not till 1851 that Lord Dalhousie was able to turn his attention to affairs in Burma. Certain acts of oppression on British merchants brought matters to a head and satisfaction having been refused, war became inevitable.

Since the Bengal sepoys showed their usual disinclination to embark, the greater part of the force which totalled 5,800 men was provided by Madras and included the 5th, 26th and 35th M.I. General Godwin who was in command first attacked Martaban, which was carried by storm after sharp but ineffectual resistance by the Burmese, and then proceeded to Rangoon. On the 12th April 1852, the 18th and the 51st Foot and the 40th Bengal N.I. were landed, but made little progress in the face of fierce resistance and the intense heat of the sun, which caused many casualties. As in the previous war the enemy sent out strong parties of skirmishers to harass the flanks of the column and the inevitable stockade was encountered. Under cover of four guns it

was stormed by four coys. 51st Foot and a detachment of Madras Sappers, though not without considerable loss, and owing to the exhaustion of the troops this marked the limit of the day's action. The 13th was spent in bringing up heavy guns and in reconnaissance, while the ships kept up an occasional fire on the various stockades. On the following day the advance was resumed, and the enemy's position on the Shwe Dagon Pagoda stormed at the cost of 149 casualties. Having secured Martaban and Rangoon, General Godwin next turned his attention to Bassein, to capture which 400 of the 51st Foot and 300 of the 9th M.I. were detached. On the 18th May the flotilla arrived off the Burmese position, which consisted of a well built mud fort mounting several guns. The Burmese reserved their fire till the attacking columns approached, but our troops were not to be denied and stormed the position with great gallantry.

In August further reinforcements arrived from Bengal and Madras, the latter including the 9th, 19th, 30th and 49th M.I., and General Godwin, having collected a strong flotilla of Burmese boats, moved on Prome which was captured with little loss. He then proceeded to Pegu, which was reached on the 20th October when reconnaissance showed that the Burmese position was strongly fortified. The troops, which included the 5th M.I. disembarked on the 21st and after capturing an advanced post, cut their way through the jungle and after a fatiguing march of two miles arrived in front of the main gate. Here the Burmese were in great strength and opened a heavy fire, but the troops pressed on with vigour, and charging with fixed bayonets, drove the enemy headlong from his defences. An advance was now made on the pagoda, from which the Burmese speedily retired, and leaving 200 Madras Fusiliers and 200 of the 5th M.I. to garrison the place, Gen. Godwin returned to Rangoon. The slight resistance which the enemy had so far offered in this campaign, so different from that displayed in the previous war, apparently led the British Commander to underestimate his enemy, with the inevitable result that the small garrison at Pegu was closely besieged by a large force of the Burmese, and one attempt at relief having failed it became necessary for General Godwin himself to undertake the task at the head

of 1,300 men. This was effectively carried out and the enemy were routed with heavy loss.

In the meantime a revolution occurred at Ava, and Mindon Min ascended the throne. He was averse to war and anxious for peace but declined to sign any treaty. Lord Dalhousie therefore decided to annex the Province of Pegu but to make no further move northwards. In furtherance of this policy military operations were therefore restricted to re-establishing law and order throughout the Province, in which numerous bands of dacoits had sprung up on the disappearance of the Burmese army. The suppression of these involved considerably more fighting than previously experienced in this campaign, and one sharp reverse was sustained by Bengal troops near Donabyu, the scene of such hard fighting in the previous war. Taken as a whole the campaign is not comparable with that of 1824–26, since owing to the chaotic state of administration the Burmese were never able to put into the field a force of any size, and they had no General of the calibre of Bandoola.

Madras troops taking part in the 2nd Burma War were the 1st Light Cavalry, Artillery, Sappers and Miners and the 1st, 5th, 9th 12th, 19th, 26th, 30th, 35th and 49th M.I., all of which received the battle honour *Pegu*, while three Madras Sappers were awarded the Order of Merit. It is worth noting that Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, insisted on Madras troops being employed in this campaign, since the Bombay regiments had recently been given the opportunity of active service in the Sikh Wars.

Early in 1857 an expedition composed almost entirely of troops from Bombay was despatched to Persia, the only Madras unit being " B " Company of the Sappers and Miners, which returned to India on the 1st June, when it at once volunteered for service against the mutineers in Northern India.

Bengal Mutiny—1857—60

Many factors contributed to what is generally known as *The Bengal Mutiny*. For some time past signs had not been lacking that all was far from well with the Sepoy portion of the Bengal Army. It had emerged from the recent Sikh Wars with little

credit, and the state of discipline had sunk to a very low level, largely owing to the inveterate Bengal practice of promoting both British and Indian officers by strict seniority and retaining them long after they had become useless. In addition, the powers of Commanding Officers had been whittled down to such an extent, that even a promotion to Naik had to be referred to higher authority for sanction. Between 1844 and 1852 no less than four mutinies of Bengal regiments had occurred, due to dissatisfaction over the question of extra allowances, but these were of a purely military nature without any tinge of patriotism, whereas the rebellion of 1857 was very definitely nationalist in character. The annexation of Scinde and the appointment of the Inam Commission in the Southern Mahratta country had caused widespread discontent and apprehension among all classes of the population, and this was accentuated by the decision of the East India Company to annex the Kingdom of Oudh, whence so large a proportion of the sepoys enlisted in the Bengal Army was drawn. Even so the crisis might have been averted by the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief with some experience of India and some knowledge of the customs of the men he commanded. But with incredible folly the Army authorities at this juncture decided to issue for use by the troops a new cartridge the exterior of which was lubricated with ingredients repugnant alike to the Muhammadan and the Hindu. Those engaged in subversive activities naturally made full use of this very real cause of complaint, and as at Vellore in 1806, the fear of loss of caste and forced conversion to Christianity drove the sepoys into open rebellion, in which a large proportion of the population also joined. The first outbreak occurred at Meerut in May 1857, and within a few weeks practically the whole of Northern and Central India from the Punjab to Calcutta was ablaze, while outbreaks also occurred in the Bombay Presidency and Hyderabad in those units which contained a large proportion of Oudh men.

At the time the number of British troops in India was dangerously low due to the recent Crimean campaign and expeditions to Persia and China, and this was undoubtedly an important factor in the calculations of the mutineers. Emissaries had been sent to test the loyalty of the other Presidency armies, but met

with little success in Bombay, and in Madras with none at all. The Madras army had no grievances nor sympathies with the Brahmin sepoys of Bengal. What they had seen of them in occasional garrison reliefs and especially in Burma in 1852, had not tended to cameraderie. The Brahmin and other high caste sepoys looked down, as from an immensely superior height, upon the Madrassi, and took every opportunity to show this feeling. It is not surprising therefore that in this hour of trial the Madras sepoys not only remained loyal but volunteered for active service against the rebels, petitioning " to be granted an opportunity of proving their faithful attachment to the Government which had cherished them." In view however of certain possible eventualities in the Peninsula, the Governor-General decided that the bulk of the Madras Army should for the time being remain in the south, and in consequence the force sent from Madras in July 1857 to assist in the reconquest of North India was at first limited to one Brigade.

The Bengal Indian Army in 1857 numbered over 120,000, and though some units remained faithful to their salt the great majority mutinied, their strength being increased by the forces of some Native States, and local partisans.

The military operations during the years 1857–59 centred in the North Western Province, in which Delhi was then included, and Central India with Bundelkhand. In the following narrative only those in which Madras troops took part are described. The Madras Brigade consisting of Horse Artillery, Golandauze, " C " Company Sappers and Miners and the 17th and 27th M.I. joined General Windham's force at Cawnpore on the 15th November 1857; the 17th M.I. was detached to garrison Futtehpore to maintain communications between Allahabad and Cawnpore, while the rest of the brigade after seeing considerable fighting at Cawnpore was sent to reinforce Outram at Lucknow. Here it took part in the defence of the Alambagh, where Outram's small force of 4,400 held out for twelve weeks against repeated and most determined attacks by the enemy estimated at 120,000 with 100 guns. Later it formed part of the Oudh Field Force, and in all was on active service for two years. The units composing it were granted the

battle honour *Lucknow* and all ranks received the Mutiny medal with clasps for *Lucknow* and *Central India.* "C" Company of the Sappers and Miners was conspicuous for gallantry at Lucknow, and was the first to hoist the British flag on the roof of the Martiniere; one Havildar and three Sappers received the Indian Order of Merit for gallantry during the campaign.

Meanwhile a second Madras Force was being assembled at Jubbulpore under the command of General Whitlock, to co-operate with Sir Hugh Rose's Bombay division (serving with which was "B" Company Madras Sappers and Miners) in the subjugation of Central India, and to distract the mutineers' attention from Sir Colin Campbell's operations in Oudh. Owing to the distance which it had to march Whitlock's force did not reach its first objective till the 19th April 1858, when after a successful action at Banda, Kirwee was captured, a fabulous amount of treasure and jewels being taken and subsequently awarded to the troops as prize money, the distribution causing much heart-burning among those who did not participate. Included in the force were the 6th and 7th Light Cavalry, Madras Horse and Foot Artillery, "L" Company Sappers and Miners, and the 1st, 19th, 30th and 50th M.I. all of which received in due course the medal with bar for *Central India.*

"B" Company of the Sappers and Miners, which as already related had only just returned from Persia and was serving with Sir Hugh Rose's Bombay division, distinguished itself on a number of occasions. It took the field with 6 British officers and 120 Indian ranks, and after 20 months continuous service returned to Madras with only 40 men commanded by a junior subaltern. Lieutenant Prendergast of the Company received the Victoria Cross, while 2 Indian officers and 5 Indian ranks received the Indian Order of Merit.

Histories of the Bengal Mutiny, whether official or non-official, tend to concentrate on the operations round Delhi, Cawnpore and Lucknow, and Sir Hugh Rose's campaign in Central India, and it has proved extremely difficult to record all the actions in which Madras troops were engaged in other parts of the Peninsula. The following brief list of their activities must not be considered as

in any way complete but merely as indicative of the services performed.

In the Nagpore Field Force 1858–59 were the 4th Light Cavalry and the 26th, 32nd, 33rd and 40th M.I. all of whom received the medal with bar for *Central India* for various operations. The 30th and 47th M.I. formed part of the Bellary Field Force, while the 3rd P.L.I. from Cannanore, the 8th M.I. from Mangalore and the 16th M.I. were employed in conjunction with Bombay troops in North Canara. These units received the medal only without bar.

The Madras Rifles were actively engaged in Bengal from the 5th September 1857, to the 2nd August 1860, and with them served the 28th, 34th and 49th M.I. All these received the medal without bar, while the 17th M.I. previously mentioned was awarded the bar for *Central India.*

Altogether no less than 18 Madras Infantry battalions together with Madras Artillery, Cavalry, Rifles and Sappers and Miners took part in suppressing the Bengal Mutiny, and in a despatch dated the 19th August 1859, the Secretary of State for India said :

"The Commander-in-Chief's minute contains only a slight sketch of the important services which have been rendered by the Madras Army during the great contest in Northern India. The *great fact* has been the perfect fidelity of that army, and the perfect loyalty of the twenty-three millions of persons who inhabit this Presidency, which enabled the resources of the south of India to be freely put forth in support of our hard-pressed countrymen in the north."

Again Lt.-Gen. Sir Patrick Grant said :

"The services in the field of the troops of this Presidency employed in the suppression of the rebellion and mutiny are now a matter of history and the glowing terms in which they have been recognized must endure for ever, an unperishable record of the achievements of these noble soldiers. It can never be forgotten that, to their immortal honour, the Indian troops of the Madras Army have been, in the memorable words of the Earl of Ellenborough, 'faithful found among the faithless'."

Her Majesty Queen Victoria also graciously expressed her thanks to the Madras troops " for the useful service they have rendered during the past two years ", and to all the Madras Native army for its loyalty.

During these two years 17,000 Madras recruits were enlisted and the establishment of 52 regiments of infantry was augmented by four extra battalions. But the memory of man is short, and between 1860 and 1864 not only were the four extra battalions reduced, but twelve of the regular regiments suffered a like fate. Comment is superfluous.

Meanwhile the 2nd China War had broken out and a force was despatched to capture Canton in December 1857, the 38th M.I. being the only Indian unit present. In May 1858 the Taku Forts were captured and in the following month peace was signed; but as it was not implemented hostilities again broke out. Pre-occupations in India prevented the despatch of more troops till 1860, when a strong combined force of British and French troops was assembled and Pekin was captured, this bringing the war to an end. In addition to the 38th M.I., Madras Artillery, " A " and " K " Companies Sappers and Miners, and the 2nd, 12th and 21st M.I. were also employed in this campaign. The battle honours *Taku Forts* and *Pekin* were granted to the units engaged.

1861—77

" G ", " H " and " K " Companies of the Sappers and Miners took part in the Abyssinia Campaign of 1867–68, but with this exception, and individual Madras officers and men employed with the transport, the force consisted entirely of troops supplied by the Bombay Presidency.

In 1875–76 " C " Company of the Sappers and Miners was employed on the Perak expedition.

2nd Afghan War—1878—80

With the exceptions noted in the previous section no Madras troops had seen any active service for upwards of twenty years.

But in 1878, as the result of tension between England and Russia, hope ran high in the Madras army that they might again

take the field. In April of that year orders were issued for the despatch of an expeditionary force to Malta, in which 2 Companies Sappers and Miners and the 25th M.I. were included. The troops reached Malta in May and remained there only about a month when, owing to a peaceful agreement having been reached between England and Russia, they returned to India.

Though disappointed at the outcome of this expedition, a further opportunity for service, though on a limited scale, occurred when the 2nd Afghan War broke out, and the 1st Light Cavalry, Sappers and Miners, and the 1st, 4th, 15th, 21st and 30th M.I. joined the army in the field in 1879. Although unfortunate in having no opportunity of taking part in any general action, the Madras units did a great amount of useful work with minor expeditions, and thoroughly earned the battle honour *Afghanistan, 1878–80.*

1882—85

In consequence of a military revolt in Egypt headed by Arabi Pasha, it was decided in July 1882 to despatch a British expeditionary force to that country. The division furnished by India included two companies of Sappers and Miners and the 4th and 31st M.I., but the latter took no part in the fighting, as they were retained in reserve at Aden, till they returned to India in October of the same year. For their services in the campaign the Corps of Sappers and Miners received the battle honours of *Egypt 1882* and *Tel-el-Kebir.*

In 1885 an Indian contingent was sent to Suakin, but no Madras troops accompanied the original force, except "F" Company Sappers and Miners, whose gallantry at the hard fought action of McNeil's Zareba was specially noticed, and who earned for their Corps the further battle honours of *Suakin* 1885 and *Tofrek.*

After the withdrawal of the expeditionary force, a small garrison was maintained for some years at Suakin, but details of this force are not available, though regimental records show that the 20th M.I. formed part of it for a time.

3rd Burma War—1885—89

The scene now shifts again to Burma, where for the third time Madras troops were to be employed on a large scale. After the 2nd Burma War of 1852 relations between the British and Burmese, though not very satisfactory, remained on a more or less friendly basis so long as King Mindon Min lived. At his death in 1878, however, his son Thibaw came to the throne, and the situation rapidly deteriorated. Thibaw started his reign with a bloody massacre of about eighty of his relations, and many indignities heaped on British subjects made it clear that the violent party then in power desired a rupture with the British Government. Owing however to our commitments at this time in Zululand and Afghanistan, no troops could be spared to enforce our demands on Burma. The respite thus given and the news of British reverses at Maiwand and Isandhlwana encouraged Thibaw to further atrocities, which culminated in a plot, fortunately unsuccessful, to massacre the British Resident and his escort. After the withdrawal of the Resident, Thibaw began to intrigue with various foreign powers, and a treaty was finally signed with France in January 1885, giving to that country controlling interest over the upper Irrawaddy. War thus became inevitable, and on the 10th November orders were issued for the division which had already been assembled in Lower Burma to advance on Mandalay. This force, which was under the command of Major-General Prendergast, V.C. (who had won his decoration while serving with Madras Sappers in the Mutiny) included 3 Companies Sappers and Miners, the 23rd W.L.I. and the 1st, 12th, 21st and 25th M.I. with two Bengal battalions, while a reserve brigade was warned for service from the Bombay Presidency. The Viceroy's instructions to the Commander were as follows:—" The immediate objects of the expedition are the occupation of Mandalay and the dethronement of King Thibaw; and it is extremely desirable that these objects should be attained rather by the display than the use of force." General Prendergast accordingly crossed the frontier on the 15th November and by the 28th of that month the King and the city of Mandalay were in his power. The advance which was by water, met with comparatively little resistance except at the fort

of Minhla, where the 12th M.I. had four officers and 26 men killed and wounded, practically the only casualties incurred at this stage. The Burmese casualties were heavy; they carried away many of their dead but 170 were buried by the British and 276 prisoners were taken. This was the only place where anything like stubborn resistance was offered to the British advance, and with its fall the opposition of the Burmese army was practically at an end. Though this event complied with the Viceroy's instructions it had most unfortunate results, since thousands of Burmese soldiers were turned loose on the countryside, armed and unbeaten, to become the backbone of the dacoity which required several more years to suppress. Upper Burma had been in a state of anarchy prior to the British advance, and after the fall of Mandalay similar conditions prevailed for some time, as the troops available were totally insufficient to restore law and order over such a vast area, while frequent changes of the Ministry in England delayed decisions as to whether the country should be annexed. By the time that the future administration had been settled in March 1886, Burmese leaders had organized a national resistance, and owing to the monsoon military operations on a large scale had to be postponed till the cold weather. In the meantime small columns were sent out in different directions to intercept dacoit gangs.

A large part of Burma is covered with jungle, which added to the difficulties of troops trained only for open warfare, while transport problems limited the size of our columns, which seldom exceeded 100 rifles and a few cavalry or mounted infantry. Operations, though continuous and extensive, were therefore on a minor scale, a convoy ambuscaded, the defence of a small post against a sudden attack, or a forced march to surprise a gang of dacoits who seldom stood to fight but generally fled at the first shot. Under such difficult conditions it is not surprising that regrettable incidents should occasionally occur, but there is no reason to suppose that such were more common with Madras detachments than with troops from other Presidencies. On the other hand there are numerous records of good work by Madras troops which are recorded in detail in the official history of the war.

During this period two setbacks occurred which greatly encouraged the rebels. These were the withdrawal of the Nape garrison due to sickness, and the death of Mr. Phayre, Deputy Commissioner of Minhla, during an unsuccessful attack on an enemy post; in both cases Bengal and not Madras troops were concerned.

In the meantime considerable reinforcements had arrived, including the 2nd Madras Lancers, the 3rd P.L.I., and the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 26th, 27th and 30th M.I. and in addition a large military police force recruited from North India, so that before the end of 1886 there were in the country over 24,000 troops and some 8,000 military police. The plan of operations decided on to restore law and order consisted in establishing a large number of small military posts throughout the country, while flying columns were stationed at suitable points to keep up an unrelenting pressure on the rebel leaders, and to deal with any gangs of dacoits which might enter their area. These dispositions in due time produced the desired effect, which was materially hastened by the use of mounted infantry companies and the improvement of communications due to the extension of the railway and a greatly increased steamer service of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company. By the end of 1887 most of the rebel leaders had been accounted for and it was found possible to withdraw a number of Indian Infantry battalions, though several more years were to elapse before Upper Burma was completely pacified.

The 3rd Burma War terminated in 1891 with the suppression of a sudden outbreak at Wunthoo. The Sawbwa of that State, who for some years had been covertly hostile though outwardly subservient to the British, using as a pretext the passage of a British column in pursuit of some dacoits across a portion of his territory, suddenly broke into rebellion, and under a well-prepared scheme attacked a number of posts simultaneously. On the 16th February 1891, rebels from Wunthoo broke into Kawlin and set fire to several buildings, but were eventually driven out by the military police. Reinforcements of police arrived on the 17th and on the 19th Lieut. Nisbett arrived from Katha with 100 men of the 20th M.I., bringing the garrison up to 180. Meanwhile other

posts were being attacked, and the situation growing most serious, reinforcements were hurriedly despatched from Shwebo and Mandalay, while arrangements were made at Mandalay for a field force to be assembled.

At Kawlin on the afternoon of the 19th the rebels made a second determined attack, assailing the town simultaneously from three sides, and the garrison was hard pressed when Captain Keary with a small force of mounted police from Shwebo arrived most opportunely on the scene. He at once charged the dacoits who were driven off with heavy loss and the post was relieved. More of the 20th M.I. and other troops now reached Kawlin, and on the 22nd a force of about 400 attacked and defeated a large body of the enemy who had taken up a strongly entrenched position. The success of this action, and of an affair at Okkan on the same day, completely stamped out the rebellion in the south of the country within a week of its outbreak. The military operations therefore were practically over before the field force under Brig.-General G. B. Wolseley was in the field. The crushing of this serious rebellion in so short a time is an outstanding example of what can be effected by a resolute offensive against vastly superior numbers.

Throughout these years of arduous campaigning Madras troops had taken their full share of the work, and the official records show what useful service they rendered. They suffered far more casualties from malaria than in action with the enemy, but that was the common experience of all troops, whether British or Indian, engaged in the campaign, and they certainly earned the battle honour of *Burma 1885-87* awarded to those units which took part in these harassing operations. The Indian General Service Medal with bars *Burma 1885-87*, *Burma 1887-89* and *Burma 1889-92* was given to those who took part in the 3rd Burma War.

It has frequently been stated that the Madras sepoy proved unreliable in this campaign. With so many small detachments of troops utterly untrained for jungle warfare, and with no experience of active service for 30 years, it is probable that some minor regrettable incidents did occur, though no record of them is to be

found. But such incidents are liable to occur in any army, and there are records of their having happened in the 3rd Burma War to troops who were not Madrassis. There is no reason to suppose that the Madras soldier, in spite of so many years of peace, proved any less reliable than his comrades from Bengal or Bombay.

In this connection Lt.-Gen. Burton writing in 1888 says:—

"There has probably been here and there an instance of slackness or unsteadiness among the many thousand men, both of Bengal and Bombay, as well as Madras, who have been employed in Burma; but the Bengal papers have taken care to preserve silence on the laches of their own troops, but have industriously sought out and exaggerated all rumours affecting the Madrassis."

1889—96

But though Upper Burma had been pacified, the border tribes still remained to be dealt with, and some years elapsed before the Chins, Kachins and Shans were induced to submit. The operations were even more harassing than those of the previous years, on account of the mountainous nature of the terrain, but were in due course successfully completed. Space does not permit of a detailed account of the various expeditions, and it will suffice to record that between 1889 and 1892 Sappers and Miners and six Madras battalions (2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th M.I., 23rd W.L.I. and 32nd M.I.) were engaged in operations against the Chins and Kachins, and all appear from the official records to have done uniformly well. A detachment of the 23rd W.L.I. defended Sadon in 1892 for 13 days and nights against almost continuous attacks.

The 13th M.I. also were employed in the Chin Hills in 1896 on punitive operations, which were carried out successfully and with credit to the Regiment. The same battalion had been called upon to send 150 rifles at very short notice to suppress a Moplah rising in Malabar in 1894. Setting out immediately, the detachment covered 38 miles by road and 20 by boat in 36 consecutive hours, but unfortunately arrived too late, as the rebels had been wiped out by a detachment of the 1st Dorset Regiment.

N.W. Frontier--1895—98

In 1895 a rebellion broke out in Chitral, and the small British garrison of that place was besieged. No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners formed part of the relief force, and earned for the Corps the battle honour *Chitral*.

In 1897 trouble again broke out on the North-West Frontier, and in September two divisions were mobilized for the invasion of the Tirah. In addition to Sappers and Miners, Madras was represented by one unit only, the 21st Pioneers, which saw a considerable amount of service before operations terminated in April 1898. The Regiment earned special commendation for "great coolness and staunchness" while acting as rearguard to the column withdrawing from Burg on 28th December 1897, and behind the terse official notice lies a story. The 21st Pioneers, who had been largely employed as Corps troops and felt that they had not had their fair share of fighting, had petitioned to be given a more active role, and the General agreed to their doing rear-guard on the date in question. After the destruction of Burg, the enemy, having as usual collected on the hills all round, closely followed the rearguard as soon as the picquets were withdrawn. Knowing that they were faced by a Madras regiment they thought the opportunity too good to be missed and closed in on the 21st with a recklessness which they had at no time previously displayed. But the Madras Pioneers stood firm and inflicted on the tribesmen heavier casualties than any which they had sustained to date. That a Madras regiment with so little experience of mountain warfare could do so well is proof of what the Madras soldier is capable of under good officers. It is also worth noting that the 21st Pioneers, in spite of the intense cold, were one of the healthiest battalions engaged in these operations.

Two other Madras units, the 6th and 20th M.I. were moved up to the Tochi in 1898 but unfortunately were too late to participate in any fighting.

For this campaign the Corps of Sappers and Miners was granted the battle honours *Punjab Frontier, Malakand* and *Tirah*, while one Indian Officer and two other ranks received the Indian

Order of Merit. The 21st Pioneers was awarded the honours *Punjab Frontier* and *Tirah.*

1900—13

In 1900, in conjunction with other Allied Powers, a China Expeditionary Force was despatched from India for the relief of the Pekin Legations which were besieged by the Boxers. Operations having been brought to a successful conclusion the troops returned to India early in 1901. Madras troops taking part in this short campaign were the Sappers and Miners, the 1st M.Ps., 3rd P.L.I. and 28th M.I.

No. 12 Company Sappers and Miners was on service in 1903–04 with the Thibet Expeditionary Force, and No. 9 Company was employed in the Zakka Khel operations of 1908.

In 1911 the 79th C.I. (formerly 19th M.I.) was selected for duty in the Persian Gulf in connection with the suppression of gun-running, and a minor incident showed that the Madras soldier had lost none of his fighting qualities through so many years of peace. A mutinous Persian regiment some 500 strong advanced on the British Consulate at Shiraz on the 10th June and endeavoured to force the main gate, which was held by a guard of a Lance Naik and three privates of the 79th C.I. Every effort of persuasion having failed to stop the Persians, and fire having been opened by them, the Lance Naik ordered a burst of rapid fire and followed it up with the bayonet, on which the Persians fled. All four members of the guard received the I.D.S.M. for their gallant conduct in this little affair.

1914—39

Considerations of space preclude even an outline of the world-wide operations which took place during these years and it must suffice to record briefly the services rendered by Madras regiments in the various theatres of war.

On the outbreak of war the 61st Pioneers and 63rd P.L.I. were detailed to form part of the expeditionary force to East Africa. The 61st, being at full strength, had little difficulty in mobilising but the 63rd, being on the reduced establishment of 600, had to

indent for 400 men from its linked battalion to reach its full complement, while British officers from five different units had to be posted to complete to field service scale. The force left Bombay on the 16th October 1914, and arrived off Tanga on the 2nd November. The 61st was one of the first units to land and took its full share of the heavy fighting on the 3rd, when it lost four officers and 57 men killed and 22 wounded. On the following day the remainder of the force having landed, the offensive was resumed and the 61st was engaged throughout the day, suffering 38 more casualties. It is worth recording that when the regiment in front broke back through the 61st the latter stood firm; finally in accordance with orders it retired at midnight and re-embarked on the following day. Meanwhile the 63rd P.L.I. whose component parts had never paraded together and whose officers were mostly unknown to the men, soon after landing had been carried away by a panic-stricken regiment in front breaking through them, and this regrettable incident has been remembered while it is forgotten that the 61st Pioneers was the steadiest of all the Indian battalions present at this action. During the next three years the 61st was employed chiefly on Pioneer work during the East African campaign, while the 63rd carried out garrison duties.

Another Madras unit, the 75th C.I., was on service at Aden from April 1916 to December 1920. It had several sharp brushes with the enemy, notably on the 7th December 1916 when Jabri was attacked at dawn and captured, the regiment having nine men killed and six officers and 36 men wounded; and at Handley Hill on the 3rd October 1918, when a premature withdrawal of our cavalry enabled the enemy to get round the flanks during the retirement. The 75th were closely engaged in thick bush for an hour, but by repeated bayonet charges and steady withdrawals 100 yards at a time, were able to extricate themselves with a loss of 1 B.O. and 18 I.O.Rs. killed and 2 officers and 29 men wounded. After the Armistice the Turkish Commander admitted that his men feared the 75th C.I. more than any other Indian battalion " because they were not afraid to go in with the bayonet "—high praise indeed.

During 1915 the 81st Pioneers was actively employed on the North-Western Frontier of India and saw a good deal of fighting.

It was specially commended, with the Guides, for a rearguard action covering a withdrawal to camp when numbers of British soldiers collapsed from heatstroke and had to be carried in. The day's action was a particularly strenuous one covering 24 miles out and back.

The 81st was again employed during the Marri operations in March and April 1918.

In 1915 the 64th Pioneers was engaged in suppressing a Kachin rising in Upper Burma, during which two N.C.Os. received the I.D.S.M., and in the following year it proceeded to Mesopotamia, disembarking at Basra on the 1st March 1916. It was continuously employed until the Armistice, chiefly on pioneer work, but sustained a number of casualties in the Hai Salient. In 1919 the regiment proceeded to Kermanshah, where it was employed on L of C duties and it is recorded that the men stood up very well to the intense winter cold. In April 1920 it proceeded to Hamadan where it carried out garrison duty till it returned to India in 1921, after an absence of five years.

Other Madras regiments which took part in the Mesopotamian campaign were the 73rd, 79th, 80th and 88th C.I., 83rd W.L.I. and 1/156th Infantry; but up to the time of the armistice none of these units was given any share of active service, being restricted to garrison duties at the base and on the lines of communication.

In November 1919 the 80th C.I. joined the 51st Brigade of the 17th Division and after taking part in the operations in Kurdistan saw a considerable amount of fighting during the Arab rebellion in Iraq in 1920, one of their Subadars winning a Military Cross while nine V.C.Os. and I.O.Rs. received the I.D.S.M.

Other Madras units engaged in this theatre during 1919–1920 were the 63rd P.L.I. (Iraq), 79th C.I. (N.W. Persia and Iraq), 81st Pioneers (S. Persia), 83rd W.L.I. (Iraq) and 86th C.I. (Iraq).

Meanwhile the 3rd Afghan War had broken out on 6th May 1919, and four Madras battalions (1/61st, 2/61st, 1/81st, and 2/81st Pioneers) formed part of the field force employed against the Afghans and the tribes who rallied to their support. Peace with Afghanistan was signed on the 8th August 1919, but further operations involving considerable fighting took place in Waziristan

between 1919 and 1924. In addition to the abovementioned units the 64th Pioneers and the 73rd C.I. also were actively engaged in the same theatre. The 73rd C.I. was specially sent to the North-West Frontier to be tried out and again proved that a Madras battalion well trained and under good officers can stand comparison with any others in the Indian army.

In August 1921, a Moplah rebellion broke out in Malabar, and a considerable force had to be assembled to deal with the situation. Several severe engagements were fought, but the operations consisted mostly of jungle warfare reminiscent of the Burma campaigns. Detachments of Sappers and Miners, 64th Pioneers and 83rd W.L.I. were engaged and acquitted themselves well in action with the rebels.

In the Burma rebellion of 1931–32 the 1st Battalion Corps of Madras Pioneers (formerly 61st) was engaged on pioneer work and rounding up rebels, receiving special commendation for its services.

During the same period the ubiquitous Madras Sappers and Miners were engaged on many fronts. Between 1914 and 1918 various units of the corps served in France, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, East Africa, Palestine and on the North-West Frontier. In 1922–23 Nos. 10, 13 and 14 Companies were engaged with the Razmak Field Force, while No. 63 Company was in action against the Kurdish tribes. During 1930 and 1932 Nos. 12 and 14 Companies took part in the operations in Burma, along with the 1st Battalion Corps of Madras Pioneers (formerly 61st) while Nos. 9 and 10 Companies were employed on the North-West Frontier on the punitive expedition from Wana and the relief of Datta Khel. Between 1936 and 1939 further operations on the North-West Frontier (principally in Waziristan) saw Nos. 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15 Companies again engaged.

Mention must also be made of the Madrassi Signal Companies Nos. 33, 34 and G. Divisional Signals, which did such good work in maintaining communications in Mesopotamia and on the North-West Frontier. No. 34 Coy. had the misfortune to be captured in Kut, but was reformed in 1919 and took part in the Zhob expedition of 1920. It was also employed in the Waziristan campaigns of 1930, and 1936–37. No. 33 Coy. took part in the Marri punitive

operations, in the 3rd Afghan War, the Arab rebellion and Waziristan. G. Divisional Signals was employed in the 3rd Afghan War.

1939—46

On the outbreak of the 2nd World War in September 1939, it is doubtful whether more than 8,000 Madrassis were serving with the armed forces. But it soon became obvious that if the Indian Army was to be expanded to the extent desired, far larger numbers of men would have to be taken from South India than in the past, and before the war ended over half a million recruits had been enlisted from the Madras Presidency and the South Indian States.

Of the pre-war units, the Sappers and Miners and Madrassis serving with the Indian Signal Corps were engaged from the outset and the list of awards for gallantry shows how well they did.

Of the new formations, Madrassi gunners were the first to have an opportunity of showing their mettle at Bir Hacheim in the western desert. Here the 3rd (Madras) Indian Field battery together with two others was attacked on the 27th May 1942 by the 21st Panzer Division and the Ariete Armoured Division. The brunt of the enemy assault fell on the Madras battery, but the men, though under fire for the first time, stood to their guns with wonderful coolness. They continued to fire steadily until their ammunition was almost exhausted, when all the guns were successfully withdrawn, though weight of numbers had enabled the enemy to penetrate to the rear of the battery position. How accurate the fire was is shown by the fact that of 56 tanks knocked out, no less than 40 were credited to the Madras battery. Two I.D.S.Ms. and a number of certificates of gallantry were awarded to the Madras gunners for this action. The extraordinary coolness of the Madrassis under fire and their complete ignoring of danger were subjects of general comment, and Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, when giving the news of the engagement particularly referred to the " magnificent work of the Indian gunners." In recognition of the gallantry of the 3rd Madras battery, the Madras training battery from the Field Artillery Training Centre at Muttra was specially selected to fire the salutes at Delhi on the installation

of the new Viceroy. The 3rd battery was later engaged in Burma, where it won the highest praise from all who saw it in action.

Many other Field and A.A. artillery units served on different fronts, principally in S.E.A.C. Of the infantry, due to the fact that the Madras Regiment was not reformed till late in 1942, no battalions had a chance of active service till the Burma campaign of 1944–45, in which the 4/3rd and latter the 1/3rd were engaged with conspicuous success.

Of the Engineer battalions, No. 7 served with distinction in Iraq and Italy, while others rendered invaluable service in the Burma campaign. The R.I.A.S.C. raised a very large number of Madrassi M.T. Companies which were employed on many fronts, while Madrassi Indian Pioneer Corps battalions and companies did sterling work, some in Italy but the majority in S.E.A.C. The theatres of war in which the various Madras formations were engaged are shown in Appendix A and space forbids the mention of the services of individual units, but one exception must be made. The 17th Madras Labour battalion, as it was then designated, formed part of the force defending Burma in 1942 against the Japanese invasion. Half the battalion was evacuated by sea, but the remaining two companies were left behind. Discarding their picks and shovels, these men armed themselves with any weapons they could find and turned themselves from a non-combatant into a combatant unit. They soon learnt to use their arms with good effect, and proved a most useful addition to the small British force doggedly withdrawing from Burma in the face of overwhelming odds. These two companies finally reached the Indian frontier as a compact unit.

Lists of all Madras units which served between 1939 and 1946 will be found in the Appendix.

CHAPTER III

Historic Actions

Chengam—3rd September 1767

Col. Smith with 800 European infantry, six sepoy battalions and sixteen guns was withdrawing before the vastly superior forces of Haidar Ali and the Nizam to effect a junction with Col. Wood's detachment at Tiruvannamalai. The day's march traversed a defile between hills near the village of Chengam (North Arcot district) with a fordable river crossing the road obliquely at its entrance. The order of march was first a battalion of sepoys, then the baggage protected by another sepoy battalion on either flank, while at a short distance behind the main body followed, with the flank companies forming the rearguard. At the entrance of the defile was a village, and south-west of it a hill commanding the pass, both of which were already occupied by the Nizam's troops. The 4th M.I. which was leading, cleared the village at the point of the bayonet, and then drove the enemy off the hill. Haidar in the meantime, realizing the importance of this strong point, moved towards it with his main army, but his approach being observed, Col. Smith quickly reinforced the 4th M.I. with his main body and confronted Haidar, who saw too late his mistake in not forestalling the British. Nevertheless he made several determined attacks in mass, himself on foot at the head of his best troops, to dislodge the Madras battalions, and suffered enormous losses, his killed alone being estimated at 2,000 while he himself was slightly wounded. Foiled in their attempt to take the hill, the enemy now kept up a heavy but ill-aimed fire of musketry and guns, and made a further endeavour to break through the line by working through the woods on their flanks, but without success.

Meanwhile the British rearguard had been long delayed by the last two guns, which had been attacked by the enemy when crossing the river. On its arrival and junction with the main body the whole line, led by the Grenadier battalion, which as was usual at that time had been formed by taking the two flank companies from

each of the six battalions present, moved forward and completely routed the immense army of the confederates. The enemy was pursued till sunset and abandoned two guns, which however Col. Smith was unable to carry off.

In this battle, the Madras army really received its baptism of fire, as though it had been engaged in minor operations for some years previous, it was not until now that it was called upon, not only to fight but to manœuvre as a disciplined force, and as Wilson justly points out, in this and the succeeding action at Tiruvannamalai the close fighting was done entirely by the sepoys.

Madras units engaged at Chengam were: The Artillery, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 7th M.I. and the 13th Circar battalion which was reduced in 1785; they are represented in the Indian army to-day only by 1/1st and 1/2nd Punjab regiment as lineal descendants of the 2nd and 7th M.I.

Tiruvannamalai—26th September 1767

After the battle of Chengam, Col. Smith effected his junction with Col. Wood and their combined forces now amounted to 1,400 Europeans, 9,000 sepoys and 34 guns. But the British were in great difficulties for supplies, and the confederates, fully aware of this, determined to wait till their enemy was weakened by want and then attack. This plan was however frustrated by fortunate finds of buried hoards of grain, and the Nizam, wearied of inaction, insisted on assuming the offensive. On the 26th September, a strong force of the enemy took up a position in front of Col. Smith's left, on which a cannonade was opened. Haidar hoped that the British would move forward and become entangled in an impassable swamp which lay between the opposing forces, but Col. Smith realizing the situation, moved to the right to outflank the enemy's left, where a hill offered a favourable strong point. The direction in which Col. Smith was now moving led the enemy to believe that he was retreating on Arcot and they advanced hastily to fall upon his flanks and rear. To their mutual surprise, the two forces suddenly met on rounding the hill, which a sepoy battalion at once seized, driving the enemy from its summit before they could occupy it in force. A large body of the enemy's best infantry now moved

forward to occupy a strong position among some rocks in front of the British line of advance, but before they would effect this, three sepoy battalions, who were much inferior to the enemy in numbers, were pushed forward and in Col. Smith's, words; "advanced with such rapidity and gave so brisk a fire that the enemy's sepoys could not stand it but were obliged to quit their posts and run."

The British line now deployed opposite the main masses of the enemy which, formed into a huge crescent, seemed about to envelop the small British force. But the tremendous disparity in numbers did not shake the courage of the sepoy battalions and, again quoting Col. Smith, " did not prevent our men from marching on with a firmness that will ever do them honour, for nothwithstanding all efforts from cannon, musketry, rockets and horse, they could not discompose our lines."

The steady fire and firm advance of the British was so effective that Haidar, who realized that the battle was lost, withdrew his cannon and at length persuaded the Nizam to do the same. Darkness now fell and the British were obliged to halt, having driven the enemy from the ground and captured nine cannon. At daybreak on the 27th, Col. Smith again advanced and, finding the enemy in full retreat, followed them up as rapidly as possible, soon converting the retreat into a rout, during which no less than 55 more guns were captured. The operations of the day ended only when the troops were exhausted and Col. Smith was unable to continue the pursuit further owing to lack of supplies and transport, of which as usual he was deficient. In this important victory, the enemy lost some 4,000 men together with 64 guns and a large quantity of stores, while the British casualties amounted to only 150 killed and wounded. One of the first results of this victory was the hasty withdrawal of Tipu Sultan, then plundering the outskirts of Madras.

The following extract from Col. Smith's despatches testifies to the gallantry with which this action was fought and shows that the disciplined valour of the Madras soldier, first displayed at Chengam, was now firmly established:—" Your officers of the sepoys and their battalions deserve more praise than I can express, for I never saw men behave with more resolution and intrepidity than

those I have the honour to command. The 3rd Battalion behaved with great steadiness, facing the enemy's horse at 60 paces with shouldered arms; notwithstanding such large bodies of horse surrounding us on all sides, no consideration could restrain our sepoys from rushing on the enemy with an impetuosity that waited not for guns but only thought of joining and charging Haidar Ali's sepoys."

The Madras units which took part in this action were the same as at Chengam, with the addition of the 6th and 9th M.I. and the 11th Battalion (reduced in 1769). The 6th and 9th M.I. are now represented by the 2/1st and 2/2nd Punjab Regiment.

Porto Novo—1st July 1781

Early in the morning of the 1st July, the small British force, mustering only some 7,600 men, left its camp and was drawn up in two lines facing almost due north, while the 20th M.I. with some details comprised the baggage guard on the flank next to the sea. The first line consisted of the 73rd Foot, Madras and Bengal Europeans, the 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, and 15th M.I., the 1st and 2nd Nawab's cavalry and 30 guns, while in the second line were the 16th, 17th and 19th M.I. and the 18th Carnatic battalion, with 26 guns. The ground consisted of sandhills intersected by deep nullahs, and the enemy had placed a masked battery on every hillock covering the road to Cuddalore, while the plain was covered by large bodies of cavalry. Sir Eyre Coote, who was ignorant of the exact nature and whereabouts of Haidar's position, advanced about one and a half miles up the road and then halted to carry out a personal reconnaissance. During the hour which this lasted, the British force was subjected to an incessant cannonade from the front and left flank to which our guns were forbidden to reply owing to the necessity for conserving what little ammunition there was for decisive action. At 9 a.m. the General had come to a decision, and without any preliminary movement which could advise the enemy of his intention, rapidly marched to the right in column covered by a line of sandhills, until he reached an opening in them where a road was found, which had been constructed by Haidar for the movement of his guns. A commanding rise which Haidar had neglected to guard was occupied and the

first line, clearing the passage through the sandhills and driving back a strong corps of the enemy, deployed in battle order facing west. It then halted under a heavy cannonade until the sandhills behind were in possession of the guns of the second line, when it moved rapidly forward. Meanwhile Haidar's artillery, as usual magnificently "horsed" by his famous breed of Mysore bullocks, had been withdrawn from its original position to a new line at right angles to it and barring the British advance. Here it opened a tremendous cannonade, but in spite of this, the British first line advanced steadily making skilful use of every advantage of ground. While the first line was thus advancing, the second was attacked in a most determined manner by a large force of infantry supported by cavalry and guns, and a severe struggle ensued in which the second line, which consisted solely of sepoy battalions, eventually triumphed after repulsing three fierce attacks. Munro states the enemy came on with such resolution at this point that Capt. Moorhouse of the Artillery actually melted a brass 6 pr. gun by the rapidity of his discharges of grape.

Becoming impatient at this stubborn resistance, Haidar ordered a desperate charge of his whole cavalry, some 40,000 strong, on both lines simultaneously, but without any better success, and by 4 p.m. the British had forced the enemy line and compelled it to a precipitate retreat. Haidar now saw that all was over and ordered a general withdrawal, which his army lost no time in carrying out. Unfortunately, the victory could not be made decisive owing to the lack of cavalry and the exhaustion of the army. On this brilliant day, a British force of three European and ten sepoy battalions with 55 guns overthrew an army which certainly numbered 80,000 and possibly more, including in its ranks 600 Europeans and 23 regular sepoy battalions; only in artillery was Haidar slightly outmatched. The casualties on our side were small, thanks to Coote's manœuvring, while a moderate computation fixed the losses in Haidar's densely packed masses at 4,000 killed and many more wounded. In his despatches after the action, Coote wrote :—"The spirited behaviour of our sepoy corps did them the greatest credit. No Europeans could be steadier; they were emulous of being foremost on every service it was necessary to

undertake." The Madras units present at this action were Artillery and the 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 19th and 20th M.I. Existing battalions of the 3rd Madras Regiment representing the above are the 2nd (15th M.I.), 3rd (19th M.I.) and 6th (20th M.I.).

Sholinghur—27th September 1781

On the morning of the 27th September, Sir Eyre Coote, who had camped the previous day near the foot of the Sholinghur hill (North Arcot district), went forward to reconnoitre, and finding a long ridge of rocks held by the enemy ordered up the 2nd Brigade which quickly dislodged them. He now saw Haidar's whole army some three miles to the south, and at once sent orders to call up the remainder of his force, leaving the baggage with a suitable escort near the hills. Advancing over the ridge, the army turned to the right in file, Coote's intention being that the leading brigade should work round Haidar's left flank. The main body halted as soon as it had come opposite the centre of the enemy's line and faced left with the rear battalions formed in echelon to protect the left flank from the large bodies of hostile cavalry which were swarming over the plain. The ground between the opposing forces was comparatively open, but irregular ridges and groups of rocks afforded good cover to both armies. Haidar had been completely surprised, not expecting Coote to move forward until the following day, and under the circumstances decided to act on the defensive until the confusion caused by the surprise had been remedied. In the meantime, Coote's leading brigade in its turning movement encountered a tank, and in working round this moved further to the right than had been intended, and consequently a considerable gap developed between the two portions of the British force. Haidar seized this opportunity to pour in a tremendous fire from every gun which he could bring to bear on the British main body, but undeterred by the heavy cannonade, the British line advanced to close with the enemy. The broken nature of the ground resulted in gaps in the main line which offered to the enemy's cavalry opportunities of which they were quick to avail themselves, charging with the greatest determination, but without being able to make any impression. It was at this period that Haidar Ali's household cavalry made a desperate

attempt on the 18th and 21st Carnatic battalions, which had temporarily lost touch with the remainder of the force, but the sepoys stood firm and received the enemy with such a heavy fire that they swung off and passed between the intervals, receiving a further volley from the rear ranks which had faced about for the purpose. Here the 21st Battalion (20th M.I.) captured the leading cavalry standard, to carry which as an Honorary Third Colour Sir Eyre Coote added an extra jemadar to their establishment.

These charges by the cavalry, though all repulsed, had given Haidar time to withdraw his guns, all of which were got off except one which was captured. The 2nd Brigade, having now gained the left flank of the enemy's position, brought their guns to bear with effect on the retreating columns, and an attempt on the baggage guard by a large force of cavalry and infantry also having failed, the British were left masters of the field and encamped on the ground previously occupied by the enemy. The strength of the British army in this battle was 11,500 of whom 1,500 were Europeans. Haidar's whole army estimated by Sir Eyre Coote at 150,000 with 70 guns was present and the Mysoreans admitted that it was a severe defeat in which their loss probably exceeded 5,000 men. As usual, Sir Eyre Coote was unable to follow up his victory for want of cavalry and supplies, and after the action he wrote that he would gladly exchange the trophies he had won for five days' supply of rice. Owing to rebrigading before the action, it is difficult to determine with accuracy all the Madras battalions engaged, but these certainly included the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 19th and 20th M.I. now represented by the following battalions of the 3rd Madras Regiment—2nd (15th M.I.), 3rd (19th M.I.), 5th (3rd L.I.) and 6th (20th M.I.). The battle honour *Sholinghur* was at first bestowed only on the 20th M.I. but later all corps engaged in this action received it.

In his despatches, Sir Eyre Coote wrote :—"The 21st Battalion of sepoys received my thanks in general orders on account of taking one of the enemy's standards. I have ordered that a jemadar be added to the establishment of that corps for the purpose of carrying it." The battalion mentioned later became the 80th C.I. and carried this Third Honorary Colour up to the time of its

disbandment in 1921; the Colour now rests in the Royal United Service Institute at Whitehall.

Assaye—23rd September 1803

About 1 p.m. on the 23rd September, the British troops came in sight of the armies of Sindhia and the Rajah of Berar drawn up in order of battle behind the river Kelna. Their force amounted to 20,000 cavalry, 18 battalions of regular infantry under European officers, totalling 12,000 men, and over 100 guns, to engage which Gen. Wellesley could not dispose more than 6,000 men with 17 guns. The General resolved to attack the enemy's left and crossed the river a short distance above its confluence with another stream called the Juah, which ran behind the enemy's present position. The passage of the river was not disputed, though the fire of the enemy's excellent artillery already began to take toll and most of the few British guns were put out of action. The British force formed across the fork between the two rivers in two lines with the cavalry in the rear. The first line was composed of H.M.'s 78th on the left, the 10th and 8th M.I. in the centre, four twelve-pounder guns and the pickets (details of each corps forming the advance guard) on the right. The second line, 300 yards behind, consisted of the 4th and 24th M.I., with H.M.'s 74th on the right immediately in rear of the pickets; the third line was composed of H.M.'s 19th Dragoons and the 4th, 5th and 7th Madras cavalry. Meanwhile, the enemy had changed front, throwing their left on the Juah at the village of Assaye and resting their right upon the Kelna. Their line was defended by upwards of 100 guns, some of which were disposed in front of the village of Assaye, which was occupied by a strong body of infantry. The British troops advanced with great steadiness under a remarkably heavy fire, but the commander of the pickets, who had been directed to keep out of shot from Assaye, mistook his orders, diverged to the right and led directly upon that village, followed by the 74th from the second line. The consequence was that not only did the pickets and the 74th suffer severely under the fire from the village, but they were charged by the enemy's cavalry headed by Sindhia in person on their left flank, through the break in the line which had been caused by the

divergence of the pickets. Fortunately, before irretrievable damage could be done, our cavalry came up from the rear, defeated the enemy's horse and chased them back to their own lines, though in doing so they suffered such casualties in men and horses that they were unfit for a close pursuit at the end of the day. The 78th with the Madras battalions of both lines advancing at the same time on the main line of the enemy drove the Mahrattas from their guns with the bayonet. Most of the gunners were killed at their posts but some threw themselves down and feigned death till the British line had passed when they turned their pieces round and fired into the British rear until disposed of by the cavalry. The British line, still advancing, then attacked and carried a second position which had been taken upon the Juah at right angles to the first. Several of the Mahratta battalions now gave way entirely and fled, but others retired in good order until charged and broken by the cavalry.

The enemy left 102 guns on the field and it was long before the remains of the defeated army could be reformed as a fighting force.

Thus terminated the battle of Assaye, the first victory gained by the future Duke of Wellington, in which he commanded in chief, and one of the most decisive as well as most desperate ever fought in India. The British loss was very heavy, viz., 198 Europeans and 230 sepoys killed, 442 Europeans and 696 sepoys wounded and 4 Europeans and 14 sepoys missing, a total of 1,584 from a force which did not exceed 6,000. The loss of the enemy was computed by themselves at 1,200 killed and 4,800 wounded.

The following extracts from Wellington's correspondence show how highly he thought of his troops :—

"I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops. They advanced in the best order and with the greatest steadiness under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet; and notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry."

"Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India excepting our own; and they and their equipments far surpass Tipu's.

I assure you that their fire was so heavy that I much doubted at one time whether I should be able to induce our troops to advance, and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably. Our sepoys astonished me."

Sir John Fortescue, in "Six British Soldiers", thus aptly comments on the battle :—

"Wellesley was obliged to attack the Mahrattas at Assaye in a position more or less of their own choosing, where they could gain full advantage from their enormously *superior artillery. It is true* that his first movement was against the flank of the Mahrattas, for he reckoned that they had not sufficient skill in manœuvre to change front in order to meet him. But, on the contrary, their leaders made the requisite movement with great deftness and order; *and he found himself compelled to* deliver a *frontal attack* with a river in his rear which would ensure the destruction of his force in case of defeat. The whole engagement of Assaye was a defiance of all his tactical principles. His guns were powerless against the vast mass of the Mahratta artillery, and he had no *choice* but *to* set shock-action against missile-action. If the Mahratta infantry had been as staunch and steady as the Mahratta gunners, they could have counter-attacked Wellesley's battalions when thinned and disordered after the storm of the Mahratta batteries, and Assaye might have been a great disaster. Wellesley did not forget in after-years that, if a general has to silence batteries with the bayonet, he *can do so only at the cost of heavy casualties.*"

Of the same action, Sir John Malcolm relates the following anecdote :—

"Among the many instances of the effect which pride in themselves and the notice of their superiors inspire, we may state the conduct of the 1st Battalion 8th Regiment, which became at the commencement of his career in India a favourite corps of the Duke of Wellington. They were *with him on* every service, and the men of this corps used often to call themselves 'Wellesley ki paltan'; and their conduct on every occasion was calculated to support the proud title they had assumed. A staff officer, after the battle of Assaye, saw a number of Muhammadans of this battalion assembled apparently for a funeral. He asked whom they were

about to inter. They mentioned the names of five commissioned and non-commissioned officers of a very distinguished family in the corps. 'We are going to put these brothers into one grave,' said one of the party. The officer, who had been well acquainted with the individuals who had been slain, expressed his regret, and was about to offer some consolation to the survivors, but he was stopped by one of the men. 'There is no occasion,' he said, 'for such feelings or expressions; these men were sepoys; they have died in the performance of their duty; the Government they served will protect their children, who will soon fill the ranks they lately occupied.''

The troops were thanked by the Governor-General in Council and Honorary Colours were ordered to be presented to each regiment engaged, who were also permitted to bear the word *Assaye* with the device of the Elephant on their Colours and appointments. Madras units engaged were the 4th, 5th and 7th Light Cavalry, Artillery, the 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th and 24th M.I. and the 1st Battalion Pioneers.

The anniversary of this victory was celebrated by Madras Regiments for over one hundred years and it was a fortunate chance which enabled the Colours of the old 10/3rd Madras Regiment to be presented to the newly formed Training Centre of the 3rd Madras Regiment on the same date in 1942.

Seetabuldee—26th and 27th November 1817

The Residency at Nagpore was on the west of the city from which it was separated by the two hills of Seetabuldee. These small knolls were only about 100 feet high and some 300 yards apart, the summits being level but of small extent. The Resident, considering it expedient to anticipate any attempt on these hills, directed the Military Commander to occupy them, which was done on the 25th November. The 1/24th M.N.I. with one six-pounder was posted on the smaller hill, while the 1/20th M.N.I. with three six-pounders held the larger. On the evening of the 26th, the Raja's forces attacked both hills and the action continued incessantly till noon on the following day, the Arabs making repeated and determined attacks on both hills, coming close up to the guns.

Throughout the night, the action continued and the enemy were each time repulsed with heavy loss, but about 8 a.m. on the 27th, the smaller hill was carried by an overwhelming rush of the enemy's swordsmen in consequence of the loss and fatigue which the defenders had sustained. At this critical moment, the fortune of the day was retrieved by Captain Fitzgerald who with three troops of Bengal Cavalry and the Madras Bodyguard made a most determined charge upon a large body of the enemy's cavalry which was drawn up on the plain near the foot of the hills, utterly routed and dispersed them and took the guns which were firing on the hills. This brilliant charge greatly encouraged the defenders, and a tumbril on the small hill happening to blow up in the midst of the Arabs, our men headed by the 1/24th rushed forward and recovered the lost position, driving the Arabs down the hill and capturing two small guns which they had brought up. Shortly afterwards, the enemy, who had again assembled in considerable numbers in front of the small hill, were for the second time charged by the cavalry and put to flight. A great many were killed and from that moment the assailants appeared to lose heart; their fire began to slacken and by noon it had entirely ceased.

The conduct of the troops of all arms throughout this long and severe conflict was marked by great courage and endurance, and, in recognition of it, the corps engaged were permitted to bear the word *Seetabuldee* on their Colours and appointments, while the 1/24th, which had been involved in the mutiny at Vellore in 1806, was, at the request of the Indian ranks, restored to its former position in the army and again resumed its place as the 1/1st Regiment M.N.I. The casualties in this hotly contested action were heavy, viz., 121 killed and 239 wounded, including 17 officers. The Raja's forces were estimated at 12,000 cavalry, 8,000 infantry and 35 guns, but not all of these took part in the action and their losses are unknown.

The 1/24th and 1/20th M.N.I. later became the 1st and 39th M.I. of which the former survived as the 1st Battalion Corps of Madras Pioneers until it was disbanded in 1933, the anniversary of the action being observed annually.

Maheidpoor—21st December 1817

Holkar's army was drawn up in a strong position on the far side of the river Supra. Their first line, about 750 yards from the river, was composed of ten battalions of regular infantry with some 50 guns disposed in a semi-circular form along their front. Their right rested on a ravine and their left on a bend of the river which was not fordable at that point. The key to the position was a ruined village near the centre filled with infantry and flanked by artillery. Part of their cavalry was behind the line of infantry, but the great mass was disposed on the right flank with guns and matchlock men in their front. The British force, commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop, consisted of a little over 6,000 men of whom only 575 were Europeans, with eighteen 6 pr. guns and some Mysore Horse. Some time having been spent in reconnaissance, four companies 31st L.I., supported by Horse Artillery, were pushed forward to clear the ford, which was done, though not without loss. The troops then crossed by successive brigades and deployed into line facing the enemy. This took time, and under the heavy and accurate fire of the enemy's guns, which quickly silenced our light horse artillery pieces, considerable casualties were sustained. The line having been formed the order was given to advance, the Light Brigade commencing the action by attacking the centre of the enemy, while the 1st Brigade was advancing against their left. The ruined village was carried by the 3rd and 31st L.I. and the battery on the right centre by four companies of the Madras Rifles. The guns on the enemy's left were taken by the 1st Brigade, most of the Pathan gunners standing to be bayoneted, but their infantry offered less resistance and were quickly driven from their position. The enemy's guns were well served and laid, the gunners depressing them as the troops advanced and pouring in a very heavy fire of grape and chain shot. Meanwhile, the 2nd Brigade on the left had advanced with the object of turning the enemy's right, but, before it could reach their line, our cavalry charged in two bodies, completely routed the enemy's horse and captured most of the guns. A body of infantry in the centre with some 20 guns still held their ground, but gave way on the approach of the 2nd Brigade, the gunners alone standing to the last. The

defeat in all parts of the field was now complete and the pursuit was taken up by the cavalry. The loss to the enemy, which was estimated at 2,500, was sustained almost exclusively by their infantry and gunners. Our casualties, most of which were occasioned by artillery fire upon our advancing infantry, more especially upon that of the Light Brigade, amounted to 174 killed and 604 wounded. The number of European troops engaged having been small, the Light and 2nd Brigades were composed exclusively of sepoys, all of whom behaved with great bravery and resolution, charging up to the muzzles of the guns without hesitation, conduct which was duly appreciated by the Governor-General and by the Commander-in-Chief. The troops engaged were afterwards granted permission to bear the word *Maheidpoor* on their Colours and appointments. Madras units which took part in this soldiers' battle, the last which the Madras Army was to fight as such, were 3rd, 4th and 8th Light Cavalry, Horse Artillery, the Rifle Corps, 3rd and 31st L.I., 14th 27th and 28th M.I., and the 1st Battalion Pioneers, of which the 63 P.L.I. and the 88th C.I. survived till 1921 and are now represented by the 5/3rd and 7/3rd Madras Regiment. The anniversary of this victory was observed regularly by the Madras corps engaged.

Kemmendine—1st to 9th December 1824

The garrison of Kemmendine consisted of the 26th M.I. under Major Yates, a detachment of Madras Artillery with two 6 pr. guns and one 12 pr. carronade, 58 N.C.Os. and men 1st Madras European Regiment under Capt. Page 48th M.I., and 22 Madras Pioneers.

The stockaded post was quadrangular and closely surrounded by dense jungle on all sides except one, which was almost washed by the river.

The first attack came about 4 a.m. on the 1st December when a mass of fire-rafts came downstream and forced the H.E.I.C.'s cruiser to withdraw below the stockade. The fire-rafts were followed by a large fleet of war-boats, but these were driven off by the guns which had been so disposed as to guard the river front. Meanwhile, the enemy on shore collected all round the stockade and made several determined attempts to escalade during the day, but were repulsed with heavy loss. They however entrenched

themselves within a short distance and at 8 p.m. again attacked simultaneously on all three sides. Approaching in silence they were not fired on until within thirty yards; the attack was persisted in for some time, and many had gained the foot of the stockade before they were driven back by the continuous and well-directed musketry of the garrison. Throughout that night and for the remainder of the siege the enemy kept up an incessant and galling fire by day and night. Up to the afternoon of the 2nd the war boats were kept off by the steady and well aimed fire of the guns, but matters were becoming critical when about 2 p.m. H.M.S. "Arachne" came up with a gun brig and two gunboats. This seasonable aid enabled Major Yates to withdraw a number of his men from the river front and to strengthen other parts of the post where they were much required. The same night a party of fifty of the 1st Madras Europeans arrived to replace casualties, and on the following morning a sortie was attempted against a small gun which the Burmese had planted within fifty yards of the stockade; but though the gun was captured the enemy soon rallied and their overwhelming numbers prevented it from being carried off.

During the 4th and 5th more entrenchments and batteries were constructed by the Burmese, who kept up a heavy fire the whole time, and on the evening of the latter day, having been joined by considerable reinforcements, they renewed the attempt to escalade the southern and eastern faces but were again repulsed. Attacks on the water front being foiled by the fire of the ships, the enemy on the 7th launched two vigorous assaults in great strength on the three land faces of the stockade but with equal lack of success. Their extremely heavy losses now began to tell and their efforts to slacken, and about 4 a.m. on the 9th they abandoned their entrenchments and retired.

No one took off his clothes during the siege and every sick or wounded man, European or Indian, who was able to carry a musket, continued to take part in the defence.

The 26th M.I. were awarded the unique battle honour ***Kemmendine*** "as a perpetual record of their distinguished and persevering gallantry on that occasion." Kemmendine Day was celebrated by the 86th C.I. till it was disbanded in 1926, and the commemoration now devolves upon the Training Centre 3rd Madras Regiment.

CHAPTER IV

Seringapatam—1799

Seringapatam, the fortress capital of the Mysore Kingdom, had been threatened on a number of occasions in the past, but had never been captured.

In 1638 it was besieged by the Bijapur forces, who were repulsed with great slaughter, while in 1679 the Mahrattas suffered a similar fate. In 1755, when most of the Mysore troops were absent at Trichinopoly, the Subadar of the Deccan besieged the fortress with the aid of a French force under Bussy, but was bought off. In 1757 and again in 1759 the Mahrattas attacked the place, but without success, and in 1771, after defeating Haidar Ali at Chinkurali, they blockaded it for 15 months but could not take it.

It was the main British objective in the three previous Mysore Wars, though only actually attacked in 1792, when Lord Cornwallis stormed Tipu's entrenched camp to the north of the island and commenced preparations for a siege, which were however suspended when the Sultan accepted the terms offered.

In addition therefore to its naturally commanding position and the immense strength of its fortifications, on which neither labour nor expense had been spared, and which, in part at least, had been designed by French engineers, the fortress possessed an important moral factor also, that of invincibility; and the idea of attacking it was viewed by many at Madras with the most gloomy forebodings. No one had any illusions as to the difficulty of the task confronting General Harris.

The island of Seringapatam is rather more than three miles long and about one and a half in breadth at the widest part, the Fort, about one mile long and 1,100 yards broad, occupying the western angle, and being washed on two sides by the separate branches of the Cauvery river, which was fordable at places only at certain times of the year. On the east and south sides from the Wellesley bridge (then not in existence) to the Periapatnam bridge over the south branch of the river, there were no less than

three successive lines of huge walls with deep ditches cut in the rock and protected by a well-constructed glacis.

An attack on this face being ruled out, General Harris had to decide whether to attack across the river on the north or from the west. The former had been the line adopted by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, but since that time the defences had been improved, and a large bastion, known as the Sultan battery and mounting 24 heavy guns, had been constructed.

On the other hand it was known that the main western rampart was unprovided with traverses, and that if enfilading fire could be brought to bear, the position would be difficult to defend, while there were but few bastions to give flanking fire to the defence.

General Harris therefore decided to attack the western face, but the actual point of attack on the fortress was to be settled later, when the Chief Engineer had studied the situation and submitted his recommendations.

The Madras Army encamped before Seringapatam on the 5th of April, on rising ground about two miles from the west face of the fort, and on the same evening operations commenced with a view to driving the enemy from their outpost positions on the near side of the river. The first of these ran from the village of Sultanpet (about mile 80·6 on the present Mysore-Bangalore road) along a winding canal, past the village of Palballi towards the Cauvery river. The left attack under Colonel Shawe with the 1st and 13th Madras Infantry was successful, and a post named after him was established; but that on the right failed as the column under Colonel Wellesley, consisting of H.M.'s 33rd Regiment and two Bengal battalions, owing to the darkness and the intricate nature of the ground, fell into confusion and had to withdraw. The attack on Sultanpet was renewed on the following morning by the same troops, reinforced by the Scotch Brigade and the 19th and 20th Madras Infantry, and covered by the fire of some 12 pounder guns, and was completely successful, though the enemy had strongly reinforced the position in the meantime.

While the attention of the enemy was occupied in the defence of these outposts, Major-General Floyd with a strong detachment of cavalry marched towards Periapatnam, to cover the approach

of the army from Bombay, which arrived before Seringapatam on the 14th April and, after crossing the river, took up a position on the north side. On the following day a detachment under Col. Hart drove the enemy from a village on the north bank and established a battery of six 18-pounders and two howitzers to enfilade the western face of the fortress, distant about 900 yards.

Simultaneously with Col. Hart's attack an advance was made by the 24th Madras Infantry on the left of the main attack, from Shawe's Post to the Paschima Vahini or little Cauvery Stream, and a post established which was called Macdonald's.

A strong point known as the Powder Mill, in front of this post, was stormed on the evening of the 20th April and the fire from some guns established there dislodged the enemy from their positions on the north bank from which they galled the Bombay troops, after the latter had repulsed a sortie in force before daylight on the 22nd, on which occasion the French troops which led the assault suffered severely.

As each post was made good it was immediately connected by a zig-zag trench with the previous parallel, thus affording cover to troops moving up to the most advanced trenches. This very heavy work was carried out by the Madras Pioneers, assisted from time to time by sepoy battalions.

Meanwhile it was discovered that the supply of rice in camp would not last for more than eighteen days on half rations, and Major-General Floyd, with all the regular Cavalry and the 3rd Infantry Brigade under Major Gowdie, accordingly marched on the 19th April to escort the detachment under Colonel Read which was bringing in supplies from the Baramahal. The necessity for a strong covering force was due to the fact that Cummer-ed-din Khan with over 6,000 of Tipu's Cavalry was on the watch to cut off the convoy. The latter did not reach Seringapatam till the 11th May, a week after the assault, but anxiety regarding immediate supplies was allayed by the discovery, after Major-General Floyd had marched, of a very large private stock of rice, which was at once commandeered for the public use.

In the meantime Col. Gent, the Chief Engineer, had carried out his surveys, and on the 13th April submitted to the

Commander-in-Chief two plans of attack: one against the north-west and the other against the south-west angle, the latter based on the assumption that part of the island would have to be occupied. General Harris, considering that the former offered better chances of success, decided to adopt it. The actual point of attack was however to be concealed as long as possible, and the impression was to be created that the assault would be launched on the south-west face.

On the 23rd April the enfilading battery at Hart's Post upstream opened fire, and on the 24th and 25th the battery at the Powder Mill was increased to 8 guns, and further strengthened by a new battery of 4 guns, which commenced to fire on the morning of the 26th.

It now became necessary to drive the enemy from their last remaining works outside the fort, so that the breaching batteries might be established at the selected site 380 yards from the north-west angle. These works extended along a watercourse under 400 yards distant from and parallel to the whole of the south-west face of the fort. They were strengthened at each end by a stockaded redoubt and also by a circular work some distance in advance, covering the stone bridge over the *Paschima Vahini* stream.

Covered by the enfilading fire from Hart's Post and by every gun which could be brought to bear, two columns stormed the greater part of these works after sunset on the 26th, the defenders of the circular work being pursued by a small party across the Periapatnam bridge and into the entrenched camp of the enemy, where several guns were spiked and so much confusion caused that in anticipation of a general assault the whole fort was illuminated with blue lights and every gun on the south and west faces opened fire. The circular work was reoccupied by the enemy in force before dawn but they were finally driven from it after stiff fighting by detachments under Col. Wallace and Major Skelly, after whom the two posts were named. A stone marking the latter's post may be seen by the roadside just beyond the Paschima Vahini bridge.

The whole of the posts gained by the army, extending from the bridge up to the Powder Mill on the Cauvery, now formed a very strong parallel 700 yards in length, and not only confined the operations of the enemy, but enabled the prosecution of the siege to proceed with greater facility.

On the 28th and 29th a breaching battery for six 18-pounders was erected on the left of our most advanced trench and only 380 yards from the fortress, but owing to the difficulty of conveying the heavy guns across the watercourse, fire was not opened till the morning of the 30th. Before the close of that day the outer wall covering the ditch was breached, and the shoulder of the angle bastion, known to the army as the " Political Breach " from the expectation that it might cause Tipu to accept the terms offered, extremely shattered. During the night another battery, known as the " Nizam's," of five guns was erected, and one for six howitzers, while Lieutenants Farquahar and Lalor with a small party of Pioneers crossed the river and ascertained that it was fordable. On the 1st May two more 18-pounders were brought up for counter-battery work, and a new battery was added to Hart's Post to increase the enfilading fire, a shot from which set fire to a magazine of rockets in the fort. A sunken battery for four 12-pounders was also erected between Shawe's and Skelly's Posts to enfilade the works on the southern face of the fort and to bear on some cavaliers which fired from a considerable distance but with much effect on our batteries.

It was not however till the morning of the 2nd May that both the breaching batteries, after having previously destroyed the shoulder of the north-west angle bastion, commenced to form the real breach about sixty yards to the south-east of that work, in accordance with Gen. Harris's plan. The object in concealing the actual point of assault for as long as possible was to prevent any attempt by the French Engineers in Tipu's service from mining or cutting off the breach by fresh works in the rear which could not be reached by the guns of the attack. It was of the utmost importance that the capture of the fortress should not be delayed, both on account of a possible rise of the river and also because the troops were again desperately short of food.

By the evening of the 3rd May the breach, which the enemy had attempted to repair on the night of the 2nd, appeared nearly practicable, and it was determined to make the assault in the course of the following day. The night was therefore spent in assembling the troops destined for the assault and in completing the final preparations. General Harris judged that during the heat of the day the enemy would be less apprehensive of an assault, and accordingly directed it to take place at 1 p.m., in two columns totalling 2,500 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys, which were to scour the ramparts to the right and left respectively. The right attack included the flank companies of the 13th, 20th, 21st and 22nd Madras Infantry, while both attacks were accompanied by a proportion of Madras Artillery and Pioneers, the latter carrying hatchets, scaling ladders and fascines. The Infantry carried the usual 24 rounds in the pouches but were ordered to rely principally on the bayonet. Col. Wellesley was in reserve with the Regiment de Meuron and the 8th, 11th, 16th and 19th Madras Infantry ready to support the attack if necessary. In case these also failed General Harris had determined to lead all the remaining troops in person.

At daybreak on the 4th May the breaching batteries re-opened fire and before noon the breach, which was 100 feet wide, was reported to be practicable. The fact that the trenches were crowded with troops and that an assault was imminent had not escaped the notice of the defenders, and this was reported to Tipu; but doubtless remembering that Lord Cornwallis had attacked by night and that Gen. Harris also had used the cover of darkness to cloak most of his operations against the outposts, he refused absolutely to believe that any attempt would be made during daylight, and so far from collecting additional troops to guard the breach and to form a reserve, he permitted the Kiladar to withdraw men from the threatened point to receive an issue of pay. It was very largely due to Tipu's faulty tactics that the assault proved so comparatively easy, and it is not improbable that the disastrous repulse at Bhurtpoor six years later was in part due to failure to appreciate this fact.

At 1 p.m. on the 4th May, preceded by the usual "forlorn hope" and covered by the fire of every gun which could be brought to bear, the columns, led by Major-General Baird, issued from the trenches (still marked by two cannon buried in the ground), rapidly passed the rugged bed of the Cauvery, though exposed to a very heavy fire from musketry and the still numerous artillery in the fort, crossed the broken outer wall and the ditch without much difficulty and ascended the breach in the face of considerable opposition from the enemy, many of whom rushed down the slope to meet them. Most of the "forlorn hope" and many of the stormers were killed in ascending the breach, by musketry from the bastion and from the stockade in the ditch underneath it which the enemy had constructed for the purpose. On reaching the summit the assailants divided, as they had been instructed to do, and within two hours the whole of the fortress was occupied by our troops.

The right attack under Col. Sherbrooke was accompanied by General Baird, and reached the eastern face of the fort in less than an hour without meeting any serious opposition except near the Mysore gate, where many men were killed and injured. As the cavaliers were in turn captured, the guns on them were turned on to the occupants of the camp outside the fort, who fled across the Karighat ford.

The left attack met with more resistance, not only from the enemy's resolute defence of the successive traverses, but also from a heavy fire of musketry directed against them from the inner rampart, which was separated from the main rampart by a deep wet ditch, the existence of which was unknown to the attackers. But a party of H.M.'s 12th Regiment, with great daring, crossed the inner ditch, and advancing along the inner rampart parallel with the main body of the column, assisted the advance of the latter by firing across the ditch. It was here that Tipu commanded in person, and fighting desperately till he was wounded, was finally killed at the small gate in the inner rampart (no longer in existence) while presumably endeavouring to reach the Palace. The spot is now marked by a stone slab.

Finally the enemy were driven into the north-east angle of the fort, where perceiving the near approach of the right column, they

fell into confusion, and great numbers were killed at the Bangalore gate, which could not be opened owing to the press of men endeavouring to escape. Casualties in the right column amounted to 186 killed and wounded, as compared with 179 in the left column. As the latter undoubtedly met with a far more vigorous resistance, presumably the right column suffered considerably more from musketry and gun fire while crossing the river.

As soon as the ramparts were cleared, a detachment was sent to secure the Palace, which was also the Treasury, and to protect the family of the Sultan; but they had been anticipated by the 8th. Madras Infantry, which had been sent across the river by Colonel Wellesley as soon as the success of the assault was observed, and which had already accepted the surrender of the French troops and their Colours. After some delay in parleys General Baird, who had great difficulty in restraining the indignation of the soldiery at the murder of the prisoners taken during the siege, was admitted into the Palace and the Sultan's two younger sons surrendered to him. Tipu's fate was unknown till his body was found under a heap of slain, after night fall.

Nine hundred and twenty-nine pieces of ordnance were found in the fort, of which two hundred and eighty-seven were mounted on the works, but no less than 436 were guns throwing balls under five pounds. It is recorded that on one occasion a 24 lb. cannon ball reached General Harris's tent distant 4,300 yards from the cavalier from which it was fired. Casualties during the siege amounted to 825 Europeans and 639 Indian killed, wounded and missing, including Madras Artillery 85, Madras Infantry 327, and Madras Pioneers 46.

An exact return of the enemy's casualties is not available, but nearly 11,000 bodies were buried in the two days succeeding the storming and 24 of Tipu's chief officers perished. The State registers show Tipu's army to have amounted before the war to some 48,000 men, of whom over 21,000 were in the fort or on the island on the 4th May, while 14,000 cavalry were in the field with Futeh Haidar, Cummer-ed-din Khan and Purneah. The remainder were dispersed in various garrisons.

Among the spoils which fell to the victors on the capture of Seringapatam, none were more welcome than Tipu's train of draught bullocks, a special breed whose immense superiority over the ordinary cattle of the Carnatic had enabled him and his father to make such extraordinary marches. With their help Haidar had marched 100 miles in 2½ days to the relief of Chidambaram, and after every defeat was able to draw off his guns in the face of his enemies; they had made it possible for Tipu to cross the Peninsula in one month for the recovery of Bednore, and to march 63 miles in 2 days before General Medows. Later they were to enable Major-General Pritzler to march 346 miles in 25 days in pursuit of the Peshwa, and Major-General Campbell, after the failure of his Bengal equipments, to advance on Ava and thus bring the 1st Burma War to a successful conclusion. They also made it possible for Col. Wellesley to move with such speed during his Deccan campaign.

The death of Tipu greatly facilitated the settlement of the Mysore territories, while his principal surviving officers, whose families, in accordance with Tipu's policy, were residing in Seringapatam, surrendered all the more readily for that reason.

An examination of the Sultan's correspondence with the French Directory, with Napoleon Bonaparte who was then in Egypt, and with Zeman Shah of Cabul, who was threatening to invade India, completely vindicated the Governor-General's policy.

The prize money distributed after the capture of the fortress amounted to £1,146,216 in jewels and specie, but there is reason to believe that a very large amount was looted before steps could be taken to classify and seal the remainder. After an acrimonious dispute on the subject of participation between the prize committee on the one hand and the detachments of Cols. Read and Brown on the other, the Governor-General decided that all troops occupying places captured during the war should be admitted to share in the general distribution, in the same manner as if they had been present at the assault of Seringapatam. The shares thus sanctioned ranged from Rs. 370 to a Subadar to Rs. 42 to Indian rank and file.

Tipu's standard which was of red cotton cloth ornamented with a white radiated sun, together with the Colours of the French Corps in Tipu's service, were sent to Madras and presented to the Governor-General who had made his Headquarters there throughout the operations. Tipu's state sword was presented to Major-General Baird who led the assault

The importance of the capture of Seringapatam was marked by the issue of a medal, given for the first time to all troops engaged, whether European or Indian.

The medal for Seringapatam was awarded in 1808 but was not actually distributed to survivors till 1811. On the obverse is represented the storming of the breach, with the meridian sun denoting the time, and an inscription in Persian:—" The Fort of Seringapatam the Gift of God, the 4th May 1799 "; while the reverse shows a Lion subduing a Tiger, with the words " The Lion of God, the Conqueror."

The medal was given in gold to high-ranking officers, in silver gilt to Field officers, and in silver to Captains and Subalterns, while the Non-commissioned officers received it in bronze and Privates in " pure gravin tin."

It was not till 1820 that the battle honour *Seringapatam 4th May 1799* was sanctioned, when the following Madras units received permission to bear it on their appointments and Colours:—

1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Light Cavalry.

Regiment of Artillery.

1st, 6th, 8th, 11th, 13th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th Madras Infantry, and Madras Pioneers.

In these days the fall of Seringapatam is too often regarded as an episode of minor importance, and but few of those who pass the fortress on their way to Mysore or Bangalore trouble to visit the historic breach and the many other places of interest on the island. But in fact it was one of the most decisive episodes of Indian history—the climax of four hard fought campaigns and the final removal of a menace which for more than thirty years had hung over the Carnatic. No longer would the inhabitants of Madras see the sky red with the glare of burning villages or suffer

the cruel invasions of the past, while the French plans for the invasion of India were frustrated once and for all. Troops were indeed sent to South Kanara after the fall of Seringapatam to prevent a possible French landing, but their services were not required.

The visitor, whether he enters the fortress by the Bangalore or Mysore gate, would be well advised to proceed along the north side direct to the north-west angle bastion, where stands an obelisk on which are engraved the names of the corps which took part in the siege and of the officers who fell. Looking across the river he will see the two buried cannon which mark the trenches from which Major-General Baird led the columns of assault, while below is the ditch with its retaining wall, and some fifty yards to the left the site of the breached rampart, now repaired. In the rear is the inner ditch and rampart which proved such an unpleasant surprise to the assailants. Upstream can be visulised the site of Hart's post, whose enfilading fire contributed so largely to the success of the assault, while down stream beyond the railway bridge are visible the two bastions or round towers which flanked the breach with such effect. Returning along the north rampart, the dungeons under the Sultan Battery where the prisoners were kept chained to the walls may be visited, while belong the Water-gate is the scene of Tipu's death, though the exact spot cannot now be identified, the inner rampart having been thrown into the inner ditch soon after the occupation of the fortress. In the north-east angle are more dungeons, where the unfortunate General Mathews is believed to have met his fate. Outside the fort lies the Darya Dawlat Bagh, Tipu's summer palace, later occupied by Colonel Wellesley, on the front wall of which is a vivid painting of Colonel Baillie's defeat at Pollilore in 1780. Towards the east end of the island lies the mausoleum of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan, while at the extremity is the tomb of Col. Montague, who commanded the Bengal Artillery. There are many other places on the island of historical or romantic interest for details of which reference may be made to the numerous guide books available.

CHAPTER V

The Madras Soldier

Slain, thou wilt obtain heaven ; victorious, thou wilt enjoy the earth ; therefore stand up, O Son of Kunti, resolute to fight.

Bhagavad Gita, II 37.

Having seen how the Madras Army was formed and having followed its war services over a period of 200 years, it is logical to enquire into its composition and recruitment. But first it is necessary to dispel once and for all the totally erroneous idea which has unfortunately gained much credence in the Punjab, that Madras Regiments were formed on nuclei of men from Northern India and that they were very largely recruited from the same source. This malicious libel, for such it is, was started in North India about 1903, at a time when a number of Madras Regiments were being reconstituted into Punjabis and the newly formed units were permitted to take over the battle honours and devices which had been won by their Madras predecessors.

There is not the slightest foundation for this story, which both contemporary accounts of the early wars and the old muster rolls prove to be absolutely untrue. From the beginning of their history the Madras Regiments were almost entirely composed of men born and bred in South India, and the proportion of those enlisted outside the Presidency seldom exceeded 5 per cent and was generally far less. It was natural that units serving 1,000 miles or more from the Carnatic in those days of intolarably slow communications, when a draft might take months to arrive, should take any suitable men that offered to replace casualties, and this accounts for the great majority of such enlistments, but they were far too small to affect in any way the normal composition of the Madras units.

The idea that Madras battalions were formed on nuclei of up-country men is equally without foundation. The first battalions were formed from independent companies which were locally enlisted and had been in existence for some years. As fresh

battalions were raised they were formed on nuclei of drafts from existing battalions, as may be verified by reference to the orders of formation and early Army Lists.

In any case martial qualities are not the monopoly of North India. Constant warfare had been going on for centuries all over the South and had produced a class of soldier not only courageous but also enterprising. This particular point is dealt with in greater detail in a subsequent chapter.

Good fighting material was most certainly available in the South, but for the first hundred years of its existence the English settlement at Madras preferred to rely for its protection on a small mixed force of Europeans, half-caste Portuguese and Africans, the reason probably being that as strangers in a foreign land the Company felt that more reliance could be placed on the fidelity of soldiers who also were alien.

To the French must be ascribed the honour of first realizing the value of local troops; they raised a force of 5,000 in 1739 and with this example before their eyes the English Company took similar steps a few years later.

Exactly what classes of men were enlisted into the Madras battalions in the early days can be ascertained from contemporary authors and records.

The following extracts bear on the subject :—

" From the proceedings of Government, dated 7th May 1770, it appears that the Sepoy battalions then consisted of Mohamedans, Tamils and Telugus, but no details of caste are given. It may be inferred that the number of Brahmans, Rajputs and Mahrattas in the Madras Army was very small. It is clear that the authorities were desirous of restricting enlistments to men of good caste, but it is equally clear that this was not practicable during the last (18th) century."

Captain Innes Munro writing in 1789 referring to the boys who carried the knapsacks of the European soldiers on the march and who cooked for them in camp, says : " These boys are amazingly attached to their masters and will keep close to their heels in the midst of the greatest dangers. When they grow up they make the best sepoys, for all of them speak English well."

Captain R. Gold writing about 1791 says: " Though the Coast sepoys are frequently of small stature, they have a very soldier-like appearance, and from the high state of perfection their officers have brought them to, by a strict discipline and a study to make their lives comfortable, they appear really attached to the service."

In 1795, owing to the small pay of the sepoy and the high price of rice, considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining good recruits, and the battalions were kept up to their proper strength by accepting undersized men and those of low caste. An attempt was made to obtain recruits from Bengal, but desertions were so numerous that the Supreme Government directed the experiment to be abandoned. Similar attempts in Bombay met with equal lack of success. It appears however from a minute written by General Harris early in 1798 that the difficulty in procuring eligible recruits in the Carnatic had then begun to diminish, since he writes: "Although the men obtained in the more southern countries are much inferior to the northern recruits in caste, size and appearance, they are nevertheless hardy and thrifty, and being less subject to local attachments and little encumbered with religious habits or prejudices to interfere with the regular performance of their duty, are found to stand the pressure of military hardships with much fortitude and to manifest at all times a firm adherence to the service."

A further reference in 1818 on the subject of recruiting in Hindustan for the Madras Army elicited the following reply from the Adjutant-General in Bengal: " The men who would enter the ranks of the Madras Army from Hindustan are generally those who have no ties behind, have committed some act for which they are in disgrace with their kindred or amenable to our laws, or wish to escape from the debts they have contracted—in short all those of desperate fortunes and who for fear of detection are unwilling to enter our battalions."

Writing in 1823 Sir John Philippart says: " The infantry sepoy of Madras is rather a small man, but he is of active make, and capable of undergoing great fatigue upon a very slender diet. We find no man arrive at a greater precision in all his military exercises; his moderation, his sobriety and his patience give him

a steadiness that is almost unknown to Europeans; but although there exists in this body of men a fitness to attain mechanical perfection as soldiers, there are no men whose mind it is of more consequence to study." The last sentence deserves special emphasis, since in it will be found the key to the Madras sepoy's devotion to those officers whom he knows to take an interest in his welfare, and to the maintenance of discipline in a Madras unit.

Col. Welsh writing in 1830 says that the Madras Army was composed of Musulmans, Rajputs to a very limited extent, Gentoos (Telugus), Tamils and Pariahs (Adi-Dravidas) and regrets that of recent years the latter class, " brave, active and attached as they were to their officers and the service, have of late years been excluded from the line, in order more fully to conciliate the higher classes." This unfortunate discrimination however did not persist, and Pariahs (as the Adi-Dravida was then called) continued to be enlisted, though principally into the Sappers and Pioneers.

Lt.-General Burton referring to the Madras Army in 1840 writes :—" The Army was fully officered and in a state of good discipline and efficiency. The men are not tall but there is no want of activity and strength in proportion to their size. They are mostly well-featured, but dark in complexion ; they are always ready to work with spade and pickaxe, an excellent trait which the Bengal sepoys do not so commonly possess; they are good marchers, frugal feeders and possess in short many good qualities on active service. They have few caste prejudices and when properly led are fully as reliable as their more showy brethren of the other Presidencies." The words " when properly led " deserve special note.

Sir Neville Chamberlain published the following order on the 2nd May 1878 : " The Commander-in-Chief intimates that recruits are not to be enlisted outside the Presidency. What the Coast Army did in times past, their successors if judiciously selected may be expected to do in the future. The sepoy of Bengal, Madras or Bombay is just what his British officers make of him, and Sir Neville Chamberlain has now seen enough of this (Madras) Native Army to feel assured that the Presidency can produce plenty

of good efficient soldiers provided they are sought for and when obtained be properly trained and well commanded." Emphasis may again be laid on the last two words.

Col. Wilson comparing the facility in recruiting at the time of the Bengal Mutiny when 17,000 men were enlisted, with the difficulties experienced between 1882 and 1887, attributes the cause partly to insecurity of permanence of service caused by frequent reductions between 1862 and 1882, during which period no less than 20 battalions were disbanded, but above all to the systematic way in which the Madras Army had for many years been kept in the background on most occasions of active service.

In the latter connection Lt.-General Burton writing in 1888 may again be quoted: "If the Madras sepoy is now of less worth than he was in the days of our first struggles for empire in India, it is because of disuse of war and of enforced inactivity, to which the dominant policy of the Supreme Government has of late condemned him. The evil to an army which has become mortified and dispirited by neglect and contemptuous treatment is very serious, and no protest against such treatment can be too strong. It is on account of this ill-treatment that the Madras Army needs an advocate. Once let it have a fair share of active service and its turn in the front line with the men of other presidencies, and it will perform its own advocacy in a sufficiently spirited manner."

The above extracts should be sufficient to dispel once and for all the idea that the Madras Army was largely recruited from Northern India. To confirm it the muster rolls of 36 Madras battalions taken at random between 1808 and 1829 show the following percentages among 32,318 sepoys:—

Bengal	1·65
Deccan	1·66
N. and Guntur Circars	28·32
Carnatic and Trichinopoly	35·43
Madura and Dindigul	7·78
Tanjore	7·45
Travancore and Tinnevelly	6·98
Malabar and Bombay	0·44

Mysore	...	9·40
Mahrattas	...	0·89
	Total ...	100·00

The above figures call for little comment. The small numbers from Malabar are due, so Col. Wilks says, to the unwillingness of the Malayali of that day to leave his native place, a disability which he has long since overcome. The Mahrattas were no doubt the descendants of former invaders who had settled at Tanjore, Madura and Krishnagiri. The men from Bengal and Deccan can be accounted for by the fact that so many Madras battalions were during these years on service far to the North of the Presidency, and as already explained would naturally accept any suitable local recruits who offered, to replace casualities.

On the outbreak of War in 1914 all that remained of the Madras Army was the Corps of Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners, three battalions of Madras Pioneers and eight Infantry battalions, and it must be admitted that some of the last-named were definitely not fit for field service. No Corps in the Indian Army has a higher reputation than the Madras Sappers, and the Madras Pioneers also were admittedly first class troops. Since the same class of man was enlisted for all three categories, it may be asked why the Carnatic battalions were not all up to the high standard of the others, and the answer is plain. Both Sappers and Pioneers had picked British officers, they were kept to full establishment and as Corps troops were constantly employed on active service. The Carnatic battalions on the other hand were on a reduced establishment of 600 so that they could not possibly mobilise without very large drafts from linked battalions; they had not for many years been given any chance of service, and finally a number of their officers had been sent down from north-country regiments as undesirable or inefficient. In spite of such handicaps some battalions which were fortunate in their officers, when sent on service did well from first to last, the 75th and 80th C.I. both deserving mention in this connection; but some of the others were at the

outbreak of war definitely below the standard required for active service, and the fact that when their turn came to go overseas with complete establishments and the necessary change of officers they acquitted themselves so well proves that any previous fault lay with the policy of relegating them to what were practically police duties, and with some of their officers, and most definitely not with the men themselves.

That the Pioneers and Infantry made good in the 1st World War is shown by the fact that Subadar Devaraju (Vizagapatam district) 80th Carnatic Infantry, won the Military Cross "for conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty on the 7th May 1920 near Abu Kemal," and that between 1914 and 1924 the following awards were made of the Indian Distinguished Service Medal:—

61st K.G.O. Pioneers	Eleven.
2/61st Pioneers	Two.
64th Pioneers	Twelve.
73rd C.I.	One.
75th C.I.	Seven.
79th C.I.	One.
80th C.I.	Nine.
81st Pioneers	Three.
86th C.I.	Two.

Considering that some units saw very little fighting, the record is not a bad one. During the same period Indian ranks of the Madras Sappers and Miners won one M.C., 5 I.O.M.'s, and 27 I.D.S.M.'s.

It is often forgotten that recruits for all branches of the service come from exactly the same classes as those for the Sappers and Miners, whose reputation is second to none, and it is well that officers serving to-day with Madras units should remember that fact, and that it devolves upon themselves to make the most of the excellent material at their disposal.

During the 2nd World War, some 500,000 men, all volunteers, enlisted in the Armed Forces from the Madras Presidency and South Indian States. From July 1940 to October 1945 I was Civil Liaison Officer of the same area and my close association with the families in the course of many extensive tours, afforded

first-hand information as to the motives which impelled recruits to come forward in such numbers. In the early days it was a spirit of adventure and the chance of going overseas as so many of their fathers had done in the 1st World War. Then came the fall of Singapore, the aerial bombardment of ports on the east coast, and the imminent threat of a Japanese landing at Madras. The urge now was purely patriotic; a real desire to do something to defend their homes from the horrors of invasion. The knowledge that the welfare of their families would be attended to by the Civil Liaison organization while they were away from home also had an encouraging effect, but it was not till much later in the war that recruitment owed much to economic conditions.

The fact that the newly raised Madras units did so well, in spite of any but the smallest numbers of trained men on which they were formed, was due not only to the excellent spirit of the men themselves and a determination to show that the Madrassi could do as well as anyone else, but also to the fact that they were given officers who suffered from no anti-Madrassi complex but were prepared to take their men as they found them. While I was C.L.O., I used to send out monthly to some 400 Madras units a Welfare Bulletin to keep all ranks informed as to what we were doing to look after their families and home interests generally. Many Commanding Officers corresponded with me, and without exception all said they could not want better men. How the gunners of the 3rd Madras battery stood to their guns in the face of overwhelming odds at Bir Hacheim has been related in a previous chapter, and the Officer Commanding a Madrassi 25 pr. Field battery in Burma wrote :—

"The battery served throughout the recent initial operations in Burma, from the time when the tide of Japanese soldiers swept towards India at an alarming rate, up till when beaten and smashed, with equal speed it recoiled back to Burma. Throughout the operations the Madrassi showed himself a good gunner in every sense of the word. Quick to learn, his gunnery was of a high standard, and he was able to hold his own in any company, either British Field Artillery or Indian Artillery. His guns became his gods, and the better to serve them, he developed a

toughness under the most trying conditions that earned for him the respect of all who came in contact with him.

"The Battery's first action on the Tiddim Road earned it the unwelcome attentions of the Jap 105 m/m guns, and for three days Jap shells battered away at the battery position, and the Madrassi "took it," and "took it" well; guns and vehicles were hit, but the Battery fought back the whole time, and the guns came back. From thereon the Battery never looked back, it was in good spirits and morale was high; as the jobs came along they were done—at times the Battery went forward in a role far better suited on paper to the Mountain gun, but showed that Field could do it too. The signallers and O.P. parties uncomplainingly toiled up and down mountain sides, carrying a burden that would make most men quail. Yet they were always there when the hard pressed infantry needed them.

"Under Jap small arms and M.G. fire, under their mortar and gun fire, these men proved that the Madrassi has not gone back on the reputation he earned in John Company's day."

Another battery commander in the front line wrote that "their casualties make the men all the more determined to get their own back," and from another source: "The men in hospital have only one idea—to get back into the line again and have another go at the Jap."

As regards the Infantry, Major F. Yeats-Brown, the well-known author, read a paper "With the Indian Soldier To-day," to a meeting in London of the East India Association presided over by Field Marshal Lord Birdwood, in which he said:—

"Before leaving Tamu I also visited a Madras battalion. You will agree that the standard set by a crack battalion of Gurkhas and a crack battalion of Sikhs is pretty high. Well, these Madrassis who have been raised since the war are smart by any standard. I do not want to use too many superlatives, or to repeat what their enthusiastic Colonel said about them, but I can say this, that everyone in the Indian Army in a position to know, will tell you that the Madrassi is a good fighting man, not only in the famous Sappers and Miners, but in the Infantry."

The idea has long been prevalent that Madrassis cannot stand cold, in spite of the fact that the Madras regiments serving in the Khyber in 1879–80 were the healthiest of all the troops engaged. In this connexion the O.C. a Madras Pioneer Company which had been with the M.E.F. since 1941 remarked on the cheerfulness of his men who at the time of writing were "working in a foot of snow, mixed castes and mixed religions, but all pulling on well together."

Sir Arthur Hope, who was Governor of Madras throughout the War, was an ardent champion of the Madras soldier and at an address delivered early in 1945 said :—

"I have always felt in reading the history of the Madras Army in the old days that there must be something fundamentally wrong in the attitude of the Army authorities in ignoring Madrassis in recent year. When you read the history of the past from 1750 onwards you will see that Madras troops did a great part of the fighting in India in those days, and were nearly always successful.

"It only required a good lever and a good office to bring the Madrassi back to his proper place, and therefore almost from the first week I was in this country, I pressed on the late Commander-in-Chief and his successor the fact that Madrassis were as good as, if not better than anybody else, and that they have fought, are fighting and would fight again as well as any other people in India or indeed in the whole world. And now it has been proved that I was perfectly right. I have referred to it before and will refer to it again. When I was on the Burma front two months ago, I was immensely struck by the opinion of everybody, high and low, European and Indian, of North Indian officers and of people who had no contact with the people of Madras before, how extraordinarily good these Madrassis were, and how well they fought and how cheerfully they did hard work. Every single Commanding Officer, and other officers both Indian and European paid the highest possible tribute to their fighting qualities and their work. If there is one thing we have seen during these five years, it is that Madrassis are now playing their part in the defence of their country in this World War."

The people of Madras in general, and the Madras soldier in particular, can never be sufficiently grateful to Sir Arthur Hope for his spirited advocacy of their cause, without which it is probable that the Madrassi would never have been given the opportunity to make good on the field of battle, as he most certainly has done, not only under leaders of another race, and to prove that there is as good fighting material in the South to-day, as in any other part of India.

The chief characteristics of the Madras sepoy have always been his undeviating loyalty, a remarkable power of endurance, and devotion to his officers, but that devotion can only be won by those who deserve it. Of his courage, the chapter on war services gives ample testimony; few troops would stand unshaken the fire which inflicted 25 per cent casualities on Wellington's small force at Assaye, or on the Madras brigades at Maheidpoor, and the Madrassis serving to-day are the direct descendants of those who participated in those actions and many other notable campaigns. No prouder records adorn any page of military history than those of the sepoys whom Clive, Coote and Wellesley led to victory, and that their descendants between 1939 and 1946 upheld the great traditions of the old Coast Army is confirmed by no less an authority than the Commander-in-Chief in India.

War is now essentially one of the machines, and for this the intelligence and better education of the Madrassi render him particularly suitable. It would be nothing less than a crime if prejudices of the past are allowed to hamper the true nationalization of India's Army of the future, in which all classes should be represented in proportion to the services they have rendered in the last World War, and the Madrassi given the share to which he is entitled.

CHAPTER VI

SEPARATE ACCOUNTS OF EACH BRANCH OF THE SERVICE

(1)

Cavalry

The first mention of Madras cavalry is in November 1758 when Mahomed Yusuf Khan, Commandant of Sepoys, was empowered to enlist 500 Indian horse on the best terms he could, and to employ them in harassing the convoys of the French army, then advancing towards Fort St. George. Apparently a considerable body was raised, principally in Tanjore, but they were undisciplined and of little use except as scouts and foragers. They appear to have been disbanded at some later date, as in July 1767 we find Colonel Joseph Smith, then with the army at Vaniambady for the purpose of opposing the entrance into the Carnatic of Haidar Ali and the Nizam, strongly urging the necessity for raising a strong body of Indian cavalry. But Government rejected the proposal, partly on the grounds of expense, and partly because their policy was at the time purely defensive. Instead, they requested the Nawab of Arcot to place 2,000 of his horse under European officers, in order that they might be put into a proper state of discipline, and this was done.

Between 1776 and the end of 1778 the Nawab's cavalry consisted of about 3,600 men divided into seven regiments, of which three or four were commanded by Company's officers. During that time the men were in a chronic state of mutiny in consequence of the extreme length of time they were kept without pay. On one occasion they confined their officers, and were only prevented from proceeding to further extremities by a large advance of money made by Colonel James of the Artillery from his private purse, and incidentally, not refunded to him for many years. An even more serious mutiny having occurred at Palamcottah, Government stepped in and arranged for the payment of all arrears. At the same time the establishment was reduced to four regiments each of 300 men.

But the remedy proved to be only temporary and on the 25th August 1780, when Sir Hector Munro was about to march from

the Mount to Conjeevaram, the regiment of cavalry then in camp suddenly refused to move unless their pay, then 14 months in arrears, was immediately disbursed. This the Nawab refused to do, and Government being without the means of complying with the demand, the men were disarmed and sent back to Madras with the exception of 56, most of whom were officers and non-commissioned officers. The cavalry remaining with the army thus consisted of this small body, and of 33 European troopers, and the lack of information regarding Haidar Ali's and Tipu's movements which resulted, was in no small degree responsible for the destruction of Colonel Baillie's detachment at Pollilore in the ensuing month.

Some arrangement to satisfy the men's demands must have been made, for when Sir Eyre Coote arrived from Bengal in November, he took under his command four regiments of the Nawab's cavalry, which rendered good service though their small numbers largely restricted their activities to scouting and escort duty.

In 1794 Government, having become alive to the necessity for ensuring more regular payments, resolved to form a regular establishment of cavalry by taking into their own service the four regiments belonging to the Nawab, which had been paid and mounted by the Company during the war, the establishment of each regiment to consist of four troops of 125 each, including officers.

But the terms of transfer were not made known to the men, and in consequence the whole corps of cavalry then at Arni mutinied and confined their officers. Prompt and effective measures were taken to suppress the outbreak and Government ordered the disbandment of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Regiments, retaining only the 3rd Regiment which had been little implicated and was renumbered the 1st Regiment (later 2nd Madras Light Cavalry). At the same time a new 2nd Regiment (later 3rd Madras Light Cavalry) was formed from the three reduced regiments, which consisted almost entirely of Mahomedans. In May 1785 a third regiment (later 4th P.W.O. Madras Light Cavalry) was raised, and in the following month a fourth regiment, which ultimately became the 5th and was reduced in 1796.

During the early part of 1786 the number of troops was increased to six, two of which were called *Grenadiers,* and the establishment of a regiment was fixed at 10 European officers, 24 Indian officers, 8 serjeants, 478 Indian other ranks, and two surgeons.

On 23rd October 1787 a fifth regiment was raised which later became the 1st Madras Light Cavalry in accordance with the custom of renumbering cavalry regiments by the seniority of their Commandants, a practice which was abandoned in 1788. The same year standards were for the first time presented to each regiment.

The training of the regiments as they were formed was entrusted by Government to Colonel Floyd of the 19th Light Dragoons, who was given a free hand in all that concerned discipline and equipment. Non-commissioned officers and privates of the 19th acted as instructors, and the system founded by him lasted practically till the end of the nineteenth century.

Great difficulty appears to have been experienced in obtaining remounts, and the heavy loss in horses sustained in Colonel Floyd's action near Bangalore in March 1791, and during the subsequent operations in April and May resulted in the 1st, 2nd and 4th Regiments being dismounted to complete H.M.'s 19th Light Dragoons and the 3rd and 5th Regiments. The result was that the whole force of cavalry which marched for Seringapatam under Lord Cornwallis in February 1791, consisted of six troops 19th Light Dragoons, six of the 3rd, four of the 5th and two of the Body Guard. Lacking an adequate force to penetrate the screen of hostile cavalry, and thus being in total ignorance of the proximity of his allies the Mahrattas, Lord Cornwallis for want of supplies was compelled to burst his siege guns and withdraw to Bangalore.

In the reorganization of 1796 the establishment of Madras cavalry was fixed at four regiments of six troops each, and the 5th Regiment was accordingly reduced, as being junior in respect of number, though actually senior to the 1st Regiment which was raised in October 1787 whereas the 5th had been raised in June 1785, as the 4th Regiment.

The Body Guard, whose inspection by the Governor-General in January 1799 evoked most favourable comment, was originally composed of 1 Serjeant, 1 Corporal and 12 European troopers

assigned to the Governor as an escort in October 1778. The number was gradually increased and in 1781 an Indian troop was added; both troops served in the 2nd Mysore War 1781–84. The European troop was then disbanded, but the Indian troop was kept on and served during the 3rd Mysore War 1791–92. It appears to have averaged from 60 to 70 non-commissioned officers and privates up to the commencement of 1799, when the number of the latter was increased to 100, and a supernumerary troop of the same strength was raised to do duty with it. In March of the same year a similar troop, known as *Montgomery's* was raised to serve with the detachment assembled at Trichinopoly under Lieut.-Colonel Brown for the purpose of co-operating with the army proceeding against Seringapatam under General Harris.

The Governor-General was evidently greatly impressed by the Madras Body Guard, for during June and July 1799, a troop of cavalry for the Body Guard of the Governor-General was formed by drafts of picked men from each of the four regiments of Madras cavalry, and was sent to Bengal shortly afterwards under the command of Lieutenant H. C. Montgomery, the families of the men being permitted to accompany them. This detachment returned from Bengal in January 1806, when men still fit for service were distributed among the several regiments, and the rest transferred to the pension establishment; its services in Bengal were highly commended by the Governor-General. The Body Guard was discontinued as a separate corps from the 30th April 1808, and the Indian officers and men were ordered to be borne on the strength of the various regiments.

Two additional regiments of cavalry, numbered the 5th and 6th, were raised in September 1799, one in consequence of the increase of territory, and the other for service with the Hyderabad subsidiary force. The nucleus of both regiments, to the extent of about 100 men in each, was composed of *Montgomery's troop*, the supernumerary troop of the Body Guard which had been raised during the war, and of drafts from the old corps. The stations assigned to the cavalry in November of the same year were Arcot, Bangalore, Coimbatore, Chitaldrug, Sira and Hyderabad.

The importance of a remount depot had been recognized as far back as 1795, when Lieutenant Evans of the infantry was permitted to make an experiment on his own account, assistance being granted by Government in the shape of grazing land in the vicinity of Ganjam. This experiment having been favourably reported on, Government took over the stud in 1800 and fixed the number of mares at 500, and that of stallions at 25. The purchase of stallions was restricted to Arabs of the best blood and figure.

A seventh regiment of cavalry was raised at Arcot in July 1800, and an eighth in May 1804, the nuclei being composed of drafts of officers, men and horses from the other regiments. The establishment of Madras cavalry was destined to receive no further augmentation, and remained at the same figure till 1857.

About this time the question of mounting the cavalry on geldings was taken into consideration, but the general opinion having been against the change, the matter dropped, and does not appear to have been revived until 1848, when geldings were tried in the 4th Regiment with such success that the use of entire horses was discontinued shortly afterwards throughout the service.

About the middle of 1805 enlistments for the cavalry were restricted to men between 17 and 25 years of age. No man was to be taken under 5 feet 4 inches, and none enlisted except Mahomedans of good sects, Rajputs, Mahrattas and Rachwars.

In April 1810 orders were issued for the formation of a Veterinary Establishment to "educate and instruct in the Veterinary art, a number of boys not exceeding 48, who will ultimately be posted to regiments of cavalry with the rank and pay of European Farriers."

During October of the same year the manner of wearing swords, which up to that time, had been carried in a shoulder belt, was altered. "The swords of all ranks in the horse artillery and cavalry are to be carried in a waist belt of the breadth of 2¼ inches, and the cartouch boxes over the left shoulder in a belt 3 inches in breadth."

On the 26th January 1813 the Indian Officers of the Body Guard, and of the 1st Regiment of Cavalry, who had returned to

Madras after having been attached to the Embassy in Persia, were thanked in General Orders for their meritorious conduct while on that service. A gratuity equal to three months' pay and batta was granted to each man, and a similar gratuity was paid to the families of men who had died during their absence from the Madras Presidency. Gold medals of the order of the *Lion and Sun* were conferred on Jemadars Syed Hoosain and Hoossainee Beg.

In November 1817, the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay applied for a draft of Indian officers, non-commissioned officers and privates from the Madras cavalry to assist in drilling the men of the regiments of regular cavalry then being raised in that Presidency for the first time. The services of these men were found so essential that in 1818 it was requested that they might be permanently transferred to the Bombay establishment; and a further draft of officers and men was applied for at the same time.

In August 1843 carbines were issued to the cavalry to the extent of 10 per troop; these were replaced by Snider carbines in 1879.

The 8th regiment was disbanded at Arcot in November 1857, for having refused to embark for service in Bengal unless allowed the old rates of pay and pension, although the regiment had volunteered only a short time before, and without suggesting any conditions. Commenting on this regrettable incident, Lieut. General E. F. Burton in *Reminiscences of Sport in South India*, remarks: "The regiment was incited to volunteer by its British officers, but was shabbily treated in pay matters. The men stood out for certain privileges they believed they were entitled to. It was well known that beyond their desire to make a good bargain for themselves, they had no mutinous spirit."

On the 26th October 1860, the 5th, 6th and 7th regiments were ordered to be disbanded, following the policy of general retrenchment on the transfer of the armed forces of the East India Company to the Crown.

In 1865 the Government of India decided to change the cavalry of the other Presidencies into Silladar Horse, but the Madras cavalry remained unaffected and continued to exist as the sole regular cavalry units of the Indian Army, until 1921.

In March 1876 the 4th regiment received the distinction of being styled the *Prince of Wales Own*, but was disbanded in 1891 to provide a fourth squadron to the three remaining regiments.

In February 1886, the 1st and 2nd regiments were ordered to be armed with lances in addition to their then equipment, and to be designated the 1st and 2nd Madras Lancers. The 3rd Light Cavalry was similarly re-armed and re-named in 1891.

In 1903 the Indian Army was renumbered and the old Presidency distinctions abolished, when the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Madras Lancers became the 26th, 27th and 28th Light Cavalry. The first of these was designated *Prince of Wales Own* in 1906 and *King George's Own* in 1910.

At the same time it was decided to reconstitute 3 squadrons of each regiment with men from North India, and finally the Madrassi element was, except for a few individual enlistments, completely eliminated. But the services of Madrassis in other branches of the Army during the War of 1939–1945 had so favourably impressed the authorities that in 1946 it was decided again to reconstitute with Madrassis the 16th Light Cavalry (formerly 2nd Madras Lancers) thus giving them an opening in the sole branch of the service in which they had not been represented since 1919.

Precis of Cavalry Units

Governor's Body-Guard

Formed as a small escort of European troopers 1778.
Expanded to one European and one Indian troop 1781.
Reduced to one Indian troop 1784.
Supernumerary troop added 1799.
Re-organised 1808 and 1820.
Reformed as a separate troop 1897.

1st Madras Light Cavalry (Darley-ki-Paltan)

Raised as 5th Regiment Madras Native Cavalry 1787.
Became 1st Madras Native Cavalry 1788.
1st Madras Light Cavalry 1819.
1st Madras Lancers 1886.
26th Light Cavalry 1903.

26th P.W.O. Light Cavalry 1906.
26th K.G.O. Light Cavalry 1910.
8th K.G.O. Light Cavalry 1922.

2nd Madras Light Cavalry (Stevenson)

Raised as 3rd Regiment Madras Native Cavalry 1784.
Became 1st Madras Native Cavalry 1784.
2nd Madras Native Cavalry 1788.
2nd Madras Light Cavalry 1819.
2nd Madras Lancers 1886.
27th Light Cavalry 1903.
16th Light Cavalry 1922.

3rd Madras Light Cavalry (Campbell)

Raised as 2nd Regiment Madras Native Cavalry 1784.
Became 1st Madras Native Cavalry 1786.
3rd Madras Native Cavalry 1788.
3rd Madras Light Cavalry 1819.
3rd Madras Lancers 1891.
28th Light Cavalry 1903.
7th Light Cavalry 1922.

4th Madras Light Cavalry (Younge)

Raised as 3rd Regiment Madras Native Cavalry 1785.
Became 4th Madras Light Cavalry 1819.
4th P.W.O. Madras Light Cavalry 1876.
Disbanded 1891.

5th Madras Light Cavalry

Raised as 5th Regiment Madras Native Cavalry 1799 at Trichinopoly.
Became 5th Madras Light Cavalry 1819.
Disbanded 1860.

6th Madras Light Cavalry

Raised as 6th Regiment Madras Native Cavalry 1799 at Arcot.
Became 6th Madras Light Cavalry 1819.
Disbanded 1860.

7th Madras Light Cavalry

Raised as 7th Regiment Madras Native Cavalry 1800 at Arcot.
Became 7th Madras Light Cavalry 1819.
Disbanded 1860.

8th Madras Light Cavalry

Raised as 8th Regiment Madras Native Cavalry 1804 at Arcot.
Became 8th Madras Light Cavalry 1819.
Disbanded 1857.

(2)
Artillery

The Madras Artillery, though nominally a European corps, had from the earliest times included in its composition Indian gun lascars, who acted as sappers in the battery, and in case of need, worked the guns. The present Corps of Madras Artillery may, therefore, with every justification, trace their descent from the earliest times of the East India Company, though in point of fact it was not till 1784 that Indian Artillery was raised as a separate corps, nor until 1805 that it was brought permanently on to the establishment of the Army.

The earliest record of the Company's Artillery dates back to 1628, in which year the garrison at Armegon, a settlement 36 miles north of Pulicat, which was later transferred to Madras, is described as consisting of 28 soldiers and 12 pieces of ordnance. Thirty recruits with a considerable amount of ordnance and military stores were landed at Madras in 1644, and in 1690 the garrison of Fort St. George included a company of artillery. But it was not till 1748, two years after the capture of Madras by the French, that orders were received from the Court of Directors for the regular establishment of a company of artillery 115 strong (exclusive of gun lascars) under a captain, who also held the post of Chief Engineer. Detailed instructions were issued for their training "in the practice of gunnery in general, as the manner of serving and firing all sorts of pieces of Artillery, whether designed for the throwing of shot, shells, stones, grenades, carcasses * and other fire works, and likewise the manner to mount or dismount cannon or mortars, and to

* Metal cylinders filled with combustibles, the fore-runner of the incendiary bomb.

remove them from place to place, at which they are to be exercised at proper times, but so as not to overfatigue them, or give them a disgust to the service." Monthly inspections were to be carried out, and "twice at least every year a solemn exercise, to fire at marks and throw shells in the presence of the Governor."

A few years later a second company was formed, and at the same time orders were issued regulating the management of Gun Lascars, the proportion of Indian officers being fixed at one Tindal to each gun and one Serang to each 2 guns. The train of each company consisted of two 12 pounders, ten 6 pounders and three 5¾ inch howitzers.

In 1765 the establishment was increased from two to three companies, each of seven officers and 100 rank and file; but General Caillaud strongly urged on Government the necessity for further augmentation, to enable the corps to carry out its duties in garrison and in the field, and three years later the Court of Directors ordered that a battalion of five companies should be formed, under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel.

The field guns then in use were six and twelve pounders, with medium eighteen pounders for siege purposes. In 1770 a number of 18 and 24 pounders arrived from England, but were considered much too heavy to suit conditions in India, since the former weighed 40 cwt. and the latter 50 cwt. About this time two short brass 3-pounder guns were ordered to be attached to each sepoy battalion; they were to be worked by two selected sepoys from each company who would receive an extra allowance, while a European gunner and a lascar were appointed for each gun.

During 1771, the Artillery was regularly inspected and reviewed for the first time, and the following is an extract from the report on the company stationed at Trichinopoly:—

"*Firings.*

"From six 6 pounders, a hundred rounds very briskly, but not in very exact time, many tubes missing fire.

"From two 6 pounders with shot at the target, three rounds each.

"From a 4½-inch mortar, a 5½-inch mortar, two 4½-inch howitzers and one 5½-inch howitzer, three rounds of live shells each,

distance 650 yards. Shells from the mortars burst very properly; part of the howitzer shells went dead.

"This detachment in good order, and fit for service."

In July 1778 the establishment of the battalion was fixed at 8 companies, each consisting of five officers and 78 rank and file, *including for the first time two fifers*; while in the following year the corps of lascars was ordered to be formed into 24 companies, each company to consist of 1 syrang, 3 tindals and 50 lascars. Eight of these companies were placed under the sole direction of the Commandant of Artillery, who was instructed to attach them to the several companies of Artillery, or to make such other disposition of them as might be approved by the Commander-in-Chief. In the former case this would mean that an Artillery Company would comprise 5 British officers, 3 Indian officers, 78 British, and 50 Indian other ranks. The lascars were to be drilled and armed and to act as the sappers of the company, thus saving the gunners from much severe duty and exposure; in case of need they were to work the guns also.

On the termination of the 2nd Mysore War a battalion of Indian Artillery of 10 companies was raised, but within a year this new formation was reduced, and its place taken by a corps of "Assistant Native Gunners" attached to each company of European Artillery, their strength being 1 *Subadar*, 2 *Jemadars*, 6 Havildars, 6 Naiks, and 200 Gunners. But this corps also had as short a life as its predecessor, for when in 1786 the European Artillery was re-organized into two battalions of five companies each, the old system of attaching companies of gun lascars to the Artillery companies was reverted to.

The practice of attaching guns to cavalry and infantry units was still in favour at the time, and the following order on the subject was issued by the Commander-in-Chief on the 5th May 1786:—

"When the battalions of European and Indian infantry, or the regiments of cavalry are commanded to take the field for service, they are to be equipped with two field pieces each. Two tindals and twenty-eight lascars are also to be attached for working the artillery, and one European non-commissioned officer and eight privates for pointing the guns, and taking care of the ammunition and stores."

The year 1799 is notable for the formation of Horse Artillery to be attached to each regiment of European Dragoons and Madras Cavalry, and the following order was issued on the subject :—

"The plan adopted by Government for attaching flying artillery to the cavalry corps having been communicated to the heads of regiments respectively, the Commander-in-Chief is now pleased to direct that the detail of European artillery and gun lascars to be attached to each regiment be sent to the several corps from the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Artillery agreeably to the following arrangements, viz., 1 Lieutenant Fire Worker, 1 Sergeant, 1 Corporal, 1 Syrang, 2 Second Tindals and 20 Lascars for each regiment of European Dragoons, and 1 Sergeant, 1 Gunner, 1 First Tindal and 18 Lascars for each regiment of Madras Cavalry."

The Commandants of the battalions of Artillery were at the same time directed to select the most active and intelligent Non-Commissioned officers and men for this duty. The fact that the Horse Artillery so formed was very largely composed of Indians, is a proof not only of the efficiency in their duties attained by the Artillery lascars, but of the determination of the Madras Government to support their military advisers on the subject, against the expressed wishes of the Court of Directors.

At the same time a company of Indian artillery was raised for duty at Madras during the war. Its strength was 2 Indian officers and 103 Indian other ranks, and it was commanded by the Deputy Commissary of Stores in Fort St. George.

In April 1805, orders were issued for the formation of a separate body of Horse Artillery, consisting of one European and one Indian troop, which was augmented to three troops in 1808 and designated: "The Corps of Horse Artillery." Its composition was 15 British and 3 Indian officers, 195 European and 86 Indian rank and file; while the ordnance consisted of two 12 pounders, two 5½-inch howitzers and ten 6 pounders.

The year 1805 also marks the re-raising of the Golandauze or Indian Foot Artillery, two companies being formed, each consisting of 1 British and 3 Indian officers, and 96 Indian rank and file.

* Literally "Hurlers of balls."

In 1819 the Corps establishment was revised, and augmented to one Horse Brigade and three battalions of Foot Artillery. The former was to be composed of six troops, viz.: four European and two Indian, with a European Rocket troop attached. The ordnance was restricted to 6 pounders, the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief that one troop should be armed with 9 pounders being rejected on the grounds of expense, and the undesirability of introducing a calibre not then in use in India. The horses and appointments of the galloper guns attached to regiments of Dragoons and Madras Cavalry were absorbed into the new formation. The two battalions of European Artillery were to consist as before, of seven companies each, with seven companies of gun lascars attached, while the companies of Golandauze or Indian Artillery, till then attached to the European battalions, were increased to ten, and formed into a separate battalion with a similar establishment of gun lascars. The Golandauze battalion consisted of 17 British and 31 Indian officers, 820 N.C.Os. and privates, and 70 recruit and pension boys, while the Gun Lascars attached totalled 31 Indian officers, 480 rank and file, and 80 recruit and pension boys.

The Commander-in-Chief had pressed for an increase of British officers with the Golandauze, but Sir Thomas Munro, then Governor of Madras, dissented with the following observation: "I am so far from thinking that the efficiency of Indian troops is increased in proportion to the number of European officers, that I think the number of such officers may be too great, and that when this is the case, it injures the discipline of the corps. Indian officers are well acquainted with their duties, and expert in their execution. One European officer to a company is quite enough for every useful purpose." Sir Thomas Munro also considered that rockets were of little if any use on service, and were in fact more dangerous to our own troops than to the enemy. The Rocket troop was therefore converted into a reserve troop of Horse Artillery, but was later reformed when the new Congreve rocket was introduced into India in 1823.

In 1824 the Corps was again reorganized into two Brigades of Horse Artillery each of four troops, viz., 1st European and 2nd

Indian Brigade; and four battalions of Foot Artillery, viz., three European of four companies each, and one Indian of ten companies, with the usual complement of gun lascars. Stations were allocated as follows :—

1st European Brigade Horse Artillery—St. Thomas Mount.
2nd Indian Brigade Horse Artillery—Bangalore.
1st Battalion Foot Artillery—Nagpur.
2nd Battalion Foot Artillery—Secunderabad.
3rd Battalion Foot Artillery—St. Thomas Mount.
4th Golandauze Battalion—St. Thomas Mount.

In the same year the famous Mysore establishment of gun and draught bullocks which had been captured at Seringapatam in 1799 was taken over by the Army, eight companies or karkhanahs each of 160 bullocks with drivers being allotted for service with the Foot Artillery, while the remainder were formed into 37 karkhanahs each of 100 bullocks for general purposes.

In January 1848, the substitution of horses for bullocks with the Foot Artillery was ordered and began with the Light Field Batteries, whose ordnance at the time consisted of four brass 9 pounders, and two brass 24 pounder howitzers. Two Horse Field batteries (Indian) were also raised for service in Pegu, at the time of the 2nd Burma war.

In consequence of the transfer of the East India Company's forces to the Crown, the Madras Artillery was absorbed into the British Army in 1861 as follows :—

The four European troops of Horse Artillery became A, B, C and D batteries of the 3rd Royal Horse Brigade.

The three European Artillery battalions were reformed into the Royal (Madras) Regiment of Artillery, of three brigades, viz., 17th, 20th and 23rd Brigades Royal Artillery.

The two remaining Indian troops of Horse Artillery (two had been reduced in 1831) were formed into one troop, designated F troop, in 1860; this was disbanded in 1866.

The Golandauze Battalion was reduced to a single Company in 1864 and attached to the 17th Brigade R.A. under the designation "The Battery of Indian Artillery"—it was disbanded in 1870.

Colonel Wilson, commenting on the disbandment of the Indian Artillery remarks :—

" This measure, which was part of the general policy of Government, deprived the country of an excellent and efficient body of Artillery, maintained at comparatively small cost, which had rendered good and faithful service from the time of the first war in Burma, up to that of the Mutiny in Bengal, during which it distinguished itself on every opportunity which occurred. Their gallantry during the actions at Cawnpore on the 26th, 27th and 28th November 1857, and subsequently in the operations under Lord Clyde which resulted in the final defeat of the mutineers near Cawnpore on the 8th December of the same year, elicited the thanks and commendations both of the Officer commanding the Brigade, and of Major-General Dupuis commanding the Royal Artillery."

The European troops and batteries during this service were frequently driven by Madrassis, who uniformly behaved in the most gallant manner. *For instance, at Lucknow in December* 1857 where the guns of the E. Troop were recorded by Lord Clyde to have been fought with great ability. Major (later Major-General) Chamier wrote of them thus:—

" I served subsequently during the campaign with Major Cotter's battery, the drivers of which were Madrassis. We were engaged in several actions under General Sir T. H. Franks on our march from Benares to Lucknow; also during the siege of Lucknow under Lord Clyde; and afterwards in the pursuit of Koor Sing, and in several engagements under Sir Edward Lugard at, and in the vicinity of Azimghur, and the Jugdespore jungles. The conduct of the battery drivers was soldierlike and brave and I never witnessed a single instance to the contrary. They drove fearlessly and well, and their conduct was favourably noticed in my presence by Colonel Maberly, R.A., who commanded the Artillery with General Frank's force.

" Attached to each battery of Madras Artillery in Bengal there was a body of Gun Lascars. These men being drilled and armed, acted as the sappers of the battery, and saved the gunners from much severe duty and exposure, besides which they frequently

rendered valuable assistance in action. Several of them obtained the " Indian Order of Merit " for gallantry in working the guns when the European Gunners were disabled by wounds, or exhausted by fatigue."

Between 1862 and 1922 the driver establishment of many Brigades of R.G.A. and R.F.A. serving in India was of Madrassi composition, till their class was finally excluded in the latter year.

It was not till January 1935 that Indian Artillery again appeared in the Army List, with the raising of " A " Field Brigade (later 1st Field Regiment) Indian Artillery, at Bangalore. Included in its composition of four batteries, was the 1st (Madras) Field Battery, formed from the Madras Pioneer Company which had been raised when the three Madras Pioneer battalions were mustered out a short time before.

On the 15th May 1940, a 2nd Indian Field Regiment was formed, which also included one battery of Madrassis, raised on a nucleus provided by the 1st Battery.

The superior intelligence of Madrassis and their aptitude as gunners was quickly recognized, and as the war progressed more and more were enlisted into this branch of the service.

The 3rd Indian Field Regiment was raised in April 1941 and the 1st Madras Battery transferred to it en bloc and renumbered the 5th.

The 4th and 5th Indian Field Regiments were raised in 1942 each containing one Madrassi battery, while in the following year the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Indian Field Regiments were formed, their composition being entirely Madrassi.

The 5th Indian Light Anti-Aircraft battery of the 1st Indian A.A. Regiment, was the first Madrassi one to be formed. It proceeded to Malaya in November 1941 and was captured by the enemy in January 1942. The next Madrassi A.A. batteries to be raised were the 6th Indian Heavy in June 1941 and 9th Indian Light in October 1941.

The year 1942 saw the formation of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Light A.A. and the 6th and 10th Heavy A.A. Indian Regiments, which were composed entirely of Madrassis, while the 9th Punjab Heavy Regiment included one Madras battery, and one and half batteries of Madrassis were in the 5th Indian Heavy A.A. Regiment.

Finally in 1943 no less than 5 Light A.A. and 8 Heavy A.A. Regiments (Nos. 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18, and Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21 and 25 respectively) were formed of Madrassis only, so that by the end of the war, Madrassis preponderated over all other classes in the Indian Artillery. The services of the Corps were recognized by the Royal title in 1945. A full list of Madras Artillery units which served between 1939 and 1946 is given in the Appendix.

(3)

Sappers and Miners

The earliest record of Pioneers as they were first called, is during the siege of Madras by the French in 1758 when three volunteer companies were formed, one of European and two of Indian volunteers each consisting of 2 officers, 6 N.C.Os. and 94 rank and file.

They were employed on repairing works, making traverses, fixing palisades and constructing counter-mines, earning a big reputation from the Chief Engineer of that period.

This raising of volunteer Pioneers on an as required basis, i.e., raising and disbanding after every battle, continued until 1780 when Lieut. Joseph Moorhouse of the Artillery, Commissary of Stores, recommended to Government the necessity of maintaining pioneer companies as part of the army in place of temporary labourers.

The outcome of this recommendation was an order which directed that two companies of Pioneers be raised by the Commissary of Stores, each company consisting of 2 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 5 Havildars, 5 Naiks and 100 Indian Pioneers, and officered from the line.

The excellent work of the Pioneers in the Mysore wars and the reputation they gained resulted in their establishment being augmented, till in 1799 it consisted of eight companies, of a strength of 5 British officers and 1,092 British and Indian rank and file. Four years later the Corps was further augmented to sixteen companies and formed into two separate battalions of eight companies each.

In March 1818 a Corps of Sappers and Miners was formed, consisting of one European and two Indian companies, but the actual strength never exceeded 50 Europeans and 32 Indians and it was disbanded in May 1821. From this time onwards until 1831 opinions varied as to what should constitute the Engineer arm of the service, Pioneers or Sappers and Miners. In 1824 there was a proposal that one battalion of Pioneers be converted into Sappers and Miners and that British N.C.Os. should be brought from England.

In 1831 2 N.C.Os. and 8 Sappers arrived from the United Kingdom and in this year the 1st Battalion of Pioneers became the Corps of Sappers and Miners, officered from the Corps of Engineers with an establishment of 10 British officers, 10 B.N.C.Os., 8 Indian officers, 49 N.C.Os, and 709 I.O.Rs., 5 servants, 13 artificers and 4 assistants.

The 2nd Battalion of Pioneers was incorporated in the Sappers and Miners in 1834 and the distribution of the Corps at that time was :—

Regimental Headquarters ..	Bangalore ..	3 companies.
Detachment	Nilgiris ..	2 „
„	Madras ..	1 company.
„	Hyderabad ..	2 companies.

After the war in Coorg in 1834, the Headquarters moved to Mercara and remained there until 1855 when it was located at Dowlaishwaram. In 1836 a fixed establishment of 39 B.W. and N.C.Os. was given.

In 1837 the establishment was reduced to six companies but *was augmented to twelve companies in 1857 and the number of* officers of the line doing duty with the Corps increased to 24. In 1862 a reduction to ten companies was ordered as no portion of the Corps was required for the Pegu division.

In 1856 the order of precedence for Indian troops laid down that the Corps of Sappers and Miners should take the right of all Indian Infantry. In the same year, Corps Headquarters moved from Dowlaishwaram to Bangalore, where they are still located.

In 1876 H.M. Queen Victoria conferred on the Corps the distinction of being styled *Queen's Own*, and of bearing on Colours

and appointments the *Royal cipher within the Garter.* At this time the Corps consisted of ten companies, 5 of which were in Bangalore, 3 at Secunderabad, 1 in the Nilgiris and 1 at Rangoon. The men were armed with the 5 grooved muzzle loading Snider carbine, and carried their ammunition in two pouches on the waist belt, in addition to various engineering tools.

In 1885 the Corps was reorganized into six Service Coys., numbered 1 to 6, and two Depot Coys. A & B. Each service company consisted of 2 British and 3 Indian officers, 2 B.N.C.Os. and 168 I.O.Rs. "A" company consisted of 2 B.Os., 26 B.N.C.Os., 3 I.Os., 16 N.C.Os. and 152 I.O.Rs. "B" was the recruit depot Coy. It is noteworthy that sepoys were hereafter called "Sappers."

In 1887 the Burma Sappers and Miners was raised. It consisted of one company and was affiliated to the Q.O.S. and M. which provided officers and N.C.Os.

In 1897 the Queen's Own Sappers and Miners by virtue of seniority were given precedence over the Bengal and Bombay Sappers and Miners.

In 1898 3 N.C.Os. and 17 Sappers were seconded for 3 years for service in Nigeria with the W.A.F.F., Hav. Munisami and Naick Rajendram earning the West Africa Medal with bar 1900 while so employed. Whilst in England, on the return journey to India the detachment was taken to Balmoral to see H.M. Queen Victoria who complimented them on their work.

In 1903 the Corps name was changed to *2nd Queen's Own Sappers and Miners* but retained the precedence given in 1897. At the time the companies were renumbered 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 (Burma Coy.) and C & D. The first 7 still retain the same numbers.

In 1904 His Majesty the King became Colonel-in-Chief of the Corps, and General Sir H. D. Prendergast, V.C., G.C.B., was appointed Honorary Colonel; the latter won his V.C. whilst serving with Madras Sappers and Miners in 1857.

In 1909 the designation Service Coy. was changed to Field Coy. which is still in use.

The Corps was re-named the *2nd Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners* in 1911.

On the outbreak of War with Germany in 1914 the strength of the Corps was 21 B.Os., 25 I.Os., 31 B.N.C.Os., 1,389 N.C.Os. and men, 120 drivers, and the establishment consisted of 7 Field Coys., 1 Field Park Coy., 2 Photo Litho Sections, 2 Printing Sections, 1 Field Troop and a Defence Light Section at Rangoon.

At the close of the 1914–18 war the Corps strength was 3 Field Troops, 16 Field Coys., 16 Depot Coys., and 3 Burma Coys., totalling 144 B.Os., 85 B.N.C.Os. 5,742 N.C.Os. and men and 1,287 Burman ranks.

The period 1919–23 was one of reconstruction and reduction, seriously impeded by the outbreak of small wars; Afghanistan 1919; Kurdistan, Persia and Iraq 1920–21; North-West Frontier 1920–1921, and Malabar 1921–22.

At the end of this period the Corps was reduced to its post-war establishment, except that 63 Coy. was retained in Iraq for work on R.A.F. Hangers. Secunderabad and Rawalpindi were abolished as Corps Stations and 2 Field Coys. detailed instead as covering troops in Waziristan.

1921 saw two new types of Field unit in Sappers and Miners establishments; Army Troops Coy. and Div. H.Q. Coy.

In 1922 the Burma Coy. became independent and was manned by Burmans instead of Madrassis. It was designated the 4th Burma Sappers and Miners and absorbed the Defence Light Section at Rangoon.

In 1923, the title of the Corps was again changed from *2nd Q.V.O. Sappers and Miners* to *Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners*, revising the change made in 1903. The strength of the Corps then was 2 Field Troops, 5 Field Coys., 2 A.T. Coys., 1 D.H.Q. Coy., 3 Depot Coys., 1 Photo Litho Sec., 1 Printing Sec., consisting of 36 B.Os., 56 R.E.W. and N.C.Os. and 2,167 I.O.Rs.

In 1925 the Corps received the battle honour *Afghanistan 1919*, and also those for the war of 1914–18, viz.: *France and Flanders 1914–15*, *Suez Canal*, *Egypt 1915–17*, *Gaza*, *Megiddo*, *Sharon*, *Palestine 1917–18*, *Tigris 1916*, *Kut-el-Amara 1917*, *Baghdad*, *Mesopotamia 1915–18*, *Persia 1918*, *N.W.F. 1914–15* and *1917*, and *East Africa 1918*.

In 1929 on the disbandment of the Burma Sappers and Miners, Mandalay again became a duty station for Madras Companies. In 1933 on the abolition of the Corps of Pioneers, Sapper and Miner units were increased by 1,000.

In 1943 the designation of the Corps was again changed to *Queen Victoria's Own Sappers and Miners Group, Royal Indian Engineers,* which title it still holds.

During the war of 1939–45 enlistments into the Corps totalled 44,923 Indian ranks and 2,244 non-combatants.

A nominal roll of units is given in Appendix A.

(4)

Infantry

Organization

The services of Madras Infantry commence in 1746 in which year they took part in the defence of Fort St. David against the French. At that time they were formed in independent companies of varying strength; discipline appears to have been poor and not more than one-third of the men were armed with muskets. But the experiment showed that given proper training, they might be made into an efficient fighting force, as had already been done by the French, and when Fort St. George was threatened by the latter in 1758, Government decided to form their sepoys into regular battalions, and to place them under the command of British officers —the latter mostly were seconded from the Royal Service and their *military experience was of the greatest value in disciplining* and training the new formations.

As a start five battalions were formed, of which the 2nd was disbanded in 1785, and the remaining four later became the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Madras Infantry, while more battalions were raised in the following years till by 1795 the establishment had reached nineteen. Each battalion consisted of 10 companies, of which the flank companies, as they were called, were composed of men selected for their superior physique and termed *grenadiers.* In accordance with the custom prevailing at the time in the British Army these flank companies when so required were detached from

their battalions, and formed into a separate body of shock troops, a system which must have considerably impaired the efficiency of the battalions from which they were drawn. The composition of a company at the time was 1 Subadar, 2 Jemadars, 6 Havildars, 6 Naiks and 100 sepoys. Each battalion was commanded by a Captain, with five Lieutenants, five Ensigns, and an Indian Commandant (the latter post was abolished in 1784 but replaced by that of Subadar Major in 1819) while a field officer was in charge of the whole Corps of Sepoys.

The original designation of the battalions was *Coast Sepoys*, but about 1769 changes were made in both name and number, the battalions in the South being called *Carnatic* and numbered from 1 to 13, while those serving in the North of the Madras Presidency were named *Circar* and numbered from 1 to 6. These were to recruit each from their respective areas, and normally were not required to serve outside them, a restriction which was to have unfortunate results when the Circar battalions were called upon to fight in the Carnatic.

The first regular inspection of European and Indian troops was held in 1771, when Brigadier General Smith reporting on the 10th Battalion remarked that: "The sepoys also are much improved and to all appearances will be more so. A spirit of emulation amongst the several battalions seems evidently to prevail, which will be the certain means of bringing them to the greatest regularity." He urged on Government the necessity for a regular allowance of blunt (blank) and ball cartridge to enable the men to have more practice, and comments on the bad state of their arms, one of which burst during the inspection and wounded three men. No further inspection reports are available till 1784 when Colonel Fullarton reported very favourably upon the discipline and appearance of the troops in the South, especially remarking on the excellent interior economy established in the 16th Battalion by Captain Cox.

In the same year the distinction between *Carnatic* and *Circar* battalions was abolished; all in future were to be known as *Madras* battalions. This involved renumbering, and in view of the services of the Carnatic battalions which had so often been recognized by Sir Eyre Coote, it was decided that they should take precedence of

the Circar battalions, even though in some cases junior to the latter. In consequence, the Circar battalions were renumbered 22nd to 29th Madras battalions, but they were reduced in the following year on a further change of establishment, their personnel being absorbed into the remaining battalions and into a Grenadier battalion specially formed for the purpose; the latter was disbanded in 1788.

The establishment of Recruit boys attached to each Madras corps dates from this period. They were to be the sons of sepoys who had been killed or had died in the service, and the ratio was at first fixed at two per company, but was doubled later.

It was in 1786 that we first find the Court of Directors, when ordering the issue of Fidelity medals, referring to the sepoys as *Privates*, a designation which continued to be used in the Madras Infantry till the last remaining battalion was reduced in 1928. The reformed Madras Regiment now uses the word *Sepoys* in common with the rest of the Indian Army.

In 1796 a general reorganization of the Company's armed forces took place and the establishment of Madras Infantry was fixed at eleven regiments each of two battalions of eight companies. The composition of a regiment was fixed at 45 British, and 40 Indian officers, 2,200 rank and file, and additional headquarters staff. There were at the time 36 battalions in the service, and the new establishment involved the reduction of 14, but Government decided to retain 4 of the latter, so only 10 were actually broken up. The new regiments were formed as follows: The ten senior battalions became the first battalions of the first ten regiments in regular sequence. The next senior ten, from 11th to 21st inclusive (excluding the 18th which was broken up) became the second battalions but not in regular sequence, being apparently determined by their location at the time; details are given in the precis of units.

For the next twenty-eight years this system remained in force, additional regiments being added to the establishment as required, but the sequence was broken by the mutiny at Vellore, as a result of which the 1st and 23rd regiments were struck off the strength of the army from the 31st December 1806, and two new regiments numbered the 24th and 25th formed in their place. The 24th

regiment was however restored to its original position in consideration of the gallantry displayed by the 1/24th at the battle of Seetabuldee in 1817, and the 25th regiment resumed its number of 23rd shortly afterwards.

The outstanding performance of the Light Brigade in the Peninsula decided Government to form four light infantry battalions in 1812, and the 1/3rd, 1/12th, 1/16th and 2/17th were selected for the purpose. These later became the 3rd Palamcottah, 23rd Wallajabad, 31st Trichinopoly and 34th Chicacole Light Infantry, of which only the 23rd remains to-day as a Madras unit, under the designation of 4th Battalion The Madras Regiment.

The regimental establishment of two battalions remained in force for only twenty-eight years, and in 1824 a reversion was made to single battalion regiments, a system which in spite of its shortcomings was destined to last for nearly a century. The new regiments were numbered from 1st to 50th Madras Native Infantry in accordance with their seniority, while two additional corps, the 51st and 52nd M.N.I. were formed a year later. With this augmentation the Madras Infantry attained its maximum strength, having expanded in eighty years from two to fifty-two battalions.

From 1838, the establishment of a regiment was fixed at ten companies and this continued in force till 1860 when the Grenadier and Light companies were abolished to conform with the changes introduced in the British Army.

Reductions now became the order of the day and by 1882 no less than twenty regiments had been disbanded. The establishment of the 32 remaining continued to consist of eight companies each of a strength of 90 privates, exclusive of N.C.O's.

The following year saw the 1st and 4th M.N.I. converted into Pioneers, the group being completed by the addition of the 21st M.I. (the word "Native" having been dropped) in 1891.

In 1886, in order to correct to some extent the defects inherent in the single battalion system, all Indian Infantry regiments were linked together in groups of three battalions. When warned for service a battalion would be made up to its strength of 1,000 effective rank and file by transfers from other battalions of the group, the terms of enlistment being arranged to cover this contingency.

At the same time a system of active and garrison reserves (on a voluntary basis) was introduced, which remained in force till 1914.

Between 1890 and 1903 seventeen Madras regiments were converted into Gurkhas or Punjabis, which have since been renamed 1st, 2nd and 8th Punjab Regiments, and the 1/7th and 1/10th Gurkha Rifles.

On the reorganization of the Indian Army in 1903, all regiments were renumbered, the Madras Infantary and Pioneers having 60 added to their original numbers, but without affecting their order of precedence in the Line; thus the 1st M.I. became the 61st Pioneers. Certain changes were made at the same time, the 5th M.I. becoming the 65th C.L.I. to complete the Light Infantry group, while the 11th M.I. were converted into the 71st Coorg Rifles and the 17th and 25th M.I. into the 77th and 78th Moplah Rifles. The establishment of the nine Carnatic battalions, viz., 63rd, 65th, 73rd, 75th, 79th, 80th, 83rd, 86th and 88th was reduced to 600, as they were intended to perform the duties of garrison troops only, though this fact was not made apparent till war broke out in 1914. But in order to improve their efficiency a number of selected junior officers who volunteered for transfer from the British service were posted to each regiment. The Pioneers and remaining units continued to have the same establishment (840) as the other regiments of the Field Army.

The 65 C.L.I. was disbanded in 1904 and the 71st Coorg Rifles about the same time, while three years later the 77th and 78th Moplah Rifles were also mustered out. Thus on the outbreak of World War I in 1914 all that remained of the old Madras Infantry were three Pioneer and eight Carnatic battalions, the latter being on a reduced establishment. But as always in time of war Madrassis flocked to the Colours, and not only were the existing Carnatic battalions brought up to full strength but during 1917 and 1918 eight additional battalions were raised, viz., 2/61st, 2/81st Pioneers and 2/63rd, 2/73rd, 2/75th, 2/80th, 2/88th and 1/156th Infantry.

When the Indian Army was re-organized in 1922, Madras was allotted one regiment of Pioneers and one of Infantry. The units which formed these were the 61st, 64th and 81st Pioneers

renumbered 1/1st, 2/1st and 10/1st Madras Pioneers, and the 73rd, 75th, 79th C.I., 83rd W.L.I. and 86th C.I., renumbered 1/3rd, 2/3rd, 3/3rd, 4/3rd and 10/3rd Madras Regiment. It had been intended that the 80th C.I. should form the 10/3rd but owing to a clerical error the 86th C.I. was substituted, and thus disappeared from the Army List a regiment which was the proud possessor of Haidar Ali's standard captured at Sholinghur in 1781.

Between 1923 and 1928 the whole of the Madras Regiment was disbanded, while the three remaining Pioneer battalions with their splendid record of service, on the abolition of Pioneers in the Indian Army, were mustered out in 1933, leaving as representatives of the old Coast Infantry only 4 Territorial battalions and 1 University Training Corps, which had been formed in 1921 and 1922, and were numbered 11th, 12th (Malabar), 13th (Malabar), 14th (Coorg) and 5th (Madras) battalions respectively. A 15th (Madras) battalion was formed in 1939.

In 1941, thanks to the spirited advocacy of Sir Arthur Hope Governor of Madras, it was decided to reconstitute the 3rd Madras Regiment and restore it to its proper place in the Army List. The 11th, 12th, 13th, and 15th Territorial battalions were converted into regulars and became the first four battalions of the Madras Regiment, with Regimental Centre at Madukarai (Coimbatore) while three new battalions 5/3rd, 6/3rd and 7/3rd were added later. Owing to the absence of any nucleus on which to build, it was found necessary to form the 3/3rd into a special cadre battalion for the intensive training of prospective Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and N.C.Os. while large batches of recruits to form the rank and file were sent to every Training Centre in India, where during their six months training they won the highest commendation from Commanding officers who previously had never seen a Madrassi nor heard anything good about him.

In 1944 the 7/3rd was absorbed into the 3/3rd leaving the Madras Regiment with six active battalions and the Regimental Centre at Madukkarai near Coimbatore.

During the war four Garrison battalions also were raised, viz., 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th, the last named having originally been formed as an Indian Coast Defence battalion—all these have since

been disbanded, or are under orders for reduction, in accordance with the general policy affecting all units.

The Coorg Territorial battalion became a Garrison battalion in 1942 and was converted into an Anti-Tank battalion in 1946. It is affiliated to, but forms no part of the present Madras Regiment.

This record would be incomplete without some reference to the numerous local and special service battalions raised from time to time, mostly for revenue duties, but some for a more active role.

Between 1779 and 1786 local Corps were raised at Guntur, Tanjore, Masulipatam and Vizagapatam, all of which were later absorbed into the Line on augmentation of establishment—the Masulipatam battalion consisted principally of disbanded sepoys of the French Hyderabad contingent.

A small Corps of Guides was raised in 1787 for intelligence and survey duties and is chiefly notable for the fact that all the personnel were Brahmans—it was reduced a few years later.

Other local Corps were the Ramnad battalion, whose long and faithful service was recognized on its disbandment in 1810 by permission being given to officers and men to transfer to the Line and count their former service; the Madras Fencibles formed for garrison duty at Fort Saint George in 1804 and maintained by private contribution in lieu of personal service by the inhabitants of Madras—this corps was later absorbed into the Line; the Hill Rangers—a Sebundy Corps in the Northern Circars; the Seringapatam local battalion raised in 1825 for garrison duty in the fortress owing to the absence of so many Madras regiments taking part in the 1st Burma War; and the Wynaad Rangers with headquarters at Manantoddy, a corps which rendered excellent service in the jungle warfare of 1802–05 and was reduced in 1830; they were the forerunners of the Malabar Special Police formed in 1919 from the disbanded personnel of the 2/73rd Malabar Infantry.

But the most famous of all the special corps was the Madras Volunteer Battalion raised for foreign service in 1810, which became the Madras Rifle Corps four years later. In 1830 it was broken up as a separate unit and its companies were attached to eight regular battalions, but continued to wear their rifle green uniform. Six Rifle companies and two companies of the 34th C.L.I. were

temporarily formed into a corps for service in Bengal in August 1857 and were designated the Madras Rifles. Rifle companies were finally abolished in 1869.

The policy of weeding out the unfit and overage men from the regular battalions resulted in the formation of eight separate Invalid companies in 1789, and some of these men were also absorbed in the Revenue battalions then being raised, but the latter system was abandoned shortly afterwards and all invalids were thenceforth restricted to the Invalid companies. By 1807 these had increased to 46, one being attached to each active battalion for guard and line duties, and as an aid to recruiting. But this plan also proved unsatisfactory and in 1814 the Invalid companies were formed into four Veteran battalions stationed at Madras, Arnee, Ganjam and Dindigul. Two of these battalions were disbanded in 1830 and the two remaining thirty years later.

Of the Infantry of the Line certain battalions deserve special mention: the 8th M.I. (now 1/7th Gurkha Rifles) which General Wellesley considered his best sepoy battalion; the 10th M.I. (now 1/10th Gurkha Rifles) whose gallant defence of Ambur in 1767 won for the Madras Army its first battle honour; the 20th M.I. (now 6/3rd Madras Regiment) whose distinguished conduct at Sholinghur in 1781 was recognized by Sir Eyre Coote granting an extra Jemadar and permission to carry the captured standard; the 26th M.I. (now Madras Regimental Centre) whose stout defence of Kemmendine in 1826 won for them that battle honour; and the 37th M.I. who were made Grenadiers in 1841 for gallantry in China.

Note.—For detailed dates of formation vide following Precis of Units at the end of this section which shows the names of the first Commandant and the place of formation.

Arms and equipment

The first sepoy levies were armed with match locks, bows and arrows, spears, swords, bucklers, daggers, or any other weapons they could get, and it was not till 1758 when the first regular battalions were formed that they were armed with flint-lock muskets commonly known as *Brown Bess*. The weight of this musket was 11 lb. 4 oz. and calibre was approximately 14 bore; it would not

carry straight for even 100 yards and its effective range was barely double that distance. The bayonet, which was 17 inches in length, was worn on the left side, slung from a belt over the right shoulder; a leather pouch for ammunition was suspended from a similar belt over the opposite shoulder.

In 1777 the European officers and Indian Commandant were ordered to carry light muskets known as fusils, in addition to their swords, while the other Indian officers carried spontoons (a kind of half pike) in place of swords. These fusils and spontoons were superseded by swords in 1786.

In 1812 it was ordered that havildars should in future be armed with halberds and swords slung in frog belts. The halberd was a weapon with a wooden shaft about six feet long, surmounted by a bill hook constructed alike for cutting and thrusting, with a cross-piece of steel, for the purpose of pushing; one end of the cross piece was turned down as a hook, for use in tearing-down works against which an attack was made.

At the same time havildars of light companies were ordered to carry fusils and small cartridge pounches. The men in the light companies were armed and equipped in such a manner as to allow them greater freedom of action, and were usually employed as skirmishers to cover the advance or retreat of the line. Both officers and havildars carried bayonets as well as fusils and wore cross shoulder belts; the men were armed with short muskets.

General E. F. Burton writes of the musketry course, as carried out in the forties, as follows:—

"The musketry course, or 'ball-firing' as it was then called, was a simple affair. Neither officers nor men were bothered with theoretical instruction or tall talk about trajectories, etc., and position drill, etc., which now make life a burden. The recruit was taught to hold his musket straight, to aim over a sand-bag tripod, and then to burn priming and blank cartridge, as a preparation for his firing with ball at from fifty to a hundred and fifty yards. The squad of recruits, on returning from their first day's ball-firing came in triumph with their muskets decorated with flowers, and after the whole course was finished, were formally sworn in under the Colours, and were brought on the roster for duty."

In November 1844 the distances at which ball practice was to be carried out were fixed as follows :—

Muskets and Fusils ..	**96**	**120**	**142**	**180 and 240 paces.**	
Rifles	**120**	**142**	**180**	**240 and 300 paces.**	

The Commander-in-Chief remarked that the main object in all infantry practice should be to teach the men when in line to fire straight to their front, so that their shots might take full effect upon the enemy's ranks at 100 paces. The average result on the range at this distance was only 1 hit on a six foot square target to 2·75 rounds fired, and at 240 paces only 1 hit to 27 rounds.

The issue of percussion, i.e., capped, smooth-bore muskets in supersession of flint-locks began in 1845, but was not completed till several years later. The new musket had a block backsight for 150 yards and weighed about the same as the Brown Bess but the powder charge was reduced from 6 to 4½ drams; the bayonet and pouches were carried on a waist belt, instead of from crossed shoulder belts, as had been the practice to date.

The Rifle Corps had been armed with rifles of 20 bore calibre (accurate to 300 and effective to 500 yards) from the date of its formation in 1814, but regiments of the Line continued to use smooth bores till 1872 when the Enfield rifle came into general use. This weapon with bayonet weighed 9 lb. 3 oz.—it was three grooved and the bore was .577 inches. The composition for greasing the cartridges consisted of eight parts gingelly oil and seven parts bee-wax, and the cartridges were kept in packets of ten.

The muzzle loading Enfield was replaced by the breech loading Snider rifle of similar bore in 1877, the old pattern bayonets being retained; havildars carried a short rifle with sword bayonet as did all Indian other ranks of the two Pioneer regiments.

Revolvers were first sanctioned as part of officers' equipment in 1881; they were of Enfield pattern, and were replaced by the Webley Mark III in 1894.

In 1891 Martini Henry rifles .577/.450 (bore) replaced the Sniders, and the frogs for the old pattern triangular bayonet were altered to take the new sword bayonets. In the following year sanction was accorded for Indian officers to wear the Sam Browne belt.

The Lee-Metford Magazine rifle was introduced in 1902; it was superseded by the Long Lee-Enfield a few years later, and by the Short Lee-Enfield in 1912, but only the three Pioneer regiments were re-armed with the latter, the eight Carnatic regiments not receiving it till after the outbreak of war.

In 1904 each regiment received two Maxim machine guns which were later increased to four, and about 1921 replaced by Vickers; Lewis guns were issued in 1916, originally eight per regiment but later increased to sixteen. At the same time rifle and hand grenades were introduced.

Between 1930 and 1946 infantry armament was increased by the issue of 2-inch and 3-inch mortars, the latter, on a scale of 6 per battalion, were carried and could be fired from armoured track carriers, but for jungle warfare they were sometimes transported on mules. The Bren gun replaced the Lewis, on a scale of one to each section of six men, while the Vickers were withdrawn from normal battalions and concentrated in M.G. Battalions whose main weapons these were. The .45 Tommy gun and the 9 m/m Sten gun were also issued in large numbers to active battalions. As a result, by 1944 the rifle section of a normal active battalion could fire 200 rounds a minute on an advancing enemy, and a platoon of three sections plus the 2 inch mortar, had a fire power considerably more formidable than that of a battalion of 40 years before.

Coupled with improved armament came a great expansion of mechanisation of transport, and the infantry of to-day are carried to battle in a few hours over distances which would have cost Clive's sepoys many weary days of marching.

Dress

The earliest dress of the Madras sepoy was a scarlet coat cut away from the chest on both sides, with drawers fringed with blue, reaching to the ankle for Indian officers, and for rank and file to a few inches above the knee. The head-dress consisted of a blue turban in the form of a round hat, with iron plates on the four sides, and an iron rim with a rosette of linen in front; a blue cummerbund was worn round the waist. The facings of the coat were blue. The Artillery and Pioneers wore blue jackets with red cuffs and facings, brass buttons and a cap or hat.

Captain Innes-Munro, writing in 1780 confirms the above description, and adds that the Indian officers' jackets had tinsel epaulettes, while the turban was lighter, and edged with tape of the same colour as the facings, and with a tassel at the lower corner; on the feet were sandals.

With the exception of the coat which formed a separate charge, the other articles of dress, known as *Slops or Half mounting*, were kept up by stoppages from the men's pay which did not exceed 4 fanams * monthly from a sepoy. But even this reduction from the previous rate proved unpopular, and in 1780 it was abolished, and the sepoys were permitted to provide their own half mounting.

Captain Charles Gold's *Oriental Drawings* sketched between 1791 and 1798, show that little alteration had till then been made in dress, except that the facings were yellow instead of blue, and that the Indian officers wore half boots.

The cavalry wore scarlet jackets with white facings up to 1814, when French grey was introduced and remained in force till 1922, the facings being buff and the lace silver.

In 1797 a new uniform pattern of the turban and blue cummerbund was introduced, while detailed orders for the dress of officers and other ranks were issued about the same time. Two years later the cummerbund, as an article of uniform, was discontinued, but from a plate depicting a sepoy in 1819, it appears to have continued in use in some corps.

The turbans introduced in 1797 did not give satisfaction on account of their weight, and in 1805 a new pattern with leather cockade was ordered to be taken into use. This order, with others which were considered to infringe on caste, caused discontent throughout the whole army, and culminated in the Vellore Mutiny, of which an account has been given elsewhere. Eventually the order was cancelled, and the 1797 pattern turban remained in use; at the same time leather cockades and plumes were forbidden, and all unauthorized alterations in dress or interference with national observances, strictly prohibited.

* The fanam was worth about two annas, and the pagoda, a small gold coin so often mentioned in early accounts, about rupees three, annas eight, the exchange value of the rupee then being two shillings.

In 1811 a new pattern knapsack was adopted and haversacks were introduced at the same time, principally for the carriage of rice, for which purpose the knapsack was forbidden to be used; the sepoy carried a brass jumbo slung from his right shoulder.

In the following year the short drawers, which had been worn for half a century, were replaced by pantaloons, white for full dress, and coloured for service; a uniform pattern of sandal was also introduced.

In 1819 the issue of woollen trousers or woollen jackets was sanctioned for all ranks serving beyond the frontiers, where extreme changes of temperature were experienced; these articles were to be paid for from the Off-Reckonings Fund *.

In 1825 the Indian ranks are described as wearing "red coats, white trousers and blue turbans with a brass ball at the top", and the same dress was in use in 1840 when Lieut.-General E. F. Burton commented as follows :—

"The dress and equipment was in a most antiquated style. The men wore bobtail coatees, barred in front with white tape, and on their heads a marvellous structure called a turban. This turban was a kind of shako, spreading out at top, built of bamboo basket work, perfectly stiff and hard, covered with blue cloth, and with a narrow brass rim, over all which was an outer removable cover of black varnished linen for *undress.* At the apex was a brass affair, as big as, and shaped like the half of a small orange, from which projected two ribs, very like two little boats, keel upwards, also of brass. It was a tradition that the use of this arrangement was as a musket rest when lying down to fire, the turban being placed on the ground in front of the fighting man. However that may be, it had other uses, seeing that it served as a kind of extra pocket or travelling bag for its wearer. I must not forget that in full dress a broad pipe-clayed tape band, with an equally well pipe-clayed rosette, something like a double dahlia, was carried diagonally along the side of the fabric on the top edge

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* The profits made on regimental clothing contracts were known as *Offreckonings.* When Government took the clothing of the troops into its own hands, the profits made on the contracts each year were at first divided equally among the dispossessed colonels, but later it was found convenient to commute these varying payments by a lump sum.

of which the rosette was perched as a finish to the whole concern. The knapsack, weighing when filled about 14 or 15 lb. was suspended over the shoulders by two leathern straps, which came under the arm pits, and had a connecting strap across the chest; the whole contrivance being admirably adapted to cut the man under the arms, to constrict his chest-play, and to impede his breathing."

The General is equally uncomplimentary about the unsatisfactory pattern of sandals which the troops wore, and says that after a company had doubled in from extended order practice, the parade ground would be dotted with the black sandals, very much as if a flight of crows had settled on it.

The print by Ackerman shows the uniform of this period, while another by the same artist portrays the white tunics with red facings, gold lace and epaulettes, dark blue trousers with broad red stripes, large red shakos with white plumes, and black shoes with brass buckle, worn by the musicians and drummers.

Boots were introduced in lieu of sandals in 1850 and about the same time packs were substituted for knapsacks, which must have caused a sigh of relief to go up from all who had worn the latter. But it was not till 1862 that the old basket work turbans disappeared, and were replaced by a plain Indian puggri of muslin or cloth, the pattern and colour being decided regimentally.

In 1860 full dress tunics were first issued, with brass buttons bearing the regimental numeral; while the white jacket or *angreka* was worn on all other duties and parades, with black linen trousers; white trousers were finally abolished as an article of clothing in 1869.

In 1882 the facings of Infantry regiments were limited to white, green and yellow. The 1st, 6th, 8th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, 21st, 22nd, 29th and 30th M.I. were to wear white; the 2nd, 3rd, 9th, 11th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th and 31st green; and the 4th, 5th, 7th, 10th, 15th, 16th, 19th, 27th, 28th, 32nd and 33rd yellow; the colours of black, orange, buff, blue and red being eliminated. Some years previously the facings of the 7th and 19th had been changed from French grey to blue, and those of the 33rd M.I. from yellow to black.

In 1883 the old dress of the Indian Army was given up and the following substituted :—

1 Serge Zouave jacket.

1 Serge Knickerbockers.

1 Pair Khaki gaiters.

1 Khaki blouse.

1 Khaki Knickerbockers.

1 Khaki turban with band of the colour of the regimental facings and with a khaki fringe.

Brass numerals, showing the number of the regiment, were to be worn on the shoulder straps of both cloth and khaki uniforms. At the same time drummers and musicians were ordered to wear the turban in lieu of a helmet.

Khaki shorts were brought into general use about 1908 and at the same time for full dress the Zouave jacket was replaced by a scarlet cloth tunic for Indian officers, and by a long scarlet blouse for Indian other ranks. Full dress was discontinued except in the case of Regimental bands after the close of the First World War, and khaki remained the sole uniform of Indian troops till replaced by battle dress in 1939, green drill being used by troops serving with the XIVth Army. As head-dress the steel helmet, slouch hat or beret was worn.

PRECIS OF UNITS

1st Madras Pioneers **(Shaikh Mudin-ki-purani paltan)**

Raised as 1st Battalion of Coast Sepoys 1758 (from independent Coys.).

Became 1st Carnatic Battalion 1769.
1st Madras Battalion 1784.
I/1st Madras Native Infantry 1796.
1st Madras Native Infantry 1824.
1st Madras Infantry (Pioneers) 1885.
61st P.W.O. Pioneers 1906.
61st K.G.O. Pioneers 1910.
1st Battalion Corps of Madras Pioneers 1929.

Disbanded 1933.

Crest—The Plume of the Prince of Wales,
Royal and Imperial Cypher.

2nd Madras Infantry (Mooto Naik)

Raised as 3rd Battalion Coast Sepoys 1759 (from independent Coys.)

Became 2nd Carnatic Battalion 1769.
1/2nd M.N.I. 1796.
2nd M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as 62nd Punjabis 1903.

Became 1/1st Punjab Regiment 1922.

Crest—The Elephant—A Golden Dragon with the Imperial Crown.

3rd Palamcottah Light Infantry (Turing)

Raised as 4th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1759 (from independent Coys.)

Became 3rd Carnatic Battalion 1770.
1/3rd M.N.I. 1796.
3rd Palamcottah L.I. 1824.
63rd P.L.I. 1903.

Disbanded 1922.

Reformed as 5/3rd Madras Regiment 1943.

Motto—*Now or Never.*

4th Madras Pioneers (Baillie)

Raised as 5th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1759 (from independent Coys.)

Became 4th Carnatic Battalion 1770
1/4th M.N.I. 1796.
4th M.I. (Pioneers) 1885.
64th Pioneers 1903.
2nd Battalion Corps of Madras Pioneers 1929.

Disbanded 1933.

Crest—The Elephant.

5th Madras Infantry (Shaik Khudawund)

Raised as 6th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1759 (from independent Coys.).

Became 5th Carnatic Battalion 1770.
1/5th M.N.I. 1796.
5th M.I. 1885.
65th Carnatic Lt. Infantry 1903.

Disbanded 1904, its place being taken in the Army by 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.

6th Madras Infantry (Mackenzie)

Raised as 7th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1761 at Trichinopoly.
Became 6th Carnatic Battalion 1769.
1/6th M.N.I. 1796.
6th M.I. 1885.
Reconstituted as 66th Punjabis 1903.
Became 2/1st Punjab Regiment 1922.
Crest—A Golden Dragon with the Imperial Crown.

7th Madras Infantry (Cooke)

Raised as 8th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1761 at Trichinopoly.
Became 7th Carnatic Battalion 1770.
1/7th M.N.I. 1796.
7th M.I. 1885.
Reconstituted as 67th Punjabis 1903.
Became 1/2nd Punjab Regiment 1922.

8th Madras Infantry (Dunwoody)

Raised as 9th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1761.
Became 8th Carnatic Battalion 1770.
1/8th M.N.I. 1796.
8th M.I. 1885.
Reconstituted as 8th (later 7th) Gurkha Rifles 1902.
Crest—The Elephant.

9th Madras Infantry (Kelly)

Raised as 10th Battalion Coast Sepoys between 1762 and 1765 at Madura.

Became 9th Carnatic Battalion 1770.

1/9th M.N.I. 1796.

9th M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as 69th Punjabis 1903.

Became 2/2nd Punjab Regiment 1922.

Crest—A Galley with the motto *By Land and Sea.*

10th Madras Infantry (Calvert)

Raised as 14th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1766 at Vellore.

Became 10th Carnatic Battalion 1770.

1/10th M.N.I. 1796.

10th M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as a Burma Battalion (later 1/10th Gurkha Rifles) 1890.

Crest—The Elephant surmounted by the Rock Fort and *Amboor.*

The Colours are in the Vellore Fort Church over a tablet, which however incorrectly gives the Defence of Amboor as 1749 instead of 1767.

11th Madras Infantry (McLean)

Raised as 15th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1766 (from selected Nawab's Sepoys).

Became 11th Carnatic Battalion 1770.

2/9th M.N.I. 1796.

11th M.I. 1885.

71st Coorg Rifles 1903.

Disbanded 1904.

Reformed as 1st Coorg Battalion 1942

12th Madras Infantry (Barim)

Raised as 16th Battalion Coast Sepoys 1767 at Cuddalore.

Became 12th Carnatic Battalion 1770.

2/8th M.N.I. 1796.

12th M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as a Burma Battalion (later 72nd Punjabis) 1890.

Became 3/2nd Punjab Regiment 1922.

13th Madras Infantry (Alcock)

Raised as 13th Carnatic Battalion 1776 at Madras.

Became 2/3rd M.N.I. 1796.

13th M.I. 1885.

73rd C.I. 1903.

1/3rd Madras Regiment 1922.

Disbanded 1928.

Reformed as 1/3rd Madras Regiment 1942.

14th Madras Infantry (Wahab)

Raised as 14th Carnatic Battalion 1776 at Vellore.

Became 2/6th M.N.I. 1796.

14th M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as 74th Punjabis 1903.

Became 4/2nd Punjab Regiment 1922.

Crest—The Dragon with the motto *Ready and True.*

15th Madras Infantry (Davis)

Raised as 15th Carnatic Battalion 1776 at Tanjore.

Became 2/4th M.N.I. 1796.

15th M.I. 1885.

75th C.I. 1903.

2/3rd Madras Regiment 1922.

Disbanded 1926.

Reformed as 2/3rd Madras Regiment 1942.

16th Madras Infantry (Lane)

Raised as 16th Carnatic Battalion 1776 at Trichinopoly.

Became 2/5th M.N.I. 1796.

16th M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as 76th Punjabis 1903.
Became 3/1st Punjab Regiment 1922.

17th Madras Infantry (Butler)

Raised as 17th Carnatic Battalion 1777 at Fort St. George.
Became 2/1st M.N.I. 1796.
17th M.I. 1885.
77th Moplah Rifles 1903.
Disbanded 1907.

18th Madras Infantry (Bilcliffe)

Raised as 19th Carnatic Battalion 1777 at Cuddalore.
Became 2/10th M.N.I. 1796.
18th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1864.

19th Madras Infantry (Muirhead)

Raised as 20th Carnatic Battalion 1777 at Trichinopoly.
Became 2/7th M.N.I. 1796.
19th M.I. 1885.
79th C.I. 1903.
3/3rd Madras Regiment 1922.
Disbanded 1923.
Reformed as 3/3rd Madras Regiment 1942.

20th Madras Infantry (Bagot)

Raised as 21st Carnatic Battalion 1777 at Tanjore.
Became 2/2nd M.N.I. 1796.
20th M.I. 1885.
80th C.I. 1903.
Disbanded 1921.
Reformed as 6/3rd Madras Regiment 1943.

Carried as an Honorary Colour the cavalry standard captured from Haidar Ali's troops at the battle of Sholinghur 1781.

Crest—Three Colours crossed.

21st Madras Infantry (Roberts)

Raised as 28th Madras Battalion 1786 at Chicacole.
Became 1/11th M.N.I. 1796.
21st M.I. 1885.
81st Pioneers 1903.
10th Battalion Corps of Madras Pioneers 1929.
Disbanded 1933.

22nd Madras Infantry (Dalrymple)

Raised as 29th Madras Battalion 1788 at Ellore.
Became 2/11th M.N.I. 1796.
22nd M.I. 1885.
Reconstituted as 82nd Punjabis 1903.
Became 5/1st Punjab Regiment 1922.

23rd Wallajahbad Light Infantry (Tolfrey)

Raised as 33rd Madras Battalion 1794 at Madras.
Became 1/12th M.N.I. 1797.
23rd W.L.I. 1824.
83rd W.L.I. 1903.
4/3rd Madras Regiment (W.L.I.) 1922.
Disbanded 1923.
Reformed as 4/3rd Madras Regiment 1942.
Motto—*Now or Never.*

24th Madras Infantry (Macdonald)

Raised as 34th Battalion 1794 at Vellore.
Became 2/12th M.N.I. 1797.
24th M.I. 1885.
Reconstituted as 84th Punjabis 1903.
Became 10/1st Punjab Regiment 1922.
Crest—The Elephant.

25th Madras Infantry (Kenny)

Raised as 35th Madras Battalion 1794 at Trichinopoly.
Became 1/13th M.N.I. 1797.

25th M.I. 1885.
78th Moplah Rifles 1903.
Disbanded 1907.

26th Madras Infantry (Innes)

Raised as 36th Madras Battalion 1794 at Tanjore.
Became 2/13th M.N.I. 1798.
26th M.I. 1885.
86th C.I. 1903.
10/3rd Madras Regiment 1922.
Disbanded 1926.
Reformed as Training Centre 3rd Madras Regiment 1942.

27th Madras Infantry (Lindsay)

Raised as 1st Extra Battalion M.N.I. 1798 at Trichinopoly.
Became 1/14th M.N.I. 1798.
27th M.I. 1885.
Reconstituted as 87th Punjabis 1903.
Became 5/2nd Punjab Regiment 1922.

28th Madras Infantry (Martin)

Raised as 2nd Extra Battalion 1798 at Vellore.
Became 2/14th M.N.I. 1798.
28th M.I. 1885.
88th C.I. 1903
Disbanded 1921.
Reformed as 7/3rd Madras Regiment 1943.

29th Madras Infantry (Macleod)

Raised as 3rd Extra Battalion 1798 at Masulipatam.
Became 1/15th M.N.I. 1800.
29th M.I. 1885.
Reconstituted as a Burma Battalion (later 89th Punjabis) 1893.
Became 1/8th Punjab Regiment 1922.

30th Madras Infantry (Crewe)

Raised as Masulipatam Battalion (from Raymond's French Brigade) 1799.

Became 2/15th M.N.I. 1800.

30th M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as a Burma Battalion (later 90th Punjabis) 1892.

Became 2/8th Punjab Regiment 1922.

31st Trichinopoly Light Infantry (Jennerett)

Raised as 1/16th M.N.I. 1800 at Trichinopoly.

Became 31st T.L.I. 1824.

Reconstituted as a Burma Battalion (later 91st Punjabis L.I.) 1892.

Became 3/8th Punjab Regiment 1922.

Motto—*Now or Never.*

32nd Madras Infantry (Dyce)

Raised as 2/16th M.N.I. 1800 at Madura.

Became 32nd M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as a Burma Battalion (later 92nd Punjabis) 1890.

Became 4/8th Punjab Regiment 1922.

33rd Madras Infantry (Wahab)

Raised as 1/17th M.N.I. 1800 at Guntur.

Became 33rd M.I. 1885.

Reconstituted as a Burma Battalion (later 93rd Burma Infantry) 1890.

Became 5/8th Punjab Regiment 1922.

34th Chicacole Light Infantry (Durand)

Raised as 2/17th M.N.I. 1800 at Chicacole.

Became 34th C.L.I. 1824.

Disbanded 1882.

Motto—*Now or Never.*

35th Madras Native Infantry (Parkison)

Raised as 1/18th M.N.I. 1800 at Bangalore.
Became 35th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1882.

36th Madras Native Infantry (Nundy)

Raised as 2/18th M.N.I. 1800 at Nundydrug.
Became 36th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1882.
Crest—A Golden Dragon with the Imperial Crown.

37th Madras Grenadiers (Forbes)

Raised as 1/19th M.N.I. 1800 at Ichapur.
Became 37th M.N.I. 1824.
37th Madras Grenadiers 1841.
Disbanded 1882.
Crest—A Golden Dragon with the Imperial Crown.

38th Madras Native Infantry (Macgregor)

Raised as 2/19th M.N.I. 1800 at Ellore.
Became 38th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1882.

39th Madras Native Infantry (Martin)

Raised as 1st Extra Battalion 1803 at Trichinopoly.
Became 1/20th M.N.I. 1804.
39th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1882.

40th Madras Native Infantry (Volunteer)

Raised as Madras Volunteer Battalion for service in the Moluccas 1801.
Became 2/20th M.N.I. 1804.
40th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1882.

41st Madras Native Infantry (Crane)

Raised as 2nd Extra Battalion 1803 at Chicacole.
Became 1/21st M.N.I. 1804.
41st M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1882.
Crest—A Golden Dragon with the Imperial Crown.

42nd Madras Native Infantry (Macfarlane)

Raised as 4th Extra Battalion 1803 at Ellore.
Became 2/21st M.N.I. 1804.
42nd M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1864.

43rd Madras Native Infantry (Whitlie)

Raised as 3rd Extra Battalion 1803 at Nellore.
Became 1/22nd M.N.I. 1804.
43rd M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1864.

44th Madras Native Infantry (Buchan)

Raised as 6th Extra Battalion 1803 at Trichinopoly.
Became 2/22nd M.N.I. 1804.
44th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1864.

45th Madras Native Infantry (Shaw)

Raised as 5th Extra Battalion 1803 at Walajabad.
Became 1/23rd M.N.I. 1804.
45th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1864.

46th Madras Native Infantry (Farrar)

Raised as 7th Extra Battalion 1803 at Sankarankoil.
Became 2/23rd M.N.I. 1804.
46th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1864.

47th Madras Native Infantry (Chitty)

Raised as 1/24th M.N.I. 1819 at Ellore.
Became 47th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1862.

48th Madras Native Infantry (Waugh)

Raised as 2/24th M.N.I. 1819 at Walajabad.
Became 48th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1862.

49th Madras Native Infantry (Nundy)

Raised as 1/25th M.N.I. 1819 at Nundydrug.
Became 49th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1862.

50th Madras Native Infantry (Fenwick)

Raised as 2/25th M.N.I. 1819 at Palamcottah.
Became 50th M.N.I. 1824.
Disbanded 1862.

51st Madras Native Infantry (Leighton)

Raised as 1st Extra Regiment 1826 at Palamcottah.
Became 51st M.N.I. 1826.
Disbanded 1862.

52nd Madras Native Infantry (Stewart)

Raised as 2nd Extra Regiment 1826 at Bangalore.
Became 52nd M.N.I. 1826.
Disbanded 1862.

Madras Rifles (Munro)

Raised as Madras Volunteer Battalion 1810.
Became Madras Rifle Corps 1814.
Disbanded 1830, the Companies then being attached to Regiments on the permanent establishment. These Rifle Coys, which continued to wear Rifle uniform, were abolished in 1869.

TEMPORARY BATTALIONS FORMED DURING THE 1ST WORLD WAR

2/61st Pioneers—Raised	1918.	Disbanded	1921.
2/63rd P.L.I.	,,	1918.	,,	1919.
2/73rd M.I.	,,	1918.	,,	1921.
2/75th C.I.	,,	1918.	,,	1920.
2/80th C.I.	,,	1918.	,,	1921.
2/81st Pioneers	,,	1917	,,	1921.
2/88th C.I.	,,	1918.	,,	1920.
1/156th Infantry	,,	1918.	,,	1919

TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS

11th Madras Battalion

Raised as 1st (Territorial) Battalion 73rd C.I. 1921

Became 11/3rd Madras Regiment 1922.
11th Bn. Madras Pioneers 1928.
11th (Madras) Battalion 1933.
1/3rd Madras Regiment 1942.

12th Malabar Battalion

Raised as 1st (Malabar) Territorial Battalion 75th C.I. 1921.

Became 12th (Malabar) Battalion 3rd Madras Regiment 1922.
12th (Malabar) Battalion 1st Madras Pioneers 1928.
12th Malabar Battalion 1929.
2/3rd Madras Regiment 1942.

13th Malabar Battalion

Raised as 1st (Territorial) Battalion 79th C.I. 1922.

Became 13th (Malabar) Battalion 3rd Madras Regiment 1922.
13th (Malabar) Battalion 1st Madras Pioneers 1928.
13th Malabar Battalion 1929.
3/3rd Madras Regiment 1942.

14th Coorg Battalion

Raised as 1st (Territorial) Battallion 83rd W.L.I. 1922.
Became 14/3rd Madras Regiment 1922.
14th Battalion 1st Madras Pioneers 1928.
14th Coorg Battalion 1929.
1st Coorg Battalion 1942.

15th (Madras) Battalion

Raised 1939.
Became 4/3rd Madras Regiment 1942.

CHAPTER VII

Honours and Awards

Wealth dies, kinsmen die, man himself must die. But the fame which a man rightly wins for himself will never die.

NORSE EDDA.

The following is a composite list of Battle Honours awarded to Madras units up to the outbreak of war in 1939 :—

Amboor (1767).
Carnatic (1780–84).
Sholinghur (1781).
Mysore (1790–92).
Seringapatam (1799).
Egypt (1801).
Assaye (1803).
Cochin (1809).
Bourbon (1810).
Java (1811).
Seetabuldee (1817).
Nagpore (1817).
Maheidpoor (1817).
Kemmendine (1824).
Ava (1824–26).
China (1840–42).
Meanee (1843).
Hyderabad (1843).
Pegu (1852–54).
Persia (1857).
Lucknow (1857–58).
Central India (1857–59).
Taku Forts (1860).
Pekin 1860.
Abyssinia (1867).
Afghanistan (1878–80).
Tel-el-Kebir (1882).
Egypt 1882.
Tofrek (1882).
Suakin 1885.
Burma (1885–87).
Chitral (1895).
Malakand (1897).
Tirah-Punjab Frontier (1897–98).
China 1900.
Afghanistan (1919).

First World War

France and Flanders 1914–15, Suez Canal, Egypt 1915–17, Gaza, Megiddo, Sharon, Palestine 1917–18, Tigris 1916, Kut-al-Amara 1917, Baghdad, Mesopotamia 1915–18, Aden, Persia 1918, North-West Frontier India 1914–15, 1917, Baluchistan 1918, Kilimanjaro, East Africa 1914–18.

As already mentioned, the 20th M.I. were permitted to carry as an Honorary Colour the cavalry standard captured at the battle of Sholinghur in 1781. Honorary Colours were also granted to the Madras units engaged at the battle of Assaye, in commemoration of that victory.

Special awards to individuals were from time to time made by the Company. The earliest which can be traced is the grant of a gold chain and medal to Mir Mansoor, a Subadar of Sepoys, on the 5th November 1753, for " having on many occasions behaved with remarkable bravery and received many desperate wounds." On one side of the medal were the Company's arms with the legend : " The gift of the Hon'ble United East India Company," and on the reverse the Subadar's " own Effigies with a drawn sword in his hand ".

A gold medal weighing 3 oz. 2½ dwt. was bestowed on Mahomed Yussuf Khan (the Nellore Subadar), by order of Council on the 27th March 1755, " as a distinguishing mark and reward of his bravery and good service." The obverse was the same as the preceding, but on the reverse was a Persian inscription : " To Mahomed Isoup Cawn Bahadur, Commander of the Hon'ble English Company's Seapoys, this medal is given by the Hon'ble Governor and Council of Fort St. George as a Reward to Courage, and to preserve to Posterity the Name of a brave soldier, a skilful Officer and a faithful Servant." This Officer had previously been in the French service during the siege of Madras in 1746. His unfortunate ending at Madura in 1763 has already been related.

Another gold medal and chain was presented to Subadar Abdul Cauder in 1795, the medal bearing on the obverse the words " For conduct and courage on all occasions," and on the reverse " By Government 7th June 1795." A similar award was made to Jamadar Boodh Singh in 1795 for courage and fidelity, and others are known to have been granted, but no details of them can now be traced.

The first distribution of medals to commemorate collective bravery appears to have been made by Governor Pigot to the garrison of Fort St. George after its unsuccessful siege by Lally in 1758–59. While approving the monetary award made at the

same time, the Court of Directors took the Governor to task for ordering medals to be issued without their sanction. No example of this medal appears to have survived and we are indebted to Dodwell's *Nabobs of Madras* for knowledge of its existence.

An unofficial silver medal was struck for the capture of Pondicherry in 1761. On the obverse is the King's head with the inscription *George the Third*; on the reverse a winged figure standing between palm trees and inscribing on a shield the words *Coote* and *Steevens*, while water pouring from pitchers below symbolises the Indus and the Ganges. Round the circle the legend reads *Total Expulsion of the French from India*, and at the bottom *Pondicherry taken MDCCLXI*. It is not known how many of these medals were issued or who were the recipients. Another and better known unofficial medal in bronze shows Lord Cornwallis receiving the sons of Tipu Sultan as hostages in 1792.

In 1786, the Court of Directors ordered that a medal inscribed *Fidelity* should be issued to "such of the Sepoys as resisted the many endeavours used to seduce them from the English service, as a reward for their firmness, fidelity and attachment, and as an encouragement to others to follow so laudable an example. The medals to the Commissioned Officers to be of gold, and those to the Non-Commissioned and Privates of silver."

An instance of fidelity on the part of a distinguished Indian officer who died in prison rather than accept service under Tipu is too remarkable to be passed over in silence. Syed Ibrahim, Commandant of the Tanjore cavalry, was made a prisoner in 1781. Repeated attempts to induce him to enter Tipu's service, though backed up by the most brilliant promises, all failed to shake his fidelity, and finally he died in 1784 in the notorious prison fort of Kabaldrug from the hardships of a rigorous confinement and unwholesome food, which had been intended to produce that acquiescence which the Sultan's promises had failed to procure.

Government Order, Fort St. George, dated May 26th, 1800 directs :—

"In order to manifest his respect for the long services, the exemplary zeal and impregnable fidelity of Syed Ibrahim, the Governor in Council is pleased to order and direct that the amount

of his pay as Commandant of cavalry, being fifty-two pagodas and twenty-one fanams per month shall be conferred as a pension for life on his sister who left her home in the Carnatic to share his misfortunes in captivity and who was subsequently wounded in the storm of Seringapatam."

Government also had a tomb erected to his memory at Chennapatna with a suitable endowment for its upkeep. This tomb, which continues to be maintained by the Madras Government, is a conspicuous object on the main Bangalore-Mysore road north of Chennapatna. Unfortunately it bears the misleading inscription that it was erected to the memory of Syed Ibrahim, Commandant of Bangalore, who showed kindness to the British prisoners during the 2nd Mysore war. It is a recorded fact that one Syed Mahomed, who was Tipu's Commandant at Bangalore, showed kindness to British prisoners at that place between 1780 and 1784, and that the officers who benefited by his attentions collected subscriptions on his behalf after their release. How this officer came to be confused with the East India Company's faithful cavalry commandant is not known. There is however no possible doubt that the notice referred to is incorrect and that the tomb was raised to the memory of the Tanjore Commandant Syed Ibrahim of the British service and not to any officer of Tipu's.

Medals issued by the Company for the campaigns in the Carnatic, Mysore, Ceylon, Egypt, Rodrigues and Bourbon, and Java, were given only to the Bengal troops engaged, and not to the Madras and Bombay Sepoys who fought alongside them, but all units of whatever Presidency whether European or Indian received the medals for Seringapatam 1799—the first occasion on which a general issue was made.

For the 1st Burma War 1824–26, only Indian ranks received the medal struck to commemorate the campaign, their British officers being awarded the Army of India Medal with the bar *Ava*, in 1851, if they survived so long. The latter medal with its 21 clasps and pale blue ribbon was the first India General service medal and is dated 1799–1826, though the first clasp is for 1803. Probably the earlier date was intended to cover the capture

of Seringapatam, under the mistaken impression that all ranks had not already received the medal for that campaign.

The H.E.I.C. issued medals for the campaigns in Afghanistan, China, Scinde; the 2nd India General Service Medal with its well-known blue and red ribbon and 23 clasps which continued in use till 1895; and the Mutiny Medal 1857–58, after which all medals were issued by the Crown. These and subsequent issues are so well known that no descriptions are necessary.

Of special individual awards for gallantry, the Indian Order of Merit in three classes was instituted in 1837, and the Indian Distinguished Service Medal in 1907. In 1911, the Victoria Cross, and three years later the Military Cross were thrown open to Indians, while in the course of the Second World War they were similarly made eligible for the Military medal. The George Cross and George Medal for gallantry not in the face of the enemy were instituted in 1943, and Subadar Subramaniam of the Madras Sappers and Miners was the first Indian to win the former, when during the operations in Italy, he threw himself on a landmine to save the lives of his comrades.

CHAPTER VIII

"What is a Madrassi"?

Pandu's sons are strong in valour,
Mighty is their armed hand.

MAHABHARAT, BOOK VI, LINE 5.

To answer this question, we shall have to delve far back into history, and to emphasize the all important difference between the north and the south of India, I cannot do better than quote the following extract from Vincent Smith's *Oxford History of India* :—

"It is desirable to understand and remember that the distinction between the peoples of the north and those of the south goes back far beyond the dawn of history. The peninsula was isolated by reason of its position, and ordinarily could not receive either new inhabitants or novel institutions except by sea. The unceasing immigration of strangers by land into Northern India, which has made the population there the mixture which it is, did not affect the south, which was shut off by the wide and almost impenetrable barrier of hill and forest represented by the Narbada, the Vindhyas and the Satpura ranges. It is worth while to dwell upon the natural separation of the north from the south even in the most remote ages, because the roots of the present go down deep into the past to a depth beyond measurement. The incomplete unity of India depends mainly on the diffusion through the reluctant south of the Hindu ideas of the north, a process which probably had not begun earlier than 1000 B.C. Its slow and gradual progress forms no small element in the real inner history of India, that history which never has been and hardly can be reduced to writing. The conflict between the Dravidian ideas of the south and the Indo-Aryan ideas of the north, which has lasted for three thousand years more or less, still continues, although on the surface the victory of the north seems to be complete."

This lucid explanation of the gulf between the north and the south deserves the closest attention, and goes far to explain why the Madrassi has such a dislike to serving under northerners, though

he had not the least objection to working under British N.C.Os. It explains too why it used to be sc difficult to persuade ex-army men to send their sons to the King George's Royal Indian Military Schools in North India, which is to the Madrassi practically a foreign country. Imagine the reaction of an Englishman asked to send his son to a school in Bulgaria, by no means an unreasonable parallel in more senses than one, since the outlook of the north is so fundamentally different from that of the south. This point of view has at last been recognized, and the establishment of a King George's Royal Indian Military School at Bangalore now offers to the Madrassi an opportunity which had been lacking in the past.

Four great races to-day make up the Madras Presidency and the South Indian States. Roughly speaking, the Tamils occupy the east coast and centre from Madras to Cape Comorin, the Telugus (Andhras) the east coast north from Madras to Vizagapatam and part of the Ceded districts, the Malayalis the West Coast from Mangalore to Trivandrum, and the Canarese the State of Mysore with parts of the South Canara and the Ceded districts. There are of course others in South India; the Coorgs in that small but very attractive province; the Tulus of South Canara; and a number of aboriginal tribes with dialects of their own, but the Tamils, Telugus, Malayalis and Canarese make up by far the greater part of the population, and a short historical summary is necessary to explain their origin.

So far back as the time of the Buddhist Emperor of India, Asoka Maurya (B.C. 250), two ancient Tamil kingdoms existed in the extreme south; the Pandyas with their capital at Madura, and the Cholas centred on Trichinopoly, while on the West Coast were the Chera (Kerala) dominions. All three states became wealthy and prosperous in virtue of their valuable foreign trade, and attained a high degree of material civilization at an early period. During the first and second centuries of the Christian era, the trade between Southern India and the Roman Empire was extensive, and we hear of the Pandya King sending a mission to the Emperor Augustus so far back as B.C. 20.

Further north was the Andhra kingdom, which in the second century A.D. stretched across the Deccan from the Arabian Sea near Bombay to the Bay of Bengal, with its capital on the east coast in the delta of the Kistna and Godavari rivers.

About A.D. 225, the Andhra dynasty was subdued by the Pallavas, whose history has been unearthed only in recent years. It has now been proved beyond reasonable doubt that they were a tribe of Parthians expelled from Northern India by fresh invaders, and that in the course of their movement to the south they clashed with the Andhras, who in time lost their western and central dominions, and were finally confined to the Godavari and Kistna districts on the east coast.

After conquering the Andhras, the Pallavas moved on south till a century later they captured the famous city of Kanchi (Conjeevaram) near Madras, and made it their capital for some seven centuries, exercising an over-lordship in varying degree over the Chola and Pandya kingdoms of the south.

A severe defeat inflicted by the rising power of the Chalukyas of the Deccan in A.D. 740 marked the beginning of the end of Pallava supremacy, which was finally extinguished at the close of the tenth century by a combination of the Cholas and Pandyas. The conquering Chola King, Rajaraja the Great (A.D. 985–1011), added Kalinga and a large part of Mysore to his dominions and in A.D. 1005 went so far as to annex Ceylon. By A.D. 1050, the kingdom of the Cholas, already covering practically the whole of Southern India, had been extended as far as Orissa and Bengal, while their powerful navy enabled them to invade Lower Burma.

It is known that Malaya, Java and Cambodia were conquered by overseas expeditions from the east coast of what is now the Madras Presidency, but further historical evidence is necessary to fix definite dates for these achievements, and it is still uncertain whether credit for them should be assigned to the Andhras, Pallavas or Cholas. The study of the history of Greater India had not progressed far when it was interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1939 and much still remains to be done.

On the West Coast, the Chera kingdom lasted till A.D. 825, when the Emperor Cheraman Perumal, according to tradition,

decided to embrace Islam and to proceed on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Before leaving, he divided the kingdom among his dependant rajahs, and the States of Travancore and Cochin still observe the Kollam era dating from the year of the Emperor's departure.

The Muhammadan invasion of A.D. 1310 extinguished all the dynasties of the Deccan and the South with the exception of the Pandyas, who remained independent for nearly a century longer. From the debris left as the tide of aggression receded, arose the Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar with its capital at Hampi in the Bellary district, which for two centuries checked Muhammadan expansion to the South, until it was overthrown by a confederation of the five kings of the Deccan at the battle of Talikota in 1565. From its ruins gradually arose the kingdom of Mysore, which first under Hindu rulers and later under the skilful guidance of the usurper Haidar Ali Khan expanded till in A.D. 1780 it covered the whole of the peninsula south of the Kistna, save for a narrow strip on the east coast held by the English East India Company, and the kingdom of Travancore on the west. After the storming of Seringapatam and the death of Tipu Sultan in A.D. 1799, the Madras Presidency attained its present proportions.

From this brief historical outline, it will be seen that the Tamils of to-day are the descendants of the Pallavas, Cholas and Pandyas; and the Telugus of the Andhra kingdom; while the Malayalis derive descent from the Cheras with a later addition of the Muhammadan Mappillas, descended from Arab traders who had settled in the country. These races differ from one another very considerably physically as well as temperamentally. Each too has its own language and literature dating back many centuries. Emphasis may perhaps be laid on the word *language*, since one so often hears of *South Indian dialects*, which is of course a complete misnomer.

Then there are the various differences of caste and religion. In the Tamil and Telugu districts are found caste Hindus, Adi-Dravidas or Adi-Andhras (*Depressed Classes* as they were known in former days), Madrassi Mussulmans (some of pure descent but many converts of a more or less recent date), and Christians of various denominations; while on the West Coast are the Hindu

Nayars and Tiyans, and the Muhammadan Mappillas, as well as a large Christian population.

As regards physical characteristics, the long-accepted idea in Northern India, dating back to the Ramayana, is that the Madrassi is short and very dark, with platyrhine features, and it is true that some of this type will be found all over the South, but on the other hand many Telugus are tall, and the complexion of the average Nayar from the West Coast is as fair as any to be found in the North. Nor is the right type of Madrassi lacking in physique, in fact those enlisted between 1939 and 1946 compared very favourably with the recruits of Northern India. During the war, many Madras units serving both in India and overseas came into contact with the inhabitants of other parts of India, and it is to be hoped that the popular misconceptions regarding the Madrassi, based largely on ignorance, have been dispelled once and for all, and that in India's army of the future there will be no idle talk of martial and non-martial classes. The gulf between the South and the North has been appreciably narrowed by the war, and in the interests of India's unity, so ardently desired by those who wish her well, it is essential that all remaining differences of outlook should be subordinated to the common weal.

EPILOGUE

The officer commanding a Madras unit who has read so far may logically ask how best he can win that devotion of his men which has always been so marked a characteristic of the Madras Soldier. To Madrassi officers advice would be impertinent, but unfortunately the officer class in the South, due largely to the disappearance of so many Poligar families which flourished in the early days of the Company, is small, and it seems probable that for some years to come, Madras units will to some extent be commanded by officers born and bred in other parts of India. To such a few words of advice may not be out of place.

The question is of course one of psychology. The officer who is constantly nagging at his men will have even less success with Madrassis than with any other class of soldiers. On the other hand one of sympathetic temperament who shows not only by words but by deeds that he is really interested in his men and that he will not permit any disparaging remarks to be made about them will certainly win their affection and regard.

For the rest, a close personal association with them through games and shikar, and learning their names, coupled with a real personal interest in their own well-being and in their family affairs, will quickly bring about the desired result.

The point is admirably expressed in the Recruiting Manual: "Madrassis, while on the one hand alive to injury and prone to resent ill-treatment whether fancied or real, are when kindly used the most faithful and attached of all soldiers," and the implications of this extract deserve the closest attention.

One of our main difficulties in the South is the lack of an outstanding Madrassi military personality such as Shivaji of our neighbours the Mahrattas, Akbar of the Muhammadans, or Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs. But we do have the glorious records and traditions of the old Coast Army and of their successors in the Second World War, of which any race or class can be proud. These I have attempted to bring out, however inadequately, in this book.

Provided they are studied by the officers and inculcated into the rank and file, this record should inspire the men with a proper pride in themselves and in their great heritage.

May the Madras Soldier of the future enhance the glories of the past.

JAI MADRAS!

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LIST OF MADRAS UNITS

1939—1946

Royal Indian Artillery

Unit.	*Formed.*	*Disbanded.*	*Theatre of War.*
6th Ind. Fd. Regt.	1942	....	Iraq and S.E.A.C.
7th Do.	1942	....	S.E.A.C.
9th (Para) Ind. Fd. Regt. ..	1943	....	India Command.
11th Do. ..	1945	(Old 8th Lt. AA. Regt.).	Do.
14th Do. ..	1942	(Old 10th Hy. AA. Regt.).	Do.
15th Do. ..	1945	(Old 11th Hy. AA. Regt.).	Do.
1st Ind. Medium Regt. Redesignated as 40 Med. Regt.	1943	(Old 8th Fd. Regt.)	S.E.A.C.
3rd. Do. Redesignated as 41 Med. Regt.	1945	(Old 14th Hy. AA. Regt.).	Do.
10th Ind. A.Tk. Regt. Redesignated as 37 Coorg A/Tk. Regt.	1946	(Old Coorg Bn. Madras Regt.).	India Command.
6th Ind. Hy. AA. Regt. Redesignated as 18th Hy. AA. Regt.	1942	..	Burma.
25th Do.	1943	1946	Middle East.
3rd Ind. Lt. AA. Regt. Redesignated as 27th Lt. AA. Regt.	1942	..	Burma.
4th Ind. Lt. AA. Regt. Redesignated as 29th Lt. AA. Regt.	1942	.. ..	Do.
5th Do.	1942	1946	Do.
10th Do.	1943	1946	India Command.
11th Do.	1943	1946	Burma.
12th Do.	1943	1946 ..	Do.
13th Do.	1944	1944	India Command.
14th Do.	1943	1944	Burma.
15th Do.	1943	1946	Do.
16th Do.	1944	1946	India Command.
17th Do (50 per cent Madrassi.)	1943	1945	India Command.
1st (Madras) Fd. Bty. ..	1935	..	S.E.A.C.
3rd Fd. Bty.	1940	1946	Western Desert and Burma.

Unit.	*Formed.*	*Disbanded.*	*Theatre of War.*
9th (Madras) Fd. Bty.	1942	1946	S.E.A.C.
13th (Madras) Fd. Bty.	1942	1946	Do.
6th Hy. A.A. Bty.	1941	1946	Do.
10th Hy. A.A. Bty.	1942	1946	Do.
13th (Madras) Hy. A.A. Bty.	1942	1946	Do.
502nd Ind. Hy. A.A. Bty.	1943	1945	India Command.
5th Lt A.A. Bty.	1941	1946	P.O.W. Malaya.
9th Lt. A.A.Bty.	1941	1946	S.E.A.C
102nd Ind. Lt. A.A.Bty.	1943	1945	Do.
5th Ind. Coast Bty.	1941	..	India Command.
1st Ind. Coast Maint Bty.	1946	..	Do.
2nd Ind. Coast Maint Bty.	1944	..	Do.

Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners

Unit.	*Raised.*	*P.A.I.F.*	*M.E.F.*	*C.M.F.*	*S.E.A.C.*	*Ind. Comd.*
9 Fd. Coy.	Pre-war.	5/41-5/42	5/42-9/43	9/43-10/45	..	9/39-5/41
10 Do.	Do.	4/41-6/42	6/42-3/44	3/44-12/45	..	9/39-4/41
11 AT Coy.	Do.	..	9/39-12/43	12/43-12/45	..	..
12 Fd. Coy.	Do.	..	10/39-11/43	11/43-12/45	..	9/39/10/39
13 Do.	Do.	..	..	..	12/41-9/45 P.O.W. Mal.	9/39-12-41 ..
14 Do.	Do.	9/41-7/43	8/43-3/44	3/44-11/45	..	9/39-9/41
15 Do.	Do.	..	..	..	8/39-45 P.O.W. Mal.	..
16 W/S Pk.	Do.	3/42-5/42	10/40-2/42 6/43-7/46	..	..	9/39-10/40
32 Fd. Sqdn.	Do.	7/41-11/43	11/43.12/45	..	..	9/39-7/41
36 Do.	1941	..	..	..	7/44-3/46	6/41-7/44
39 Do.	1941	5/42-11/43	11/43-12/45	..	..	10/41-5/42
44 Fd. Pk.	Pro-war	10/42-5/43	9/40-10/42	..	10/43-5/46	5/43-10/43
46 A.T.Coy.	1940	..	..	..	12/40-9/45 P.O.W. Mal.	9/39-9/40 7/40-12/40
50 Fd. Coy.	1940	..	..	..	12/41-2/43	7/40-12/41
52 AT Coy	1940	6/41-4/44	..	4/44-11/45	1/46-10/46	11/40-6/41
56 Fd. Coy.	1940	..	..	..	6/41-2/43	4/43—date.
57 Do.	1940	9/41-10/45	..	..	..	4/40-6/41 7/40-9/41
58 Do.	1940	10/41-7/42	7/42-12/42	..	1/43-10/46	7/40-10/41
59 Do.	1941	..	..	..	4/42-8/43	4/41-4/42
60 Do.	1941	..	..	..	1/42-9/45	8/43-8/45 6/41-1/42
61 Do.	1941	6/43-3/44 8/41-5/42	.. 5/42-5/43	.. 3/44-12/45	Redesignated. as 13 Fd. Coy.	5/41-8/41
62 Do.	1941	..	..	..	9/43-date	6/41-9/43

Unit.	*Raised.*	*P.A.I.F*	*M.E.F.*	*C.M.F.*	*S.E.A.C.*	*Ind. Comd.*
63 Fd. Coy.	1941	..	..	..	3/44-date	6/41-3/44
64 Do.	1941	..	..	..	3/44-9/45	8/41-3/44
65 Do.	1941	..	..	..	3/44-9/45	8/41-3/44
101 Rail Cons.	1940	6/41-8/43	4/41-5/41	..	11/43-2/46	6/40-6/41
303 Fd. Coy.	Transfered to M.S. & M. 1943.	..	..	..	10/43-8/46	7/41-10/43
309 Do.	Do.	..	..	..	10/43-11/46	10/41-10/43
323 Do.	1942	..	..	..	11/42-11/46	4/42-11/42
325 Do.	1942	..	..	..	3/43-date	8/42-3/43
326 Do.	1942	..	..	..	9/43-7/46	8/42-9/43
327 Do.	1942	..	..	..	1/43-5/46	8/42-1/43
330 Do.	1942	..	..	..	4/43-2/46	11/42-4/43
331 Do.	1942	..	..	..	7/43 date	11/42-7/43
362 Do.	1943	..	..	..	6/43-12/46	4/43-6/43
364 Do.	1943	..	..	..	6/43-11/46	Do.
365 Do.	1943	..	..	..	7/43-10/46	4/43-7/43
404 Do.	1943	..	..	..	12/43-6/46	3/43-12/43
405 Do.	1943	..	..	..	10/43-6/46	3/43-10/43
421 Do.	1942	Redesignated as 15 Fd. Coy.			5/43-date	1/42-5/43
422 Do.	1942	..	..	..	10/43-7/46	1/42-10/43
423 Do.	1942	..	..	..	10/42-7/46	2/42-12/42
424 Do.	1942	..	..	..	10/43:9/46	3/42-10/43
425 Do.	1942	..	..	..	3/44-4/45	3/42-3/44
426 Do.	1942	..	..	..	12/44-10/45	4/42-12/44
427 Do.	1942	5/45-12/45	..	..	11/42-5/45	5/42-5/45
428 Do.	1942	..	..	..	11/42-5/46	5/42-11/42
429 Do.	1942	..	..	..	3/43-7/45	7/42-3/43
430 Do.	1942	..	..	..	12/43-7/45	9/42-12/43

431 Fd. Coy.	1942	..	..	..	6/43-6/46	9/42-6/43
432 Do.	1942	..	..	..	6/43-11/46	Do.
433 Do.	1942	..	..	..	6/43-11/46	10/42-6/43
434 Do.	1942	..	..	..	6/43-6/46	Do.
441 Quar Coy.	1943	..	..	..	10/43-9/46	4/43-10/43
442 Do.	1943	..	..	..	10/43-8/46	Do.
443 Do.	1943	..	..	..	..	11/43-3/46
456 F.A.E.	1943	..	..	..	8/43-9/45	..
459 Do.	1943	..	..	..	12/43-12/46	8/43-12/43
461 A.T.E.	1943	..	..	..	11/43-2/46	..
470 Do.	1945	..	..	..	12/45-7/46	5/45-12/45
471 Cage	1944		..	..	45-8/46	11/44
472 Do.	1944	..	..	..	12/44-12/46	11/44
468 G.H.Q. T. Engs.	1944	..	..	..	..	..
618 E. & M. Coy.	1944	..	..	..	..	..
1 Arm. Div. Engs.	1940	7/41-11/43	11/43-12/45	..	..	10/40/7/41
6 Div. Engs.	1941	9/41-10/44	..	..	..	4/41-9/41
10 Do.	1940	4/41-5/42	5/42-3/44	3/44-12/45	..	9/40-4/41
17 Do.	1941	..	..	..	1/43 date	..
19 Do.	1941	..	..	..	1/43-5/46	..
25 Do.	1942	..	..	..	-/43 date	3/42/43
33 C.T.E.	1943	Short lived, redesignated S.A.T. Engrs.			..	..
463 L. of C. Engs.	1943	..	..	..	..	7/43 date.
454 D.C.E. Ops.	1942	..	..	..	12/42-11/43	..
625 A.T.Engs.	1945	..	..	..	..	3/45 date.
21 Eng. Bn.	1943	..	..	..	9/43-1/47	2/43-9/43
22 Do.	1943	..	..	..	..	4/43-2/46
1 Br. Sec.	1940	7/41	..	..	..	5/40-7/41
6 Do.	1941	..	..	..	10/41-9/45 P.O. W. Mal.	3/41-10/41
7 Do.	1941	..	..	..	4/42-9/45	3/41-4/42

Unit.	Raised.	M.E.F.	C.M.F.	S.E.A.C.	Ind. Comd.
10 Br. Sec.	1941	..	..	6/42-11/45	6/41-6/42
14 Do.	1941	..	..	12/41-9/45 P.O.W. Mal.	9/41-12/41
16 Do.	1942	..	..	..	5/42-1/46
18 Do.	1942	..	..	..	8/42-5/45
1019 Do.	1942	..	..	7/43-9/45	11/45-7/43
1020 Do.	1942	Redesignated as 758 M.E. Sec.	..		..
1021 Do.	1943	..	..	..	1/43-5/45
858 H.B. Coy.	1943	..	..	..	2/43 date.
12 E.T.C.	1941	Location Secunderabad	..	..	10/41-11/45
15 Do.	1941	Do. Sialkot.	..	..	10/41-1/45
20 Do.	1943	Do. Kohat	..	..	1/43-10/45
2 S.L.E.R.	1943	..	..	..	3/43-7/44
141 Do.	1043	..	..	..	3/43 7/44
142 Do.	1943	..	..	..	3/43-7/45
143 Do.	1943	..	..	..	3/43-7(45
641 R.R. Sec.	1943	..	..	5/43-9/45	4/43-5/43
642 Do.	1943	..	..	11/43-9/45	4/43-11/43
446		..	..	..	..
618 E. & M. Coy.	1943	..	..	..	5/43 date
664 M.E. Coy.	1943	..	..	10/43-9/45	8/43-10/43
755 M.E. Pln.	1944	..		10/43-9/45	8/43-10/43
756 Do.	1944	..	..	10/43-9/45	8/43-10/43
757 Do.	1944	..	..	10/43-9/45	8/43-10/43
758 Do.	1944	..	..	10/43-9/45	8/43-10/43
415 Ind. Sec.	1942	..	..	10/43-6/44	1/42-10/43
204 B'Cast Coy.	1943	..	..	6/43-1/45	..
S.A.M.P.S.	1944	..	..		10/44-2/46
S.A.B.C.	1944	..	..		12/44 date.

During the war period 1939–45 enrolments to the Corps totalled 44,923 Indian ranks and 2,242 non-combatants.

Royal Indian Engineers

Unit.	*Date of formation.*	*Date of disbandment.*	*Theatre of War in which served.*	
No. 2 (Madras) Eng. Bn.	Jan. 1942 (Secunderabad).	30 Sep. 1946.	Nov. 1942	Karong (Eastern Manipur Road Area).
			July 1944	Imphal.
			Apr. 1945	Burma.
			Feb. 1946	Myitkyina.
No. 7 (Mad.) Eng. Bn.	May 1940 (Bangalore).	19 May 1946.	July 1941	Iraq.
			Nov. 1943	Italy.
No. 12 (Mad.) Eng. Bn.	Nov. 1941 (Begumpet).	10 Nov. 1946.	June 1942	Ceylon.
			Oct. 1944	Imphal.
			Jan. 1945	Tamu.
			June 1945	Burma.
			Feb. 1946	Toungoo.
No. 16 (Mad.) Eng. Bn.	Apr. 1942 (Dighi)	15 Jan' 1946.	Jan. 1943	Imphal.
			June. 1945	Lake Beale.
No. 17 (Mad.) Eng. Bn.	Apr. 1942 (Secunderabad).	Absorbed in 14th Bn. of No. 4 group.	Dec. 1942	Chittagong.
			Feb 1943	Arakan.
			Apr. 1943	Ukhia (E.C.)
			Aug. 1943	Arakan.
			Jan. 1945	Cox's Bazaar.
			June 1945	Vaniyambadi.
			Sep. 1945	Malaya.
			Feb. 1946	Kallang. Airfield (Singapore).
No. 20 (Mad.) Eng. Bn.	Oct. 1942 (Begumpet).	10 Oct. 1946.	Sep. 1943	Budni.
			Dec. 1943	Juhu.
			May 1944	Chittagong.
			July 1945	Bhiwandi.
			Jan. 1946	Lake Beale.

Nos. 21 and 22 Eng. Battns. were raised by the Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners and are shown in the list of that Corps.

First raised as Road Construction units, the designation was later changed to Pioneers, and finally to Engineer Battalions, R.I.E.

Indian Signal Corps

Designation.	*Formed.*	*Disbanded.*	*Theatre of War.*
Waziristan Dist. Sigs.	Pre-war	..	N.W.F.P.
4 Ind. Div. Sigs. *	Pre-war	..	MEF, PAIC and ALFSEAC.
8 Ind. Div. Sigs.*	1940	1946	PAIC, CMF. and India Command.
23 Ind. Div. Sigs.	1941	..	ALFSEAC.
25 Ind. Div. Sigs.	1942	1946	Do.
26 Ind. Div. Sigs.	1942	..	Do.

Designation.	*Formed.*	*Disbanded.*	*Theatre of War.*
43 Ind. Armed Div. Sigs.	1942	1943	India Command.
20 Ind. Div. Sigs.*	1942	1946	ALFSEAC and Ceylon.
19 Ind. Div. Sigs.	1942	1946	ALFSEAC.
39 Ind. Div. Sigs.	1944	1946	India Command.
Peshawar Dist. Sigs.	Pre-war	..	N.W.F.P.
Eastern Comd. Sigs.*	1943	..	India Command.
North Western Sig. Coy.*	1942	..	Do.
Central Command Sigs.*	1942	..	Do.
Southern Sigs.*	1944	..	Do.
1 Air Support Control Sigs. ..	1942	..	ALFSEAC and India Command.
3 Air Support Control Sigs.	1941	1944	ALFSEAC.
23 Ind. Air Support Sigs.	1944	..	Do.
25 Air Support Control Sigs. ..	1942	1945	Do.
"C" Ind. Spl. W/T Group !.. ..	1943	1945	Do.
H.Q. 330 Ind. Spl. W/T Group ..	1945	..	Do.
"B" Ind. Spl. W. T. Group ..	1942	1945	Do.
207 Ind. H.Q. Sigs.	1942	..	Do.
209 Do.	1942	1946	Ceylon and ALFSEAC.
210 Do.	1942	..	ALFSEAC.
211 Do.*	1942	1946	Do.
212 Do.	1943	..	India Command.
216 Do.	1943	1946	ALFSEAC.
217 Do.	1943	..	Do.
219 Do.*	1943	..	Do.
223 Do.*	1944	..	India Command.
224 Do.*	1944	..	Do.
225 Do.*	1944	..	Do.
228 Do.*	1944	..	Do.
232 Do.*	1945	..	Do.
15 Ind. Corps Sigs.*	1943	..	ALFSEAC.

Ind. Spl. W/T Sec. Type "B" Nos. 1, 3, 200, 206, 208, 209, 320.

Ind. Sig. Monitoring Sec. Nos. 204, 209, 210.

Ind. Wing. Sig. Sect. Nos. 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 220.

Ind. Wing. Sig. Sec. Nos. 221, 222, 223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234.

Ind. P. C. Maint Sec. Nos. 221, 229, 234, 235, 243, 247, 249, 258, 260, 268, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 281, 282, 285, 286.

Ind. Line Sec. Nos. 205, 230, 233, 237, 238, 239, 243, 249, 250, 251, 252, 257, 258.

Ind. Line Const. Sec. Nos. 226, 227, 230, 231, 233, 235, 236, 239, 240, 243, 244, 248, 255, 259.

Ind. Mtn. Regt. Sig. Sec. Nos. 23, 32, 33.

Ind. Inf. Bde. Sig, Sec. Nos. 7, 19, 36, 48, 49, 51, 64, 74, 80, 123, 150.

* 50 per cent or more Madrassi, others wholly Madrassi.

The Madrassi strength of the Indian Signal Corps on the 1st September 1939 was 757, and at the peak period in October 1945 had expanded to 24,159.

The Madras Regiment

Designation.	*Formed.*	*Disbanded.*	*Theatre of War.*
1/3rd	1942	..	Burma and Indonesia.
2/3rd	1942	..	Malaya.
3/3rd	1942	1944	India Command.
4/3rd	1942	..	Burma.
5/3rd	1943	..	India Command.
6/3rd	1943	..	N.W. Frontier.
7/3rd	1943	1946	India Command.
25/3rd	1942	1946	Do.
26/3rd	1942	1946	Bengal and Assam.
27/3rd	1943	1946	India Command.
28/3rd*	1942	1946	Iraq.
1st Coorg Battn.	1942	..	India Command.

* Originally raised as the 3rd Indian Coast Defence battalion, and became the 28/3rd Madras Regiment in 1944.

Between 1942 and 1946 enlistments to the Regiment totalled 20,958.

Royal Indian Army Service Corps (M.T.)

Div. Transport Coys.—Nos. 4, 6, 8, 60.

Armd. Bde. Tpt. Coy.—No. 2.

Infantry Brigade Tpt. Coys.—Nos. 10, 15, 17, 19, 24, 26, 28, 62, 100.

Ind. Armed. Div. Tank Tpt. Coy. No. 43 (Reorganised into No. 606 Ind. G.P.T. Coy).

G.P.T. Coys.—Nos. 29, 31, 40, 43, 44*, 47, 48*, 51 (Mysore), 53 (Travancore), 60, 61, 68, 71*, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 108, 109, 110, 111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 122, 127, 128, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 151, 152, 157, 158, 164, 169, 175, 176, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 192, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 205, 208, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 241, 242, 307, 309, 317, 321, 322 (Reorganised into 512 and 513) 606, 610*, 722, 903, 904.

Ind. Div. Regiments—Nos. 7, 25.

M. T. Regiments—Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

Units marked with an asterisk were only partly, others wholly composed of Madras personnel.

The number of Madrassis recruited into the R.I.A.S.C. (M.T.). during the war was 57, 847.

Indian Pioneer Corps

Unit.		*Formed.*	*Disbanded.*	*Theatre of War.*
No. 3*	I.P.C. Battn.	1941	....	Paiforce.
No. 5	Do.	1941	....	C.M.F.
No. 10*	Do.	1941	....	Do.
No. 17	Do.	1941	....	S.E.A.C.
No. 23*	Do.	1941	....	Do.
No. 27*	Do.	1941	....	Do.
No. 29	Do.	1942	....	Ind. Comd.
No. 35	Do.	1942	....	S.E.A.C.

Designation.	Formed.	Disbanded.	Theatre of War.
No. 38 I.P.C. Battn.	1942	....	S.E.A.C.
No. 39* Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 41 Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 44 Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 47 Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 50* Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 55 Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 56 Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 57 Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 67 Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 68 Do.	1942	....	Do.
No. 69 Do.	1942	....	Do.

Battalions marked with an asterisk contained two companies of Madrassis; the remainder were wholly Madrassi. All battalions were disbanded on the 15th September 1943 and merged into companies.

(Madras) I.P.C. Coy.—Nos. 1218*, 1236*, 1237*, 1238*, 1239* ..	C.M.F.
(Madras) I.P.C. Coy.—No. 1257*	M.E.F.
(Madras) I.P.C. Coy.—No. 1332	Assam.
(Madras) I.P.C. Coy.—Nos. 1231*, 1232*, 1259*, 1284*, 1285*, 1286, 1287*, 1288, 1310, 1311*, 1326*, 1327*, 1335*, 1359*, 1361*, 1362*, 1363*, 1368*, 1369, 1370*, 1371, 1373*, 1374*, 1388*, 1389*, 1390*, 1391*, 1404*, 1405*, 1406*, 1407*, 1418*, 1419, 1420*, 1421*, 1422*, 1423*, 1438*, 1439*, 1460*, 1461*, 1462*, 1463*, 1464*, 1465*, 1466*, 1467*, 1468*, 1469*, 1471*, 1472*, 1510*, 1511*, 1513, 1514*, 1520*, 1542*, 1563*, 1566, 1567*, 1574, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1585*, 1586*, 1587, 1588*, 1594, 1595, 1597*, 1598*, 1599, 1600, 1601, 1605, 1610.	S.E.A.C.
(Madras) I.P.C. Coy.—Nos. 1333, 1334, 1356*, 1357*, 1358*, 1386, 1470, 1473*, 1512*, 1518, 1519, 1538*, 1543*, 1544*, 1545*, 1578*, 1579*, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1592, 1593, 1596, 1604, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1618, 1619, 1620, 1623, 1624, 1625, 1626, 1627.	India Command

Companies marked with an asterisk achieved Combatant status.

NOTE.—Originally termed Labour units, the designation was changed later to Auxiliary Pioneers, and finally to Indian Pioneer Corps.

APPENDIX B

AWARDS FOR GALLANTRY

1939—1946

Royal Indian Navy

Recipient.	*Decoration.*	*Date.*	*Home District.*
O. No. 11471 Petty Officer Cook L. Lobo.	D.S.M.	1944	South Kanara.
O. No. 100028 Leading Seaman Mohamd Obeyedullah.	D.S.M. ..	1945	North Arcot.
O. No. 5135 Leading Telegraphist F. A. Rajarathnam.	D.S.M. ..	1945	South Arcot.
O. No. 12930 Stoker II Charayaph Paily Joseph.	D.S.M. ..	1945	Malabar.
O. No. 15397 Stoker II Sheik Musthan ..	D.S.M. ..	1945	Nellore.
O. No. 16287 Ord. Seaman A. M. Balasubramaniam.	D.S.M. ..	1945	Madras.
O. No. 15578 Stoker 1st Class Ramannun Nair.	D.S.M. ..	1945	South Malabar.
C. P. O. Appuswamy Krishnamurthy ..	B.E.M. ..	1945	Madras.

Royal Indian Artillery

Receipient.	*Unit.*	*Decoration.*	*Theatre of War.*	*Date.*	*Home District.*
Major P. P. Kumaramangalam	2nd Fd. Regt. ..	D.S.O.	Western Desert ..	1942 ..	....
Lieut E. P. Royappa	....	M.B.E.	....	...	Madura.
100258 Hav. Major (now Subadar) Lakshminarasu.	2nd Fd. Regt. ..	I.D.S.M.	Western Desert ..	1942 ..	Guntur.
101291 L/Nk. Yesudas	Do. ..	Do.	Do. ..	Do. ..	Nellore.
100963 Hav. Major C. P. V. Kumaran ..	7th Fd. Regt. ..	M.M.	Far East ..	1945 ..	North Malabar.

Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners

Recipient.	*Unit.*	*Decoration.*	*Theatre of War.*	*Date.*	*Home District.*
14069 Subadar Subramaniyam	11 Coy.	George Cross	Middle East	1943	Chingleput.
Lt. Col. G. F. Hutchinson, R.E.	10 Div. Engs.	D.S.O.	Italy	1944	United Kingdom.
Major J. C. Garwood, R.E.	471 A.G.R.E.	Do.	Burma	1945	Do.
Lt. Col. T. H. F. Foulkes, R.E.	10 Div. Engs.	O.B.E.	Do.	1945	Do.
Lt. Col. C. W. R. Lynch, R.E.	456 F. A. Engs.	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Lt. Col. I.C. Loch, R.E.	25 Div. Engs.	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Lt. Col. G. W. Towers, D.S.O., R.E.	456 F.A. Engs.	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Lt. Col. R. S. B. Ward, M.C., R.E.	17 Div. Engs.	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Col. A. W. Kiggel	472 A.G.R.E.	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Major E. Waring, R.E.	12 Coy.	M.B.E.	Middle East	1941	Do.
Major J. W. Bossard, R.E.	362 ,,	Do.	Burma	1943	Do.
Major T. W. I. Hedley, R.E.	323 ,,	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Major G. H. Vellacot, R.E.	21 Eng. Bn.	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Major H. C. Loe, R.E.	62 Coy.	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Major J. S. Seely, R.E.	17th Div. Engs.	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Major D. W. C. McCarthy, R.E.	327 Coy.	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Major J. V. Corbett, R.E.	428 ,,	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Major L. G. Yarrow, R.E.	414 ,,	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Major R. Kerridge, R.E.	365 ,,	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Major V. E. J. Brackstone, R.E.	6 B. Sec.	Do.	As a P.O.W. in Japan.	..	Do.
Capt. B. Prowse, R.E.	456 F.A. Engs.	Do.	Burma	1945	Do
Capt. J. Paton, R.E.	19 Div. Engs.	Do.	Do.	1945	Do
Capt. G. G. Milne, R.E.	461 A.T. Engs.	Do.	Do.	1944	Do
11002 Subadar Rangasamiyar	101 Coy.	Do.	Iraq	1942	North Arcot.
14571 Subadar Mutaulingam	428 ,,	Do.	Burma	1945	Bangalore.
13702 Subadar Krishnasami	21 Eng. Bn.	Do.	Do.	1944	North Arcot.

14747 Subadar Palanivelu	44 Coy.	Do.	I o.	1944	Bangalore.
14108 Subadar Major Kondayya	21 Eng. Bn.	I o.	Do.	1945	Vizagapatam.
13035 Subadar Pappala Yakoob	65 Coy.	Do.	Do.	1945	Guntur.
Subadar Kunhi Ramen Nair	....	Do.	Do.	1945	Malabar.
Major R. A. Lindsell, R.E.	61 Coy.	M.C.	Italy	1945	United Kingdom.
Major P. A. Walker, R.E.	60 „	Do.	Burma	1945	Do.
Major E. B. Whe ton, R.E.	12 „	Do.	Italy	1944	Do.
Major W. B. J. Armstrong, R.E.	36 Fd. Sqn.	Do.	Burma	1945	Do.
Major W. G. Tellworthy, R.E.	63 Coy.	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Major R. W. Britten, R.E.	65 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Major J. E. Ralph, R.E.	422 „	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Capt. K. E. Mason, R.E.	65 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Capt. R. S. A. Prydo, R.E.	421 „	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
Capt. R. D. Roome, R.E.	17 Div. Eng.	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
Capt. G. G. Maufe, R.E.	10 Coy.	Do.	Italy	1944	Do.
Lieut. S. E. M. Goodall, R.E.	62 „	Do.	Burma	1945	Do.
Lieut. A. Murray, R.E.	12 „	Do. (and bar)	Italy	1944	Do.
Lieut. D. A. Orr, R.E.	36 Fd. Sqn.	Do. do.	Burma	1945	Do
Lieut. E. J. Stead, R.E.	61 Coy.	Do.	Italy	1944	Do.
Lieut. I. R. Ireland, R.E.	60 „	Do.	Burma	1944	Do.
12025 Subadar Sitaram	10 „	Do.	Italy	1945	Vizagapatam.
12645 Subadar Ramunny	36 Fd. Sqn.	Do.	Burma	1945	North Malabar.
62431 Jemadar Madhavankutty Nair	60 Coy.	Do.	Do.	1944	South Malabar.
17091 Jemadar Perumal	10 „	Do.	Italy	1945	North Arcot.
62418 Jemadar K. O. Davis	61 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Cochin State.
17523 Jemadar Perumal	10 „	Do.	Do.	1945	North Arcot.
12921 Jemadar Chinnadurai	13 „	Do.	Malaya	1942	....
14931 Jemadar Balaram	....	Do.	....	..	....
13996 C.H.M. Sampangi Raju	12 Coy.	I.O.M. (2nd class)	M.E.	1941	Bangalore.
8077 Sub. Subbaroyan	44 „	Do.	Do.	1941	Do.
15345 Jemadar Loganathan	12 „	Do.	Do.	1943	North Arcot.

Receipient.	*Unit.*	*Decoration.*	*Theatre of War.*	*Date.*	*Home District.*
17272 Nk. Krishnan	12 Coy.	I.O.M. (2nd class.)	M.E.	1943	North Arcot.
66596 L/Hav. Bora Kanakayya	12 ,,	George Medal	C.M.F.	1946	Vizagapatam.
C. S. M. J. J. Webber, R.E.	44 ,,	D.C.M.	....	..	....
13080 Hav. Arokiasawmy	44 ,,	I.D.S.M.	M.E.	1941	Bangalore.
12704 Jem. Govindaswamy	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	1942	Do.
15342 Nk. Govindan	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	1942	Do.
17742 Hav. Duraimuthu	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	1943	Do.
17431 L/Nk. Hari Krishnan	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	1943	Do.
13659 C.H.M. Varadan	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	1943	North Arcot.
17829 Spr. Muthu Rakku	11 ,,	Do.	Do.	1943	Ramnad.
13996 Sub. Sampangi Raju	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	1943	Bangalore.
14069 Sub. Subramaniyam	11 ,,	Do.	Do.	1943	Chingleput.
13492 Spr. Malaipandiyan	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	194?	Tin?evelly.
69459 Nk. Durairaj Na?ar	428 ,,	Do.	Burma	1944	Do.
63208 Nk. Sankaranarayanan Nair	425 ,,	Do.	o.	1944	South Malabar.
1798. Nk. Arokiasamy	10 ,,	Do.	Italy	1944	Bangalore.
1821. Nk. Pushparaj	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	1945	North Arcot.
18561 L/Hav. Y?koob Sheriff	12 ,,	Do.	Do.	1945	South Arcot.
64007 Spr. Mahamud	6? ,,	Do.	S.E.A.C.	1945	Pudukkottai State.
19973 Hav. Viswanath?n	12 ,,	Do.	Italy	1944	North Arcot.
18823 L/Hav. Benedict	13 ,,	M.M.	Malaya	1942	Bangalore.
73672 Spr. Balasundaram	421 ,,	Do.	Burma	1944	South Arcot.
67747 Nk. Anthony	62 ,,	Do.	Do.	1944	Bangalore.
69040 Spr. Subbiah	425 ,,	Do.	Do.	194?	Kurnool.
6985 Spr. Ramasamy	425 ,,	Do.	Do.	1944	Trichinopoly.
62863 L/Nk. P.I. Paramu	362 ,,	Do.	Do.	1944	Cochin State.
17752 Hav. Appa Rao	422 ,,	Do. (and bar).	Do.	1945	Vizagapatem.
60968 L/Hav. T. P. Raja Ram	60 ,,	Do. do.	Do.	1945	Bangalore.
17204 Nk. Benny	44 ,,	Do. do.	Do.	1945	Chittoor.

19592 Spr. Sundara Velu	421 „	Do. do.	Do.	1945	North Arcot.
68691 Spr. Kandasamy	12 „	Do.	C.M.F.	1945	Salem.
19658 Nk. Shaik Hussain	58 „	Do.	S.E.A.C.	1945	Guntur.
16716 Nk. Paul Dhanaraj	58 „	Do.	Do.	1945	North Arcot.
19757 Nk. Mariasusai	58 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Madura.
63774 Spr. Swamy Velu	58 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Chingleput.
17463 Hav. Bheemeswar Rao	11 „	Do.	Italy	1944	West Godavari.
65213 Spr. Appa Rao	421 „	Do.	S.E.A.C.	1945	Vizagapatam.
63151 L/Nk. Narayanan Nair	60 „	Do.	Do.	1945	South Malabar.
63305 Nk. Mohd. Ansaruddin	60 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
63010 Nk. Alagiri Chettiar	62 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Coimbatore.
67917 Spr. Ponnaiyan	44 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Do.
66189 L/Nk. Chinnappan	365 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Salem.
60163 L/Hav. Shaik Madina	421 „	Do.	Burma	1945	East Godavari.
19039 Hav. Shaik Khader	61 „	Do.	C.M.F.	1946	South Arcot.
77963 Spr. K. Veeranna	362 „	Do.	Burma	1946	Kurnool.
18071 Hav. Ponnurangam	62 „	Do.	Do.	1946	Bangalore.
67873 L/Nk. Yakob	36 Fd. Sqn.	Do.	Do.	1946	Nellore.
68156 L/Nk. Perumal Mudali	60 Coy.	Do.	Do.	1946	Salem.
63532 Spr. Ellappan	65 „	Do.	Do.	1946	Do.
66042 Naik Kanniah	....	....	....	..	....
72586 Spr. Nookalu	426 Coy.	B.E.M.	Burma	1945	East Godavari.
16293 Hav. Jayaraj	44 „	Do.	Do.	1944	Poona.
19252 Hav. Chinnan	32 Fd. Sqn.	Do.	M.E.	1945	Salem.
66927 Spr. Prabhakaran Thambi	362 Coy.	Do.	Burma	1945	Travancore State.
13178 Sub. Thangaraj	61 „	Silver Star	Italy	1945	Bangalore.

Indian Signal Corps

Recipient.	*Decoration.*	*Theatre of War.*	*Date.*	*Home District.*
Sub/Major V. P. Raju	M.B.E.	Burma	1946	Vizagapatam.
Sub/Major Sesha Salam	Do.	Do.	1946	Trichinopoly.
Subadar Dhandan Moses	Do.	Do.	1946	Nellore.
9249 (Now Subadar) D. Chendra Reddy	I.D.S.M.	Middle East	1941	Anantapur.
Subadar D. Chadra Reddy	M.B.E.	Burma	1944	....
9064 (Now Subadar) Dharman	I.D.S.M.	Middle East	1941	North Arcot.
A 2546 L/Nk. Chockalingam	Do.	Western Desert	1942	Madura.
A. 2672 (Now Jemadar) V. Muthiah	Do.	Do.	1942	Tinnevelly.
50017 Jemadar Devaraj	Do.	Do.	1942	Cuddapah.
A. 1964 (Now Jemadar), K. T. Madhava Menon.	Do.	Do.	1943	South Malabar.
9015 (Now Jemadar) A. George	Do.	Do.	1943	Madura.
A. 269 (Now Jemadar) Manuel Harry	Do.	Italy	1944	Trichinopoly.
A. 1967 W/S/Nk. H. K. Williams	Do.	Burma	1944	North Malabar.
9419 Hav. S. Packiam	M.M.	Italy	1944	Bangalore.
A. 1833 Nk. Fakir Khan	Do.	Do.	1944	Guntur.
A. 8075 L/Nk. Venkateswarulu	Do.	Do.	1944	Do.
17152 Sigmn. Odivil Sreedhara Menon	Do. (and bar)	Burma	1945	Cochin State.
20704 L/Nk. Kunhi Raman	Do.	Do.	1945	North Malabar.
17783 Naik Kolankodu Sankara Pillai, Bhaskara Pillai.	Do.	Do.	1945	Travancore State.
11394 L/Nk. Krishnaswamy Natesan	Do.	Do.	1946	North Arcot.
11837 L/Nk. Jaraddy James	Do.	Do.	1946	Cuddapah.
A. 5771 Sigmn. Cherukra Balakrishnan Nair.	Do.	Do.	1946	Cochin State.
A. 1697 Hav. Raghavan Nambiar	B.E.M.	Do.	1945	North Malabar.

The Madras Regiment

Recipient.	Unit.	Decoration.	Theatre of War.	Date.	Home District.
Lt.-Col. W. R. Venning	1st Bn.	D.S.O.	S.E.A.C.	..	....
Lt.-Col. A. T. Scott	1st ,,	O.B.E.	.. ..	..	....
Major R. S. Noronha	4th ,,	M.C. (with bar)	Burma	..	Trichinopoly.
Major C. P. A. Menon	1st ,,	Do.	Indonesia	..	Cochin State.
Capt. P. L. Achard	4th ,,	Do.	Burma	..	....
Subadar C. H. M. Thomas	4th ,,	Do.	Do.	1945	Travancore State.
Jemadar Ramarao	1st ,,	Do.	Indonesia	1945	East Godavari.
13615 L/Nk. Chathu	1st ,,	I.O.M.	S.E.A.C.	1946	Malabar.
8503 Nk. Perumal	1st ,,	I.D.S.M.	Do.	1946	North Arcot.
8260 Hav. (now Jemadar) Pakianathan	4th ,,	M.M.	Burma	1944	Madura.
5192 L/Nk. Shengani	4th ,,	Do.	Do.	1944	Chingleput.
8219 Hav. Kannan Nair	4th ,,	Do.	Do.	1944	Malabar.
13315 L/Nk. Kanniappan	1st ,,	Do.	Indonesia	1946	North Arcot.
8533 L/Nk. Krishnan Reddy	4th ,,	Do.	Burma	1944	Chittoor.
2404 Nk. Subbiah	1st ,,	Do.	Indonesia	1946	Nellore.
8688 Sep. Sadayan	4th ,,	Do.	Burma	..	North Arcot.
4531 Nk. P. Madhavan	1st ,,	Do.	Indonesia	..	Travancore State.
4932 Nk. Sandanaswamy Michael	2nd ,,	B.E.M.	N.W.F.P.	..	South Arcot.
Nk. Devasigamony	1st ,,	Do.	India	1946	Kurnool.

Royal Indian Army Service Corps (M.T.)

Recipient.	Unit.	Decoration.	Theatre of War.	Date.	Home District.
Jem. Francis Paul Sebastian	....	M.B.E.	....	1945	....
U/D Clerk A. S. Ramesan	....	Do.	....	1945	Bangalore.
733586 L/Nk. Raj Gopal	903 Coy.	M.M.	Burma	1944	Mysore State.
785843 L/Nk. Lachman	....	Do.	....	1944	....
968514 Naik Parameshwar Nair	....	Do. (with bar)	....	1945	Travancore State.

Recipient	*Unit.*	*Decoration.*	*Theatre of War.*	*Date.*	*Home District.*
901181 Sep. Thomas Daniel	....	M.M.	C.M.F.	1945	Travancore State.
814874 Sep. Driver Ganesan	169 Coy.	Do.	Burma	1945	Tanjore.
838005 Sep. Driver Thyneswari Nadar	169 „	Do.	Do.	1945	Tinnevelly.
179263 Hav. Appu Panikkar	....	B.E.M.	....	1945	South Malabar.

Indian Army Medical Corps

Recipient.	*Decoration.*	*Theatre of war.*	*Date.*	*Home District.*
Capt. Vedantha Rangachari	M.C.	Middle East	1941–42	Madras.
Capt. N. A. Subramanyam	Do.	Do.	1943	Malabar.
Capt. C. Arumainayagam	Do.	Do.	1943	Madras.
Capt. K. Mariswamappa	Do.	Iraq	1943	Bellary.
Capt. Koka Krishna Rao	Do.	Italy	1944	Madras.
Capt. C. M. Sundara Rajan	Do.	Do.	1944	Trichinopoly.
Capt. Chedalavada Seshagiri Rao	Do.	Burma	1944	East Godavari.
Capt. Subramaniam Gopalakrishnan	Do.	Do.	1944	Malabar.
Capt. Chedalavada Krishna Rao	Do.	Do.	1944	Kistna.
Major K. C. Ganapathi	Do.	Italy	1945	Coorg.
Capt. S. Kesavalu	Do.	Do.	1945	Madras.
Capt. Rayasan Ramachandra Rao	Do.	Do.	1945	Kistna.
Capt. Kollur Madhusudan Rao	Do.	Do.	1945	Vizagapatam.
Capt. Santhana Sankaran	Do.	Burma	1945	Tanjore.
Capt. C. Vadivelu	Do.	Do.	1945	Chittoor.
Capt. P. V. Ramaniah	M.B.E.	P.O.W.	1946	Vizagapatam.
Capt. B. D. P. Rao	Do.	Do.	1946	Nellore.
Capt. T. R. Subramaniam	Do.	S.E.A.C.	1946	Trichinopoly.
40771 Nk. C. R. S. Babu Raju	I.D.S.M.	Western Desert	1943	Chingleput.
40771 Nk. C. R. S. Babu Raju	M.M.	Italy	1944	Do.
85628 L/Nk. Chinnadorai	Do.	Do.	1944	Bangalore.
86812 Nk. Durailingam	Do.	Burma	1945	North Arcot.

Unclassified

Recipient.	Unit.	Decoration.	Theatre of War.	Date.	Home District.
Lt.-Col. (now Brig.) K. S. Thimmayya	19th Hyd. Regt.	D.S.O.	Burma	1945	Coorg.
Lt.-Col. (now Brig.) K. M. Cariappa	7th Raj. Regt.	O.B.E.	Do.	1944	Do.
Sub-Major (now Hon. Lieut.) Venkata-rathnam.	R.I.E.	M.B.E.	Do.	1943	West Godavari.
Sub. Kunni Raman	K.G.V.O. S. & M.	Do.	Do.	1944	Malabar.
Lieut. M. M. Pillai	Royal Bo. S. & M.	M.C.	Singapore	1942	Tinnevelly.
Capt. V. Radhakrishnan	R.I.E.	Do.	Do.	1942	Madras.
141797 L/Nk. Dvr. Pandya Naidu	I.E.M.E.	I.D.S.M.	Italy	1945	Madura.
Swpr. Govindan Vidhayadaran	I.G.S.C.	M.M.	..	1944	Travancore.
22945 Hav. Thamiraj	R.I.E.	B.E.M.	Iraq	1943	Madura.

Royal Indian Air Force

Recipient.	Decoration.	Date.	Home District.
D. G. Bhore, Esq., M.B.E., I.C.S.	D.F.C.	August 1944	Cochin State.
F/o Ramachandra Rao	Do.	January 1945	Guntur.
Sq./Ldr. R. Rajaram	Do.	April 1945	Madras.
F/o B. B. Koteswara Rao	Do.	October 1945	East Godavari.

APPENDIX C

RECRUITING

1939—1945

Recruitment in the Madras Presidency and South Indian States from September 1939 to the end of September 1945

	District or State.	*R.O.*	*T.R.O.*	*Total.*
1	Anantapur	4,425	759	5,184
2	North Arcot	42,377	3,323	45,700
3	South Arcot	18,184	2,000	20,184
4	Bellary	3,912	470	4,382
5	Chingleput	12,640	3,177	15,817
6	Chittoor	9,025	912	9,937
7	Coimbatore	14,370	3,565	17,935
8	Cuddapah	6,063	428	6,491
9	East Godaari	7,850	2,606	10,456
10	West Godavari	7,342	1,143	8,485
11	Guntur	12,986	3,257	16,243
12	South Kanara	4,478	1,554	6,032
13	Kistna	6,617	2,161	8,778
14	Kurnool	7,558	722	8,280
15	Madras City	7,671	13,807	21,478
16	Madura	21,531	3,630	25,161
17	Malabar	48,082	13,861	61,943
18	Nellore	8,749	879	9,628
19	Nilgiris	1,168	914	2,082
20	Ramnad	13,794	2,087	15,881
21	Salem	17,852	2,125	19,997
22	Tanjore	14,631	5,302	19,933
23	Tinnevelly	22,584	3,698	26,282
24	Trichinopoly	12,416	5,119	17,535
25	Vizagapatam	19,400	1,592	20,992
26	Bangalore C. & M. Station.	1,730	4,060	5,790
27	Province of Coorg	259	646	905
28	Mysore State	5,824	6,220	12,044
29	Pudukottai State	1,288	431	1,719
30	Travancore State	56,231	24,025	80,256
31	Cochin State	11,712	6,891	18,603
32	Banganapalle State	106	..	106
33	*Outside areas*	3,732	1,220	4,952
		426,587	122,584	549,171

District or State.	*R.O.*	*T.R.O.*	*Total.*
Recruitment done for—			
Indian State Forces	926		
Madras Civil Pioneer Forces ..	3,713		
Madras Civil Labour Units ..	44,476		
Total ..	475,702	122,584	
Grand total ..			598,286

The above figures include 11,309 enlistments to the Royal Indian Navy, and 13,916 to the Royal Indian Air Force, but do not include about 100,000 men recruited for the Travancore and Cochin State Labour Units by the States concerned.

All classes throughout the area were enlisted without discrimination, but for the Sappers and Infantry the following proportions were found by experience to be most suitable :—

	PER CENT.
Adi-Dravidas and Christians ..	40
Tamils	20
Telugus	12½
Muhammadans	12½
Malayalis	15

The Royal Indian Artillery and the Signal Corps take more Malayalis.

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